

This research is published with kind support of the Balkan Trust for Democracy (BTD). All analysis and opinions put forward in this publication are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the policy and opinions of the BTD and the CCMR.



# **Security Policies in the Western Balkans**

**Miroslav Hadžić, Milorad Timotić and Predrag Petrović**

# **Security Policies in the Western Balkans**

**Editors:**

Miroslav Hadžić, Milorad Timotić and Predrag Petrović

**Publisher:**

Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, Gundulićev venac 48  
Tel: +381 11 32 87 226, office@ccmr-bg.org, www.ccmr-bg.org

**Research team:**

Adel Abusara, Enri Hide, Florian Qehaja, Islam Yusufi, Kenan Dautović, Maja Bjeloš, Geron Kamberi, Rajko Radević and Zvonimir Mahečić

**Proofreading:**

Zorica Nenadović and Vesna Vlasisavljević

**Design and computer typesetting:**

Saša Janjić

**ISBN 978-86-83543-86-1**

**copyright Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade**

**Printed by:**

GORAGRAF, Beograd

**Circulation:**

500 copies

Belgrade, 2010.

# Content

<b>Introductory Remarks</b>	<b>7</b>
<i>Enri Hide and Geron Kamberi</i>	
<b>Albania</b>	<b>9</b>
<i>Kenan Dautović</i>	
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	<b>35</b>
<i>Zvonimir Mahečić</i>	
<b>Croatia</b>	<b>61</b>
<i>Florian Qehaja</i>	
<b>Kosovo</b>	<b>81</b>
<i>Islam Yusufi</i>	
<b>Macedonia</b>	<b>97</b>
<i>Rajko Radević</i>	
<b>Montenegro</b>	<b>125</b>
<i>Maja Bjeloš</i>	
<b>Serbia</b>	<b>141</b>
<i>Adel Abusara</i>	
<b>Comparative Analysis</b>	<b>165</b>
<b>Authors' Biographies</b>	<b>187</b>



## Introductory Remarks

The collection of papers “Security Policies in the Western Balkans” is a result of the research performed within the framework of the project “Civil Society Capacity Building to Map and Monitor the Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans”. The main objective of the project was “fostering the knowledge of the civil society in overseeing, measuring and mapping the national security processes and in promoting the cooperation between regional civil society actors in order to improve regional transparency”. Think-tanks from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo participated in the project. A very complex and worked out methodology was applied in order to achieve a set of objectives defined by the Project.

The purpose of this Collection of papers was to provide a cross-section through the national strategic legislation in the area of national security of each participating country and Kosovo. In that way the Collection will facilitate the work on other products and documents within the frame of the Project. It also offers a good basis for comparative appraisal of the security legislation in the region of the Western Balkans. Furthermore, it will contribute to the transparency of the security sector in the mentioned region and to strengthening the influence of the media and the public on it. This will all contribute to a greater confidence and improve the security building in the Western Balkans.

The Collection will be distributed to the participating think-tanks from the Western Balkans and made available to the officials and to the media.

The case studies for the individual countries have been done by the researchers from the think-tanks participating in the Project, or by independent distinguished experts in this field. The opinions and estimates in the case studies are those of the authors, and cannot be attributed to their institutions, or to the CCMR or DCAF.

**Editors**





# Albania

Enri Hide and Geron Kamberi

## Strategic Documents' Context

Challenges the Republic of Albania is facing in the process of developing national security and defense strategies are not an exception, taking into consideration the answers that these strategies try to give to the role the Albanian state might have in the international system, to the threats and security risks as well as to responsible actors. After 1990, Albania found itself facing a new security environment, including new geopolitical situation in the Balkan region. The concept of national security, which until the '90s had been based on self-isolation, popular self-defense and the territorial distribution of all kinds of armed forces, was subsequently followed by the concept of "security as an interdependent issue", emanating from the political and military cooperation with the structures of collective defense, such as NATO, as well as international organizations focused on the internal political and institutional stability, such as the OSCE.

During 1992-1997 every Albanian government, the political elite and, more generally, the public opinion, sought to redefine their perception either of domestic security concerns, or of regional and international threats, based on the aforementioned instruments and orientations. Therefore, over this period, the context on which every strategic concept and document of security and defense was based, could be described in terms of finding new directions and recognizing threats and opportunities derived from domestic, regional and/or international security environment. But the troublesome year of 1997, and the following two years of domestic instability and regional conflicts, culminating with the NATO's intervention in Kosovo crisis, changed the public perception about threats, and created the necessary institutional framework to deal with drafting and further approval processes of security and defense strategic documents. In 1998, upon the adoption of the new Albanian Constitution, the institutional structure of national security policy found its foothold in the so-called "three pillars approach", discussed elsewhere in this paper.

The idea of development and approval of strategic documents related to security and defense policies was repeatedly emphasized in the first half of 2000. The period preceding 2000, in which the economic and political transition of Albania, after the fall of communism took place, could be divided into two phases. The first phase (1992-1997) coincided with the ruling period of a right-wing coalition led by the Democratic Party. This period ended with the violent riots that followed the 1997 collapse of pyramid schemes, leading, to a certain extent, to the failure of existing state security policies. Until 2000 the Albanian Parliament didn't pass any strategic document on defense and security issues. This was linked with a 'top-down approach', whose prevailing idea was that the state still had its primary role in security matters.



Such an approach was applied to the first series of strategic documents regarding security and defense approved during 2000. This period coincides with the second transition (1997-2005), when Albania was governed by a left-wing coalition, led by the Socialist Party. Due to the total collapse of the military and security structures that came as a result of the riots in 1997, the international community began providing a long-term assistance to the Albanian government. After the so-called “security emergency period” (1997-2000) Albanian government, mainly following the international community recommendations, began drafting the first strategic documents that would enable it to further respond to the security and defense challenges. To some extent, the context of these strategic documents met the willingness of Albanian government to display its improved performance in security, as well as the conditionality approach of the international community - to build a more comprehensive framework of security and defense policy in the country. In this sense, the process of drafting and endorsing these documents mostly followed a security agenda, which was mainly determined by the international actors. On the other hand, this process continued to follow the ‘*top-down approach*’, since the state retained its ownership over the defense and security.

### Albanian Strategic Framework

Title of the strategy	Adopted – date	Amendment review
1. Security Strategy Document of the Republic of Albania	2000	Yes, 2004.
2. Defence Policy Document of the Republic of Albania	2000	Yes, 2007.
3. Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania	2002	Yes, 2005.
4. Strategy of the Ministry of Defence Sector 2007-2013	2007	No
5. National Strategy on Integrated Border Management Action Plan	2007	No
6. National Strategy on Public Order Sector and State Police and its National Action Plan	2007	No
7. National Action Plan for the Fight against Trafficking in Vehicles Motor	2008	No
8. Strategy to Fight Organized Crime, Trafficking and Terrorism	2008	No

Table 1: Strategic documents of Albania

The first documents regarding national security and defense strategies were designed in 2000 and followed by the revised versions in 2002, 2004, 2005 and 2007.<sup>1</sup> The drafting period coincides with a relative stability in the economic and political spheres, as Albania had exceeded the difficult year of 1997, the political

<sup>1</sup> As mentioned above the first document belongs to year 2000 through Law No. 8572, dated 27.01.2000 “On approval of the Security Strategy Document of the Republic of Albania” (Official Journal No. 3, Year 2000, page 43) and was reviewed after four years by Law No. 9322, dated 25.11.2004 “On approval of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania” (Official Journal No. 98, Year 2004, page 6696)

unrest of 1998, and the Kosovo crisis of 1999. In this sense, the challenges, risks and threats that the Albanian government established in these documents took into account new local and regional context.<sup>2</sup> Generally, the approval and review phase went through a process closely associated exclusively with government security agencies. Although legislation provides that such strategic documents should be reviewed every 4 years, 2 of them (the ones passed in 2000 and 2004) were adopted only by teams of experts from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and Secret Services and particularly by the National Security Council (NSC) – an advisory body for security issues attached to the President.

Due to the fact that local expertise was still rather limited in terms of strategic planning in security and defense issues, the foreign experts affiliated to the Albanian security agencies had a crucial role in drafting these documents. The difference between strategic documents related to the national security policies and those related to defense and military lies particularly in the fact that the latter were more concrete due to the Armed Forces' objective to enter NATO and to implement the Membership Action Plan (MAP) adopted at the NATO Summit in 1999. However, it should be noted that the internal view of security institutions' experts (considered to be "security producers") prevails in the documents approved in the period from 2000 to 2007 while the feedback from security consumers (represented by community or special groups of interest) lacks.

It should be noted that Albania's efforts to build a new institutional relationship with the EU through the Process of Stabilization-Association (PSA) which took place in 1999, and NATO, through the Membership Action Plan (MAP) adopted at the Istanbul Summit in 1999, were also reflected in the above documents of strategic and doctrinaire framework. In this way, the concept of national security, presented in the relevant strategies, tried to maintain a balanced relation between the challenges and threats, as perceived by the Albanian state, and those perceived by international institutions.

### Strategic Hierarchy

As already mentioned above, the first security and defense strategies were approved in the same year: National Security Strategy (NSS) adopted in early 2000, National Defense Strategy (NDS) adopted later in 2000. The review process went through different phases linked with the respective legislative provisions (e.g. NSS should be reviewed every four years, while there is no legal provision pertaining to NDS). On the other hand, the gap between the review periods, somewhat greater in case of NDS (2000, 2007), had been filled by the frequent approvals of

<sup>2</sup> Regarding the adoption of the strategic framework of military doctrines they follow a series of documents approved by the Albanian parliament such as Law No. 8571, dated 27.01.2000 "On approval of the Defence Policy Document of the Republic of Albania (Official Journal No. 3, Year 2000, page 19); Law No. 8930, dated 25.07.2002 "On approval of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania" (Official Journal No. 50, Year 2002, page 1459) Law No. 9419, dated 20/05 / 2005 "On approval of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania" (Official Journal No. 46, Year 2005, page 1653); Council of Minister Decision No. 763 dated 14.11.2007 "On approval of the Strategy of the Ministry of Defence Sector 2007-2013 (Official Journal, No. 174, Year 2007, page 5332); Law No 9858, at 27/12/2007 "The adoption of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania" (Official Journal No. 184, Year 2007, p 5801)



the National Military Strategy (NMS) (in 2002, 2005, and 2007).

It is worth mentioning that NSS (2000, 2004) set a general framework for the subsequent development of NDS (2007) and National Military Strategy (NMS) (2002, 2005, and 2007). This is because the last two strategies are considered as parts of national security and it is mandatory for them to rely on its basic concepts, as determined by NSS. Given its specific goals and since it focuses on very important instruments of national security (such as the armed forces) NMS (2002, 2005, and 2007) is more detailed.

However, due to considerable similarities between NDS (2007) and NMS (2005, 2007) one can notice overlaps in certain issues and elements. However, second review of NSS (2008) hasn't been finished yet, although the timeframe for its revision was clearly set by the respective legislation. The fulfillment of this process [i.e. the second review of NSS 2008] is very important, and particularly necessary, in order to reflect all changes occurring in the environment of internal security (particularly as the membership in NATO is now a new reality). It also serves as a framework for reviewing and adjusting the strategic documents of NDS and NMS, in consistency with the new commitments and obligations arising from membership in NATO and with its new strategic concept.

### **Key factors in passing and updating Strategic Documents**

Regarding local key factors which have influenced the process of approving and updating the strategic documents a series of them need to be mentioned, such as: a) the change in the Albanian security environment, as well as the regional security environment; 2) the pressure of international community for developing comprehensive strategic security framework; 3) membership in NATO and the EU perspective, or the so-called "Euro-Atlantic integration agenda" (particularly NATO membership through stages imposed by Membership Action Plan (MPA); and 4) the legislation.

The change in security environment played a significant role in developing a strategic doctrinaire framework. After Kosovo's War, Albania witnessed a different security situation. It was reflected not only at a local level but at a regional one as well, where initiatives such as the Stability Pact or the Stabilization and Association Agreement encouraged Albanian government to undertake the reassessment of the security and defense policies.

Meanwhile, due to the fragile political stability and the riots that Albania had passed through immediately before that period [during '97], the international community exerted a lot of pressure influencing Albania's security and defense policies and providing recommendations for development a well-defined strategic framework. After 2001 parliamentary elections and the revival of "integration agenda" for the Balkans, the Albanian government declared as one of its main goals the advancement to NATO and the EU integration processes. Therefore, the perspective of NATO and EU membership acted as an impetus for the government. This is how the period of security and doctrinaire framework of Albania coincides with the beginning of Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO Membership. Therefore, both strate-

gies consider the prospective membership into NATO and EU as a main factor for accommodating the country into a safe and secure environment.

Such incentives allowed opportunity to Albania not only to represent the intended objectives and targeted performance of security institutions, but also to further testify through the strategic doctrine framework that was a factor of peace and stability in the Balkans. On the other hand, through the goals, human resources and skills put into strategic documents, it could demonstrate its willingness and readiness to cooperate with international security institutions, especially those of collective defense. Its commitment to approve such strategic documents, Albania also wanted to show that it is transformed from a “security consumer” to “security producer” country. However, NATO and the EU defined different approaches regarding Albania’s integration. Since EU membership process goes through a “tailor made approach” of SAP, the NATO integration process adopted an approach supported directly by the USA through Adriatic Chart 3, which significantly accelerated the Albania’s membership.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, the legal framework adopted by the Albanian government, obliges Albanian institutions to periodically review these strategic documents. While the national security document has so far been reviewed only twice, defense policy and military strategy have gone through a more intense phase of review. For instance, so far the Albanian government and parliament have approved: NSS (National Security Strategy) (2000, 2004), NDS (National Defense Strategy) (2000, 2007), and NMS (National Military Strategy) (2002, 2005, and 2007). As mentioned above, the factors which have contributed to a more frequent review of military strategy have particularly been associated with the steps undertaken to speed up the armed forces reforms to join NATO.

Another key factor that has influenced the strategic and doctrinaire framework review is related to the regional cooperation. Considering that regional cooperation was defined by Albania as an element that will boost and strengthen regional security, the country was involved in a series of initiatives with a regional character in this field.<sup>4</sup> Although the Stability Pact (later turned into the Regional Cooperation Council) failed to fully justify the high expectations of countries in the region to transform itself into the “*Marshall Plan for the Balkans*”, it tried to provide a model of regional cooperation despite the common perceived threats, such as illegal trafficking, border control or organized crime.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Declaration of Albanian Parliament, 18/03/2004, “On the resolution of Congress”, 04/01/2004, for membership of the 3 Adriatic Charter countries in NATO, before 2007 (Official Journal No. 23, Year 2004, Page 1189); Elira Hroni *Adriatic Charter 3- A development and influencing model in Western Balkans* ÇËSHTJE TË SIGURISË/SECURITY ISSUES, Quarterly Journal, No 13, Published by IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation), Tiranë, 2009, pg. 85-102.

<sup>4</sup> Law No. 8541, dated 21.10.1999 “On ratification of the SECI (Southeastern Cooperation Initiative) Agreement on cooperation for the prevention and fight against cross-border crime (Official Journal No. 31, Year 1999, Page 1175); Law No. 8639, dated 13.07.2000 “On ratification of the” Charter for the organization and functioning of Regional Center of SECI (SECI Center) for combating trans-border crime (Official Journal No. 22, Year 2000, Page 1078 )

<sup>5</sup> Florina Christiana (Cris) Matei *Combating against terrorism and organized crime :Common approach of Southeast Europe* ÇËSHTJE TË SIGURISË/SECURITY ISSUES, Quarterly Journal ,, Nr 14 , Published by IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation) , Tiranë, 2009, pg 84-111



Within this framework, NSS (National Security Strategy) (2000, 2004), NDS (National Defense Strategy) (2000, 2007), and NMS (National Military Strategy) (2002, 2005, 2007) of Albania also reflected the revival of Euro-Atlantic and regional integration process in the Balkans, followed by a series of important initiatives such as the ones mentioned above, which were among the key elements of security and doctrinaire framework objectives.<sup>6</sup> Given the fact that after 1999, EU undertook a series of actions to create a security zone of justice within member-countries, it adopted a “*security driven approach*” in relation to the Western Balkan countries which included Albania.<sup>7</sup> For this reason, the EU financial instrument, known as CARDS (2000-2006), spent approximately 60% on the security sector reform in Albania, including police, integrated border management, prisons, judiciary, and fight against organized crime.<sup>8</sup>

The interdependence characterizing the EU approach prompted Albanian government to implement all legal and institutional obligations. Within this framework, the National Plan for Implementation of SAA (2007-2013) is still considered important key factor containing specific obligations in the field of legislation and structural adjustments to security sector, and proves the interlinks between strategic documents and integration process.<sup>9</sup>

### **Institutions tasked with preparations of Strategic Documents**

Strategic documents on security and defense were supported by a previously approved legal framework. They specified the tasks and responsibilities of state security institutions. Since 2000, when the first strategy on national security was initiated, government efforts in this area were mostly encouraged by the suggestions and recommendations of international community. Given the fact that issues of security and defense still be considered an exclusive area of central government, along with drafting and approving processes, the Albanian government pursued a top-down approach which implies that experts of state institutions and those of international agencies, who provided an intensive technical assistance in security sector in Albania since 1997, held the upper hand. This is the manner in which the strategic documents, adopted and reviewed from 2000 to 2007, failed to follow the path of consultation and involvement of other actors. What contributed to this is the legacy from past times linked to the perception of security as an element rooted only in state institutions.

---

<sup>6</sup> Amadeo Watkins *NATO and Balkans: model for a wider integration* CËSHITJE TË SIGURISË /SECURITY ISSUES, Quarterly Journal, No 5, IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation), Tiranë, 2007, pg 41-51

<sup>7</sup> Barry J. Ryan *Development of EU security agenda: Security of Albania and Montenegro*, CËSHITJE TË SIGURISË/SECURITY ISSUES, Quarterly Journal, No 14, IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation), Tiranë, 2009, pg 30-61

<sup>8</sup> Jonida Hoxha *Organized crime in Balkan as a serious threat to EU security* CËSHITJE TË SIGURISË/SECURITY ISSUES, Quarterly Journal, No 14, IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation), Tiranë, 2009, pg 122- 136.

<sup>9</sup> Decision of Council of Ministers No. 317 dated 13.05.2005 “On approval of the National Plan for the Approximation of the domestic legislation with that of the EU’s and the implementation of commitments deriving from the SAA (Official Journal No. 35, Year 2005, Page 1288); Decision of Council of Ministers No. 463: dated 05.07.2006 “On approval of the National Plan for Implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement” (Official Journal No. 80, Year 2006, Page 23007)

The role of civil society in this process remained vague. Besides two or three think-tanks with a sort of experience and expertise in security matters, the rest were not yet able to provide any added value in this process.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, within the Albanian security institutions dominated a general idea that Albanian NGOs lacked the necessary capacities, especially in terms of strategic aspects of handling issues related to security and defense. However, the civil society's role in consolidating the national security policies has been widely recognized by academics and policy-makers.<sup>11</sup> So, the fact that during communism there were no independent civil society organizations<sup>12</sup> may be considered as one variable that led to poor democratic standards and authoritarianism in the early years of democracy in Albania. Despite such legacy, during the 90's civil society organizations and particularly the media became increasingly important as pressure groups; however not assuming the role of stakeholders of the democratic process.<sup>13</sup>

However, despite the 1998 Constitutional liberal framework which provided for freedom of association for any lawful purpose, the legal framework remained incomplete. In spite of contributing to the expansion of market and increasing the number of donors, the role of civil society in security sector reform in the last 10 years has been vague and insignificant. This is regardless of the fact that vast majority of common civil society structures have already been present in the country (such as non-governmental organizations, trade unions, professional associations, think-tanks, research institutes etc). However, they are too weak and need to develop further in order to efficiently contribute to Albania's security sector development. Non-governmental organizations, regardless steady progress concerning the involvement in security sector reform, lack authority as independent actors<sup>14</sup>. In addition, civic engagement in security issues remains low.

On the other hand Albania has only a limited number of influential NGOs and policy institutes. It is the duty of civil society to take greater responsibility for demanding progress and holding the government accountable as well as putting pressure to become a part in the process of consultations and drafting security

<sup>10</sup> Since its establishment in 1999, IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation) is focused primarily on security-related issues, especially in improving the performance of police, community policing, reform of intelligence services etc. Meanwhile since the adoption of the Adriatic 3 Charter on 4 May 2003 and till to Albania's full membership in NATO on 2 April 2009 it took a series of activities and initiatives to better explain the importance, rights, duties and costs stemming out of this membership for Albania. For more details, see: <http://www.idmalbania.org>; AIIS (New Institute for International Studies) has been more focused on the issues related to regional security, regional cooperation initiatives as well as international security environment. Recently, a group of its associate researchers have conducted a comprehensive research paper on security sector reform in Albania. For more details see: <http://www.aiis.org>

<sup>11</sup> Caparini, Marina, 'Civil Society and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector: A Preliminary Investigation'. Working Paper - No. 132, Geneva, January 2004

<sup>12</sup> Vickers, Miranda & Pettifer, James, "Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity", Hurst & Company, London 1997, p:12

<sup>13</sup> Henri Cili, "Security and Defence – Civil Society and the Media", in Fluri et al (eds.), 'Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives', Volume 1; Albania; Bulgaria; Croatia; A Self-Assessment Study

<sup>14</sup> European Commission, 'Albania stabilization report 2003', Brussels 26. 3. 2003 [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/albania/com03\\_339\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/albania/com03_339_en.pdf)





policies. There have been little or no expectations in the last years from citizens toward these organizations. This can be due to the fact that the civil society has little influence in legislative or other activity related to the government.<sup>15</sup> As such, with regard to national policy formulation, coordination between government, parliament and civil society remains frail. The inter-ministerial consultations with civil society actors on draft laws work poorly in practice.<sup>16</sup>

The state has often hindered the role of civil society and, conversely, civil society (CS) has turned into an obedient partner, severely undermining its role in a democratic society.<sup>17</sup> Participation of research institutes in the area of security reform policies has been rather limited, except for few cases such as: the involvement of civil society and other independent actors in the implementation of the Community Policing Strategy in Albania. Parliamentary expertise in specific matters related to the security sector has been provided mainly by experts from governmental institutions. The government, a product of political majority which holds power in parliament, drafts defense and security policies, obtains the approval from the majority of the parliament, and implements these policies through its government structures avoiding the independent actors. Such a system establishes a closed institutional framework, where the only opposing voice comes from the opposition in parliament, therefore undermining the role of civil society and, sometimes, even media.<sup>18</sup> As such, the laws and strategic documents are drafted predominantly by the executive branch itself and represented to the parliament for approval without any prior consultations with CS.<sup>19</sup>

As we have noted above, the role of international institutions like the OSCE, the UNDP, PAMECA (Police Assistance Mission of European Community in Albania), NATO (especially through Liaison Office in Tirana) was very important in the preparation stage of these strategic documents. It should be emphasized that since 1997, apart from several occasions, the abovementioned institutions had been

---

<sup>15</sup> Arbana. Lora, *Understanding Defence and Security In Correlation to Civil Society and Media*, Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2003, [http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:lrHWUcCdeiwJ:https://intra.css.ethz.ch/civsoc/ev\\_belgrade\\_031114Arbana.pdf+%22civil+society%22+%22security+sector%22+albania&hl=en](http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:lrHWUcCdeiwJ:https://intra.css.ethz.ch/civsoc/ev_belgrade_031114Arbana.pdf+%22civil+society%22+%22security+sector%22+albania&hl=en), Accessed February 2010

<sup>16</sup> European Commission, 'Albania, progress report 2008', Brussels 05.11.2008, [http://www.delalb.ec.europa.eu/files/albania\\_progress\\_report\\_2008.pdf](http://www.delalb.ec.europa.eu/files/albania_progress_report_2008.pdf), Accessed February 2010

<sup>17</sup> Cili. Henri, 'Security and Defence – Civil Society and the Media' in Trapans. J & Fluri. H, *Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe*, Vol.1 & II, DCAF & Center for Civil-Military Relations, 2003, <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=21335&nav1=4>, Accessed February 2010.

<sup>18</sup> Cili. Henri, "Security and Defence" – Civil Society and the Media' in Trapans et al , '*Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe*', Vol.1 & II, DCAF & Center for Civil-Military Relations, 2003, <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=21335&nav1=4>, Accessed February 2010.

<sup>19</sup> Arbana. Lora, *Understanding Defense and Security In Correlation to Civil Society and Media*, Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2003, [http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:lrHWUcCdeiwJ:https://intra.css.ethz.ch/civsoc/ev\\_belgrade\\_031114Arbana.pdf+%22civil+society%22+%22security+sector%22+albania&hl=en](http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:lrHWUcCdeiwJ:https://intra.css.ethz.ch/civsoc/ev_belgrade_031114Arbana.pdf+%22civil+society%22+%22security+sector%22+albania&hl=en), Accessed February 2010



present in a variety of security crises occurring in Albania (i.e. the disorders of 1997, the political unrest that accompanied the 1998 assassination of the former opposition deputy Azem Hajdari or the 1999 refugee crisis when refugees were violently deported from the conflict in Kosovo ) and thus were seeking a clear strategic framework that would define the roles, resources and tools to ensure security in the country.

Regarding the role of media in this process, it has been marked by marginalization, regardless of its formal weight as the fourth power within a democratic society. Such media apathy was related to the fact that the drafting and approval of these documents not only turned over the walls of state security institutions offices, but also because the media has not yet generated genuine analysts and journalist on security and defense issues. Almost all strategic documents adopted and reviewed from 2000 to 2007 were not subject of any significant analysis in the print or electronic media but were simply considered as routine news at the time of their approval in the Parliament.

On the other hand, the general public failed to perceive its importance and its role as one of the main consumers of security throughout this process. In this regard, many of these strategic documents bear security features which expose mostly the view of security producers rather than public perceptions and expectations of public pertaining to the national security environment. Due to the weakness of media and the lack of NGO's capacity, the general public, not only as a security consumer but also as a taxpayer entity as well, remains still poorly informed, especially about the financial costs entangled in the strategic doctrinaire framework. Even the specialized periodical publications on security and defense strategic issues have been almost completely absent or very rare. The recent initiatives to fill this gap include an attempt to make the process more transparent and bring different views by various groups of interest, especially from civil society.<sup>20</sup>

On the other hand, regardless of the large number of public and private universities in the country, the academic, scientific and research community was not properly represented and remained outside the process of drafting and reviewing the strategic documents. This happened not only because of the limited expertise (excluding specialized higher education institutions on security and defense issues such as Police and Military Academy), but also due to the lack of a more inclusive process on this issue. Meanwhile, the Albanian Parliament also entered a routine procedure for approval strategic documents without any hearing sessions or open debate with particular groups of interest or representatives of civil society.

In general, the process of drafting these documents remained an exercise of state security institutions, without inclusion and participation of non-military stakeholders interested in security and defense strategic issues.

---

<sup>20</sup> Only in February 2006, began publishing a quarterly magazine for security issues called Security Issues. It is published by the IDM and is the only periodical publication of a think-tank that addresses in particular issues related to practical aspects of security and defence strategies not only for Albania but beyond it. For more details, see: [http://www.idmalbania/security\\_issues](http://www.idmalbania/security_issues)



## Responsibilities in the process of preparation and passing strategic documents

It should be noted that in the aftermath of the so-called “first transition” (1992-’97) Albania continued to maintain its previous institutional security structures such as the Defense Council, which was seriously challenged by the uncommon situation of civil unrests that accompanied the collapse of pyramid schemes. Lack of a genuine and crosscutting concept of national security as well as the lack of experience, the weakness and existing politicization of security institutions brought about a security vacuum which was significant during the riots of 1997.<sup>21</sup> After the new Albanian Constitution entered into force in 1998, the institutional structure of national security policy was based on the so-called “*three pillars’ approach*”, including the Committee on National Security Policy (headed by and under the control of the Albanian Government), the National Security Council (headed by and under the control of the Albanian President), and the Parliamentary Committee of Security (Parliament). These are the key internal actors which initiate and implement the strategic doctrinaire framework of Albania.

In accordance with the legal framework adopted by the Albanian Parliament, the responsibility for passing security and defense strategic documents shall be performed in the following hierarchical order: a) Parliament; b) President of Republic; c) Council of Ministers; d) Prime Minister; e) Minister of Defense; f) General Staff; g) Chief of General Staff; h) Commanders of Armed Forces (land, sea and air).<sup>22</sup>

In this context, Parliament’s role is to approve laws on: a) strategic documents of Security and Defense Policy of the Republic of Albania; b) defense budget; and the number of Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania and their mission. Also, it provides the oversight activities over the Armed Forces by defining the powers and authority of command and direction of the Armed Forces for peacetime, emergency and wartime. A lot of these responsibilities are carried out by the Parliamentary Committee of Security, which handles large part of the control and accountability process on security institutions and armed forces.

---

<sup>21</sup> This approach is reflected in a set of rules that determine the progress of this structure such as Law No. 7528, dated 11.12.1991 “On the functions of the Council of Defence and the General Commander of Armed Forces (Official Journal No. 10 , 1991, Page 424); Decision of the Assembly No. 300, dated 02.03.1997 “On the appointment of special envoy from the Council of Defence (Official Journal No. 2, Year 1997, Page 47) Decision of the Assembly No. 319, dated 08.05.1997 “On establishment of the Council of Defence of the Republic of Albania (Official Journal No. 11, 1997, Page 291); Assembly Resolution No. 359 dated 27.04.1998” For a change in Decision No. 319, dated 05.08.1997 “On establishment of the Defence Council of the Republic of Albania (Official Journal No. 10, 1998, Page 359); Constitutional Court decision No. 77 dated 31.12.1998” The object of the request by the President of the Republic: Interpretation Article 178, paragraph 1 of the Constitution regarding the implementation of Law No. 7528, dated 11.12.1991 “On the functions of the Council of Defence and the General Commander of Armed Forces (Official Journal No. 3, Year 1999, Page 4 )

<sup>22</sup> Law No. 8671 dated 26.10.2000 “On the powers and authorities of commanding and the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania (Official Journal No. 37, Year 2000, Page 1786); Law No. 9194, dated 19/02/2004 For some additions and amendments to Law No. 8671 dated 26.10.2000 “On the powers of authorities of commanding and the strategic direction of Armed Forces (Gazette No. 16, Year 2004, Page 785)

Another important institutional stakeholder, with significant role in monitoring and implementing the strategic doctrinaire framework, is the President. Pursuant to the Albania's Constitution and laws, the President is the Armed Forces Commander General. In peacetime the President exercises the leadership of Armed Forces through Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, while in wartime s/ he leads them directly or through the Armed Forces Commander.<sup>23</sup> The President as Commander General of Armed Forces has full authority and control over the direction of Armed Forces as well as gives approvals for tasks and responsibilities: a) the proposal from the Minister of Defense on the organizational structure of the Armed Forces; b) the action plan of the Armed Forces in peacetime and establishing measures in case of emergency c) the distribution of the Armed Forces in peacetime and for mobilization; d) set benchmarks of readiness on reserve military units.

On the other hand, the National Security Council constitutes an important structure attached to the President of Republic. It provides him with the assistance regarding issues on security and strategic doctrinaire framework. The National Security Council is an advisory body to the President and it assists him in: a) matters of security and defense of the country; b) discusses and gives opinions on security and defense policy.<sup>24</sup> The members of the National Security Council are as follows: The Speaker of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Order, Finance, Transport, the Chief of Staff General and Director of National Intelligence Service. Depending of the issues discussed at the meeting of NCS, the President, may invite additional persons as permanent chairmen of parliamentary committees, ministers, heads of central state institutions, etc.

Pursuant to the Constitution and laws in place the executive branch of government has a significant role to play in terms of the drafting and implementation process of the strategic doctrinaire framework. In this case, the role of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, as part of the government and civilian control of armed forces, provides a series of commitment and accountabilities. This is why Prime Minister exercising authority over the Armed Forces, in peacetime is accountable to the Parliament and the President. He coordinates and oversees the activities of institutions that have obligations in compliance with the law "On approval of the security strategy document of the Republic of Albania."

On the other hand, the Minister of Defense is accountable to the Parliament, President and Prime Minister on defense policy implementation. His responsibility includes the following tasks: a) presenting defense policy documents and projects related to the number, structure and organization of the Armed Forces to the Council of Ministers; b) submitting (to the Council of Ministers) for approval the Defense's annual budget; c) providing long-term plans for development and modernization of the Armed Forces and special programs in defense, seeking financial support; d) approving allocation of defense budget.

<sup>23</sup> Law No. 8467 dated 31.03.1999 "On the powers of the President as Commander General of the Armed Forces and National Security Council (Official Journal No. 10, 1999, Page 311).

<sup>24</sup> Law No. 8671 dated 26.10.2000 "On the powers and authorities of commanding and the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania (Official Journal No. 37, Year 2000, Page 1786).



The Defense Policy Council has been established as an advisory body under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense. Its members are: Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief of General Staff, Deputy Chief of General Staff, commanders of land, navy and air force, commander of Training and Doctrine, commander of Logistics Support, the Director of Legal Department, and other persons invited by the Minister.<sup>25</sup>

The military structures directly engaged in the implementation of the strategic doctrinaire framework became increasingly important given their new duties and responsibilities prescribed by the law. Therefore, the General Staff constitutes the highest military structure with unique command in the Armed Forces. It is responsible for creating a joint and unified military land, sea and air force which should be able to fulfill its constitutional mission.<sup>26</sup> General Staff acts as the headquarters of the unified land, navy and air forces and is responsible for: a) joint preparation and training of all three services ; b) facing threats or risks that might endanger security in the country; c) planning and programming of defense ; d) undertaking strategic assessment of threats or risks and taking measures to tackle them.<sup>27</sup>

An important role is also played by the Chief of General Staff. He is accountable to the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense for military training and readiness of the Armed Forces as well as management and organization of military and non-military actions. The Chief of Staff is the senior military adviser of the President of Republic, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. Indeed, he has the following duties and responsibilities: a) approves the military doctrines of the land, sea and air armed forces; b) approves the plans and actions of military units of the three armed forces: land, sea and air for peacetime; d) displays the structure, number and organization of the Armed Forces.

As we already mentioned above, the players to implement the strategic and doctrinaire framework of Albania are determined by the institutional hierarchy of national security in the country. Part IV of the national security strategy (on the leadership of NSS of the Republic of Albania) is referred to the constitutional basis of leadership represented by three main institutions: the Parliamentary Committee of Security, the National Security Council of President, and the National Security Policy Committee headed by the Prime Minister. This structure reflects the constitutional model of the Republic of Albania as a parliamentary Republic, but on the other hand it does not specify in details the roles and responsibilities of other actors, especially the so-called security executive institutions.<sup>28</sup> In this sense, it determines only the constitutional relations between these institutions where the Parliament holds the highest authority, since constitutionally Albania is a Parliamentary Republic; but *there is no clear definition for actors most responsible*

---

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> The Decision of Constitutional Court No. 26, dated 24.04.2001 with subject: Interpretation of clause 1 of Article 12 of the Constitution “ the Armed Forces provide the country’s independence and territorial integrity and protect its Constitutional order” (Official Journal No. 20 , 2001, Page 629)

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> While the effort to change the content of the concept of security was also reflected in the renaming of the Council of Defence in the National Security Council and its functions .Also see the Law No. 8467, dated 31.03.1999 “On the powers of the President the Republic, as General Commander of the Armed Forces and National Security Council (Official Journal No. 10, 1999, Page 311)

*for its implementation.* The fact that the Prime Minister initiates every four year the review process of NSS (National Security Strategy) implies somehow a greater role of the executive branch.

In this context, the most important issue these documents must provide, apart from the means and ways of securing the nation, is a clear and detailed response to the division of roles within the hierarchy of the country's security paradigm.

### **Internal coherence and soundness of the Strategic Framework**

The set of documents which belongs to the strategic policies concerning security, defense and military are, among others, one of the indicators on how security sector aims to coordinate their activities in the future. Given the fact that Albania is by its Constitution a parliamentary republic, the tasks and responsibilities of the Albanian Parliament in the area of security and defense are reflected in the democratic oversight and accountability. On the other hand, taking into account the hierarchical structure of security institutions, the government has duty to implement the strategic doctrinaire framework through relevant ministries and agencies.<sup>29</sup>

It should be stated that the division of tasks and roles between the legislative and executive powers in the fields of security and defense is already consolidated through a series of laws and practices. Under the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Albanian Parliament is the highest legislative body from which all other institutions derive their legitimacy. Therefore, in the case of Albania, duties and functions assigned to the Parliament allow it to exercise control and supervision on drafting strategic documents and government's implementation process. However, Parliament's role can be strengthened to ensure an effective oversight and professional control over the processes of civilian control of army and security structures as well as to guarantee a better coordination and use of financial resources to the benefit of national security. In this context, the Parliamentary Security Committee could expand its expert advisory network not only with the full-time professionals, but with the independent experts, when dealing with issues related to the security and defense or strategic doctrinaire framework.

Although it seemed that after 2000 and 2004 when the Republic of Albania strategies of security had been adopted, much control and operational lead was given to the parliament through increasing the powers of its security and interior affairs committee, the events after Gërdec in 2008, which will become an important landmark regarding security and strategic issues in Albania, have shown that the government have gained control and more power over fundamental security institutions. Such approach raised concerns from Albania's Western security partners which were indeed clearly reflected in the draft-law regarding some changes with respect to the responsibilities of the intelligence services of Albania.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Law No. 8417 dated 10.21.1998 For the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania (Office Journal No. 28, 1998, Page 1073)

<sup>30</sup> See, for more, Albanian newspapers during February-April, 2010.



On the other hand, despite the fact that the current law clearly defines the advisory role of the National Security Council attached to the President of Republic, the existence of an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs as an advisory body close to the Prime Minister rather creates a “*hidden institutional rivalry*”, than helps better coordination of the activities of state security institutions. For this reason, the overall coordination and cooperation of security institutions to ensure a comprehensive strategic doctrinaire framework remains one of the primary tasks of the state. The preparation of these strategic documents need to pass through a professional assessment of CRT process (Challenges, Risks and Threats) which ensures as much as possible a wider participation across the institutions and stakeholders assigned to implement it in practice.

It would be a sign of coherence if, in the process of preparing and implementing these strategies, involvement from a range of experts from various institutional actors becomes greater. It is evident that there is a certain degree of soundness in the structures of democratic security and defense forces oversight (mainly in parliamentary and governmental structures) well as certain involvement of the civil society in the processes of drafting and implementing these strategies. This involvement is yet to be improved and will be discussed below.

The Constitution has clearly defined roles and basic security concepts of the country. They are founded on peace, good neighborhood and active participation in collective defense structure. So, these notions have paved the way to the general principles which support the strategic doctrinaire framework.

However, the existing laws should provide more details regarding the steps in the process of drafting and approving strategic documents. Hence, it would be possible to enable inclusion of many experts and NGO representatives thus not leaving this process to the discretion of state security institutions. In this way, the legitimacy of the process would be strengthened and the necessary support from general public would be in place.

### **Risk Analysis’ Results**

The national security and defense strategy documents should ascertain that the core concept of security strategy is mainly centered on “*respect of the rule of law*” and the “*integration approach*”.<sup>31</sup> National security and military strategies as well as the defense policy documents have defined the challenges, threats and risks following a top-down approach which implies that the relevant security institutions were not receptive towards a more comprehensive approach (i.e. to measure in advance the public perception on threats and risks). As a result, the challenges, threats and risks in these documents are ranked in three levels: *local, regional* and

---

<sup>31</sup> See Law No. 9322, dated 25.11.2004 “On approval of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania” (Official Journal No. 98, Year 2004, page 6697) and Law No. 9858, at 27/12/2007 “The adoption of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania” (Official Journal No. 184, Year 2007, page 5802)

*global*, lacking a clear prioritization and differentiation.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, in the case of NSS it was the criteria related to the local level which was pursued rather than a comprehensive approach which would seek to build on a detailed classification of these.

Security strategies and doctrinaire framework at local level identify four categories as threats and risks for Albania: *organized crime, terrorism, disasters and problems of transition*. In the case of organized crime, the term refers to various forms of illegal trafficking, primarily drugs, human beings, conventional weapon, etc. In the case of Albania, special emphasis has been put on internal security, illegal migration, such as Albanian immigrants in other countries or uncontrolled settlement of population within the country. But one can also find in the NSS vague and insufficiently elaborated notions perceived as risks – terms such as “*public opinion misinformation*” or “*insufficient development of education, science and culture*”.

With respect to the threats and challenges in regional security, it bears mentioning that national security strategy and military strategy have been influenced by the historical heritage and geo-strategic importance of the country as key factors in determining the security environment. In this context, national security document has clearly defined that the “*destabilization of the region through revival of desire for fulfillment of exaggerated nationalistic projects and development of trans-national ethnic conflicts, represents a danger for the security of the Republic of Albania*”.<sup>33</sup>

On the other hand, in both documents the policymakers’ conviction is officially acknowledged - the neighbors are not the major threat to regional security, it rather has an internal origin, such as political instability, weak economy and organized crime. In the case of Albania, the so-called “*Albanian national issue*” is set among the highest priorities of the strategic security objectives and suggested that the “*Albanian national issue is going to be achieved through European and Euro-Atlantic integration*”. So, Albania seems more focused on issues of Europeanization by avoiding any nationalistic approach and seek the solution of “*Albanian issue*” within the framework of future membership in NATO and EU.

Meanwhile, in the first survey regarding security threats and NATO integration conducted by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in April-May 2007 the respondents were asked to rank threats as per the given risk evaluation scale rating from 1 to 6 (the highest number indicates the highest risk). They ranked threats in the following order: corruption (4.6); poverty and economic stagnation

<sup>32</sup> For an analytical review of the document of national security strategy and perceived threats see also: Sotirag Hroni, Gjen.Let (in release) Pellumb Qazimi: View from Albania - Study on assessment of regional security threats and challenges in the Western Balkans, in Study on the Assessment threats of Regional Security and Challenges in the Western Balkans, Darko Istvam Gyarmati & Stancic (eds.), DCAF (Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), 2007, p. 57.

<sup>33</sup> Kastriot Islami (former Albanian Foreign Minister 2003-2005) National Security at the context of regional risks and threats (Proceedings of the International Conference: “On the development of the national security strategy”, Tirana 21 September 2007, organized by IDM & DCAF), Publishing Houese, Toena, Tirana, 2007, page 26





(4.4); failure of democratic reforms (3.91); and organized crime (3.64).<sup>34</sup> These four elements were considered even more dangerous for national security than external factors, like terrorism, regional conflicts, and so on.

In this way, a clear definition of CRT at national, regional and global level remains an incomplete structure, particularly within the national security strategies documents. Only a “*map of risks and threats*”, based on clear criteria, can help determining the most holistic basic concept on national security and defense strategies. Differentiation and prioritization of CRT should necessary be associated with other aspects rather than traditional security concepts such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. Adhering to these concepts, the national security strategy has lost the opportunity to be designed in the human security framework depending on the importance that human security presents in certain areas (i.e. food safety, environmental, social, and political, road etc.).<sup>35</sup>

From the viewpoint of CRT classification, the both security documents simply follow an order of geographical distribution of risks (global, regional or local), however, each of them lacks a definition of the scale and intensity of these in short, medium and long term.

### **Instruments providing Security**

The prevailing concept of a “*two track approach*” which links a short and mid-term objective, such as EU/NATO membership, with a long term position, such as respect of the rule of law, presents fundamental element of the Albanian national security and military strategy documents. Consequently, this concept tries to create an environment of internal security (rule of law) by relying mainly on external tools (NATO and EU accession). On the other hand, taking into account the regional security challenges, the documents paid a special attention to Albania as a factor which “*produces and exports security*” through the implementation of good neighborhood policy and regional dialogue. Through these concepts, national security and defense strategies tried to adapt to the principle of *equal distance*, especially in relation to the nation and developments in former republics of Yugoslavia where ethnic Albanians live.

On the other hand, regarding security objectives in short, mid and long terms, national security strategy showed certain shortcomings. For example, the short and medium priority is defined as long-term while the opposite should be true. This “*time mistake*” is an evidence of the lack of detailed typology of risks and threats,

<sup>34</sup> Besnik Baka: Albania : Threats and perceptions of security ÇËSHITJE TË SIGURISË/SECURITY ISSUES, Quarterly Journal , No 11 , Published by IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation) , Tiranë, 2009, pg 74-90

<sup>35</sup> For the involvement of human security concept in a document of national security strategy see Prof. Rexhep Mejdani (former President of the Republic of Albania 1997-2002) in: Some thoughts on revising the document on national security strategy publication: On the development of strategy national security (Summary of proceedings of the International Conference: “On the development of the national security strategy”, Tirana 21 September 2007, organized by IDM & DCAF), Publishing Houese. Toena, Tirana, 2007, page 26); See also: Backgrounder on human security in Albania, IDM, Tirana 2009, p. 60, which is the first paper drafted by a group of experts at the IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation) in terms of human security concept



which must correspond to the precise provisions on how to cope with them.<sup>36</sup> The whole concept of security prevailing in the document of national security strategy of Albania seems to be trying to get clearly defined horizontally, but without a concrete action model. In this way, part III and IV of NSS remains at the level of risk assessment but the general framework of actions (accompanied with the necessary tools and resources needed to achieve the objectives) is overlooked. This could be considered a common feature of national security strategies of the Western Balkan states, which after a prolonged political and economic transition, are changing their approach to security sector reform. As Laszlo Polti highlights *“as regards their essential issue, meeting the security perceptions, with the exception of modern terminology and length, the level of these documents being processed is at the initial stage”*.<sup>37</sup>

In the case of Albania, the process of design and implementation of national security and defense strategies is generally developed in accordance with specific assessments of the country's “weight” in the structure of regional and global security. This somehow has led to *“predefined instruments”* that can be used to achieve sustainable security in the country and abroad and which are necessarily attached to the security providers, such as NATO. According to the definition made in both documents, a set of elements labeled as *“instruments of national power”* will enable achievement of the country's security. They include: a) diplomacy; b) protection of public order and safety; c) financial and economic policies; d) civil protection and health & environment<sup>38</sup>.

Along with respective sub-elements they constitute a sequence *en-bloc* which lacks a clear division between *hard and soft instruments* of security, mainly implying a combination of them. Given the division of CRT at the local, regional and global level, it is clear that the instruments used are not of the same prominence. For example, the instruments of diplomacy and defence are more prominent at the regional and global security level, unlike the local level, where financial instruments of economic policy or protection of public order and human safety take the lead. Diplomacy is top ranking instrument and it coincides with the objective of the Albanian government to act in a security environment without use of force as an instrument achieving security. This obviously implies the regional and global security and relationship with other stakeholders and international actors.

Meanwhile, in paragraph 5 of national security strategy (NSS) it is stated that *“the strategy supports the creation of a security planning system by giving priority to achieving a concrete outcome under the concept: “Who does what, when, and in co-*

<sup>36</sup> In Chapter II: OBJECTIVES OF SECURITY (page 5) in Law No. 9322, dated 25.11.2004 “On approval of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania” (Official Journal No. 98, Year 2004, page 6696).

<sup>37</sup> Laszlo , Poti Assessment of the security of the Western Balkans and a comparative analysis of the threat perception in the countries of the region Darko Istvam Gyarmati & Stancic (eds.), DCAF (Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), 2007, p. 9-50)

<sup>38</sup> Law No. 9322, dated 25.11.2004 “On approval of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania” (Official Journal No. 98, Year 2004, page 6697) and Law No. 9858, at 27/12/2007 “The adoption of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania” (Official Journal No. 184, Year 2007, page 5802)



*operation with whom*.<sup>39</sup> Through this definition, the document of national security strategy is attached to the concept focused more on the producers rather than consumers of security sector.

### **Strategies vs Strategic Defense Review**

For the main political and institutional actors of the country, periodical review of the fundamental security document of the Republic of Albania, known as “National Security Strategy” is necessary and legally obligatory<sup>40</sup>. This review raises a lot of concerns mainly due to the dynamics of the security environment developments either at the local, regional or even global level. Since 2007, Albania’s strategic documents have not changed. More frequent review of military strategy (2002, 2005, and 2007) was accelerated due to prospective membership in NATO. The last review of defense strategy document was conducted nearly two years before Albania became a full-fledged member of NATO (3 April 2009). This document remains in effect and has not yet been subject to any reviews since it also refers to the ministry of defense strategy for the period from 2007 to 2013. It became an important guiding document to the armed forces in an effort to meet objectives foreseen in the strategic doctrinaire framework. This later facilitated the invitation extended, at the Bucharest Summit on 3 April 2008, to the Republic of Albania to become a member of NATO.

Having completed “the NATO membership phase” and given the fact that it became a full-fledged member of the Alliance, Albania shall now undergo a new phase of development of its defense strategy. In line with the strategy new concept Albania is required to conduct a reassessment of its financial and human capacity as well as analysis of commitments arising from the participation in NATO international missions.

### **Relation between Strategic Framework and Security Sector Reform**

The approval and review process of strategic and doctrinaire framework of Albania have also spurred reforms in the field of security sector defining it as the main instrument for Euro-Atlantic integration. In this way, Albania began walking much faster towards NATO accession, rather than EU, due to the geopolitical reasons. The so-called “*two speeds*” (two-track) approach encouraged also a review process especially of military and defense strategies. Thus, reforms in AAF (Albanian Armed Forces) were prompted by the commitment of Albania to become a member of NATO, aiming to ensure not only its security in a troubled region but also to further consolidate democracy through non-military conditionality that derived from the so-called Washington’s criteria. Given that Albania was among the first countries that joined the Council of the North-Atlantic Cooperation, in June 1992, and the Partnership for Peace Program in February 1994, there was also a need to adapt the goal for becoming a full NATO membership by reviewing military and

---

<sup>39</sup> Ibid p.2

<sup>40</sup> Based on Law 9322, Ar. 84, November, 2004.

defense strategies.<sup>41</sup>

Under the National Defense Strategy in April 2002, the Albanian government approved the implementation of Partnership Goal package which was part of a new plan called AAF Structure and Implementation Plan for the period 2002-2010. NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP mechanism) established a program that supported assistance in reforming and restructuring the Albanian armed forces, including: a) assistance in establishing conceptual framework of the armed forces; b) beginning of a structural reorganization of the army; c) management of specific problems as ammunition etc.<sup>42</sup> Almost all changes and reforms within the AAF were the result of the goal to obtain NATO membership, which was set as the primary objective in the area of security for the Republic of Albania in NSS (2000, 2004) and NDS (2000, 2002; 2005; 2007).

The whole process of reforms within AAF was finalized with Albania becoming full-fledged member of NATO Alliance during the Bucharest Summit on 3-4 April 2008.<sup>43</sup> The security sector reform within the Armed Forces, stemming from the strategic and doctrinaire framework of Albania, fostered the belief of *Albania being de facto member* of NATO and had thus strengthened Albania's position as "security exporter" through its participation in operations such as "Iraqi Freedom" led by the US coalition forces, NATO/PfP International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan under Turkish and Italian command, Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina under German command and recently in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) under French command.<sup>44</sup> Within the region, the Albanian army remained a part of the Multinational Peace Force for South-eastern Europe (MPFSEE).<sup>45</sup> The purpose of this multilateral force is to prevent conflicts and support peace, including peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building, and humanitarian interventions within and outside the Balkans under the mandate

<sup>41</sup> Law No. 7816, dated 20.04.1994 "On ratification of the Framework Document on Partnership for Peace between the Republic of Albania and North Atlantic Treaty Organization-NATO North (Official Journal No. 6, Year 1994, Page 305)

<sup>42</sup> Council of Minister Decision No. 763 dated 14.11.2007 "On approval of the Strategy of the Ministry of Defence Sector 2007-2013 (Official Journal, No. 174, Year 2007, page 5332);

<sup>43</sup> Resolution of the Parliament of Albania "For Albania membership in NATO" (Official Journal No. 7, Year 2008, Page 197)

<sup>44</sup> Decision of the Albanian Parliament No. 7, dated 15.10.2001 "Albania - Members of the wide Alliance against international terrorism (Official Journal No 4 7 Year 2001 Page1504); Law No. 8932, dated 25.07.2002 "For deployment a security military force in Afghanistan within the framework of the international coalition against terrorism ISAF (Official Journal No. 47, Year 2002, Page 1416; Law No. 9315, dated 11.11.2004 "For deployment of Albanian Peacekeeping company in Bosnia - Herzegovina to take part in EU Operation" ALTHEA (Official Journal No. 95, Year 2004, Page 6565); Law No. 9927, dated 09/06/2008 "The adoption of the normative act with the power of the Law No. 3, at 28/05/2008" The deployment in the Republic of Chad and Central African Republic of armed forces company of Republic of Albania to participate in Operation EUFOR / TCHAD / RCA EU (Official Journal No102Year 2008, Page 4493)

<sup>45</sup> Law No. 8640, dated 13.07.2000 "On ratification of the" Second Additional Protocol of Agreement for the establishment Multinational Peace Force of the Southeast Europe (MPFSEE) (Official Journal No. 22, Year 2000, Page 1080); Law No. 8816, dated 20/09/2001 for the ratification of the Third Additional Protocol of the Agreement of Multinational Peacekeeping Force of Southeast Europe (MPFSEE) (Official Journal No. 47, Year 2001, Page 1483)



of the UN, the OSCE or other international bodies. Since February 2007 SEEBRIG participated for 6 months in the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan which was an operational test of its credibility.<sup>46</sup>

All these initiatives present an evidence of a stronger commitment of Albania's security forces to become integrated and operational within the structures of collective defence, not only globally but also at the regional level.<sup>47</sup> However, Albania's participation at the Bucharest Summit on 3-4 April 2008, NATO puts it in front of the other conditions of deepening the integration process of the armed forces and security structures to a collective defence organization. The new role of a country, as a member of NATO, requires quantitative and qualitative changes in terms of internal and external security challenges. This shall serve as an incentive to Albania in further stages of adaptation of its strategic and doctrinaire framework.

At the same time, national security strategy determines the protection of public order and human safety as main instrument for achieving the security. As a result, this prompted a reform, particularly the reform within the State Police as it is one of the main actors in the security sector. Since the 1997 riots, the reforms of state police have been implemented under the EU Police assistance missions.<sup>48</sup> In this framework, the 1999 State Police Law laid down the foundation for transformation of state police into a public service, taking into consideration previous steps taken back in 1998 when Albania's Constitution separated the police force from AAF.<sup>49</sup> For the first time, this law also made distinction between political and senior police leadership introducing the posting of Police Director General. This step serves as another indicator of the reform developments.

Meanwhile, due to rising international pressure on the Albanian government to fight organized crime and corruption, the state initiated drafting of a set of strategies specifically targeted at the improvement of police reform and increasing pub-

---

<sup>46</sup> Law No. 9471, dated 06.02.2006 "On approval of the normative act with the power of the Law No. 5, dated 28.12.2004 For sending Albanian military personnel in the composition of Staff SEEBRIGU-t in support of peace mission (ISAF) in Afghanistan led by NATO (Official Journal No. 8, Year 2006, Page 162).

<sup>47</sup> Amb. Pellumb Qazimi *Regional ownership on security issues* CËSHTJE TË SIGURISË/SECURITY ISSUES, Quarterly Journal , Nr 7, Published by IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation), Tiranë, 2008, pg 25-35); Another evidence of such commitment of Albanian government to regional cooperation it was even the Decision of Council of Ministers No. 134 dated 18.02.2005 "On establishment of the Secretariat of the South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial Coordination Committee of the (SEDM-CC and Politico-Military Steering Committee of South-Eastern Europe (PMSC / MPFSEE) in Albania (Official Journal No. 14, 2005, Page 542)

<sup>48</sup> Law No. 8896, dated 16.05.2002 "On ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the European Community on the status of the Police Assistance EC (ECPA) in Albania (Official Journal No. 25, Year 2002, Page 810); Law No. 9152, dated 06.11.2003 "On ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Albania and the European Community on the Status of the Police Assistance Mission of the European Community in Albania (PAMECA) (Official Journal No. 100, Year 2003, Page 4301 )

<sup>49</sup> Law No. 8553, dated 11.11.1999 "On State Police (Official Journal No. 33, Year 1999, Page 1280). When right wing collation came in power in July 2005 it initiated a new one as Law No. 9749, dated 04.06.2007 "On State Police (Official Journal No. 73, Year 2007, Page 2171). It raised a lot of concerns among certain experts because there were allegations that it was used to remove certain high rank police officers from their job positions. However both laws were drafted and assisted by EU Police Assistance Mission

lic safety. Regarding security aspects in the field of public order and combating organized crime, the strategic and doctrinaire framework of Albania has been recently equipped with a set of strategies adopted by the Albanian government.<sup>50</sup>

## Conclusions

In conclusion we can note that strategic framework on security and defense, relying upon an appropriate assessment of human and financial capacities, constitutes the right step towards ensuring a safe environment in the country and beyond. At this very historical moment, any strategic analysis may go through traditional (or "semi-traditional") aspects, particularly those of the geo-economic field, showing potentially high level of stability and greater opportunities for cross-border cooperation and foreign investments. It is for this reason our diplomacy, based on the fundamental document of our foreign policy (upcoming strategy of national security), should be even more oriented towards the economic and pragmatic realm. It should identify concrete alliances, properly classify priorities (taking into account the reality), identify geo-economic and geo-strategic position in accordance with our national goals determined by the strategic doctrinaire framework.

On the other hand, the strategic documents that include specific strategies for security, defense and military, should be harmonized among themselves and should go through a transparent process of proper evaluation of CRT and subsequent adjustments in accordance with the available resources and security institutions in the country. That is why legal framework exists. It facilitates activities and fills in the gaps in coordination among state security institutions. In the case of Albania, one can notice lack of coherence and an overlapping between the three strategies: National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy, and Military Strategy. They deal with the concept of national security without a clear definition of the respective roles. We can also note a lack of a model for evaluating the risks, threats, and challenges coming either from local sources or from the international environment. In this context, the strategic documents of Albania have to be formulated in accordance with the clear timetable, where risks and challenges need to be faced in short, mid, and long terms.

<sup>50</sup> Decision No. 674 dated 07/12/2001 for approval of the National Strategy to Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings (official bulletin No. 59, Year 2001, Page 1859); Decision No. 292 dated 07.05.2004 "On approval of the Strategy National Anti - drug 2004-2010" (Official Bulletin No. 31, Year 2004, page 2539); Decision No. 171 dated 11.02.2005" On approval of the National Strategy against Child Trafficking and Protection of Children Victims of Trafficking and an additional CMD No. 8, dated 05.01.2002 "On establishment of the State Committee to Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings" (Official Bulletin No. 21, Year 2005, page 808); Decision No. 668 dated 29.09.2007 "On approval of the National Strategy" Integrated Border Management Action Plan (Official Bulletin No. 147, Year 2007, Page 4087); Decision No. 14, at 09/01/2008 "On approval of the Public Order Sector Strategy and Plan Enforcement Action Strategy 2007-2013 State Police (Official Bulletin No. 5, Year 2008, Page 99); Decision No. 522, at 23/04/2008 "On approval of the National Action Plan for the Fight against trafficking in vehicles motor (Official Bulletin No. 72, Year 2008, Page 3156); Decision No. 1083, at 23/07/2008 To approve the National Strategy to Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings 2008-2010 and Supplementary Document "National Strategy for Combating Trafficking Children and the Protection of Children Victims of Trafficking (Official Bulletin No. 131, Year 2008, Page 5775); Decision No. 1140, 30/07/2008 For approval at inter-sector Strategy to Fight against organized crime, trafficking and terrorism (Official Bulletin No. 138, Year 2008, Page 6124)



Defining a strategic concept of defence and security (based on power and “weight” Albania has as a regional and global actor), remains a priority task for any strategic doctrinaire framework. Due to Albania’s membership in a collective defense organization, such is NATO, it is more than important to assess all security impacts, risks and benefits stemming from such engagement.

Due to the abovementioned reasons, the process of formulation, design and implementation of the concept of national security strategy should be developed in accordance with specific assessments of the country’s weight in the global structure of regional security. Albania’s membership in NATO, obtained at the Bucharest Summit on 3-4 April 2009, brought new conditions in the process of assessment of security threats. As a NATO member country, Albania is now required to conduct quantitative and qualitative changes as regards security challenges inside and outside the country. This is because NATO membership puts Albania in the new position of structural adjustments in the security sector.

From the risk classification perspective, the national security strategy should not simply follow geographic distribution (global, regional or local), but within each of them it should determine the degree of intensity and the ways to face them in short, medium and long terms. Differentiation and prioritization of these risks should necessary be associated with other aspects, rather than the use of classical concepts such as the sovereignty, territorial integrity, development of the rule of law, democratic institutions, freedoms and human rights etc. In this way, the national security strategy should be designed taking as spotlight an interlinked concept of human security depending on the importance that it presents in certain areas (i.e. food, environmental, social, political, road security etc.).<sup>51</sup> The so-called “institutional triangle” (Parliament, Government, President) has to play the most important role in achieving a stable security environment. Such assumptions lead to a further legal clarification, by better separating their roles within security field, in order to guarantee and coordinate a sustainable performance of all relevant institutions.

Regarding the process of drafting, approving, and reviewing national security documents, the necessary amendments should be made at the Albanian legislation, providing for a broad participatory approach, including the civil society actors and stakeholders. Also, the final version of these strategic documents has to be approved by the Parliamentary Commission, through a qualified majority vote and by setting a clear timetable to periodically monitor and review the institutions responsible for its implementation. Based on their competencies and procedures the Commission can hold hearings with interest groups and representatives of civil society, thus making this process more inclusive and accountable.

Bearing in mind the recent political and economic developments in Albania, every new strategic document of national security and defense should pay a greater attention to critical infrastructure. This infrastructure is growing rapidly, including, not only traditional infrastructure (road tunnels, bridges, oil pipelines, dams) but also networks of electronic databases, important for human security (fingerprint,

---

<sup>51</sup> See also: *Backgrounder on human security in Albania*, IDM, Tirana 2009, p. 60, which is the first paper drafted by a group of experts at the IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation) in terms of human security concept

blood groups, fiscal or banking information).

Finally, taking into consideration the size, resources and problems inherited from the past communist regime, as well as the long transition period, it is important that Albania now moves towards creation of a genuine concept and strategic doctrinaire framework of national security focusing more on human security.

## Bibliography

Arbana, L. (2003) '*Understanding Defence and Security In Correlation to Civil Society and Media*', Tirana: Albanian Institute for International Studies.

*Backgrounder on human security in Albania.* (2009) Tirana: IDM.

Baka, B. (2009) 'Albania: Threats and perceptions of security', *Cështje të Sigurisë/ Security Issues*, vol. 11, pp. 74-90.

Caparini, M. (2004) 'Civil Society and Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector: *A Preliminary Investigation*', Working Paper No. 132, Geneva: DCAF.

Cili, H. (2003) 'Security and Defence – Civil Society and the Media' in Trapans, J. and Fluri, H, in *Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe*, Vol. 1 & 2, Geneva: DCAF and Center for Civil-Military Relations. [26. 3. 2003]

European Commission (2003), 'Albania stabilization report 2003', Brussels, [Online], Available: [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/albania/com03\\_339\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/albania/com03_339_en.pdf)

Hroni, S. and Qazimi, P. (2007) 'View from Albania - Study on assessment of regional security threats and challenges in the Western Balkans', in Gyarmati, I. and Stancic, D. (eds.) *Study on the Assessment threats of Regional Security and Challenges in the Western Balkans*, Geneva: DCAF.

Matei, F. (2009) '*Combating against terrorism and organized crime :Common approach of Southeast Europe*' *Cështje të Sigurisë/Security Issues*, vol. 14 , pp. 84-111.

Qazimi, P. (2008) 'Regional ownership on security issues', *Cështje të Sigurisë/ Security Issues*, vol. 7, pg 25-35.

Vickers, M. and Pettifer, J. (1997) '*Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity*', London: Hurst & Company.

Watkins, A. (2007) 'NATO and Balkans: Model for a Wider Integration', *Cështje të Sigurisë/Security Issues*, vol. 5, IDM (Institute for Democracy and Mediation), pp. 41-51.



No	Title	Category			Width			Source	Sector	Protecting	Remark
		Ch	R	Th	G	R	N				
1	Local and regional crisis	+				+			Political	Albania	NSS
									Military		
2	Globalization	+			+			Geopolitics	Political	Albania	NSS
								Global economy	Economy	Albania	
									Science		
3	WMD Proliferation	+			+			Terrorist groups	Political	Albania	NSS
								Organized crime	Criminal	Region	NMS and NDS
										International community	
4	Organized crime (all trafficking and money laundry)			+			+	Organized crime	Criminal	Albania	NSS
										Region	
5	Ethnic clashes	+				+		Unstable neighbourhood	Political	Albania	NDS
									Military		
6	Terrorism	+			+			Terrorist groups	Political	Albania	NSS and NDS
									Ideological	Region	
									Religious	International community	
7	Regional crisis	+				+		Unstable neighbourhood	Political	Albania	NMS and NSS
									Military	Albania	
								Weak state	Public Order	Albania	All
8	Spread of light arms in population hands										
9	Domestic transition	+				+		Domestic instability	Political	Albania	
									Economy		
									Social		
10	Judicial reform	+				+		Domestic reform processes	Political	Albania	
									Social		
11	Transnational threats (mostly organised crime)			+		+		Unstable state institutions	Public order	Albania	NSS
12	Natural disasters	+				+		Nature	Social	Albania	NSS
13	Technological accidents (ammunitions - explosions)			+		+		Ammunition dismantling	Human	Albania	NDS
									Political		
									Military		
14	Epidemics and infections	+			+	+		Health care	Social	Albania	NSS
										Region	
15	Mines	+				+		Health care	Social	Albania	
16	Attacks on information and communication networks Critical Infrastructure (tunnels, damsps, etc.)	+				+		Communications	Social	Albania	NMS







# Bosnia and Herzegovina

Kenan Dautović

## Introduction

Strategic thinking has already adopted the modern meaning of the term *security* as a broader approach to the one state's overall capabilities responding to an ever growing array of threats and challenges brought about by the era of globalization, compared to a traditional security which tended to deal mostly with armed forces and adverse militaries threatening the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, the main security-related terms such as *policy*, *strategy* and *doctrine* have preserved their scientific meanings as well as their interdependent correlations. This basically means that *policy* stands for a general idea or a *concept* of what is to be done; *strategy* represents ways of using resources in pursuing goals; whereas *doctrine's* role is to deal with lessons learned, framing them into the set of tenets, principles etc. (Beridan, 2008: 22-55; Dujović, 2005: 27-90).

When it comes to the strategic-doctrinal security framework of a particular state, experience suggests that there is no "one-size-fit-all", as every country has found its own way to articulate security aspirations. The reasons for choosing different approaches and, consequently, names of related documents could also be of interest for the academic community, but it is not relevant for this particular study. As far as Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is concerned, it has reflected its security intent in the Security Policy, Defense Policy and Defense Review as key documents of conceptual nature and strategic importance, whereas main doctrinal documents of strategic importance are the Military Strategy and Military Doctrine. However, it is to be stressed that the Constitution and related laws, as crucial strategic documents of normative kind as well as different Reform Commissions' Reports, constitute important documents relevant to its current security establishment. We will be referring to them to the extent we deem appropriate.

## Context

Having gone through a terrible war of 1992-95 which was stopped by the General Framework Agreement for Peace, generally known as Dayton Peace Agreement, BiH has been a subject of several different but concurrent transition and reconstruction efforts: the transformation to a parliamentary democracy and market-based economy; physical reconstruction of its living and economic infrastructure being ruined by the war, social reconstruction of its society being broken apart while facing its real statehood after a long time. This is why the Defence Reform Commission (2005: 11) states that "no other transition state in Eastern Europe or South Eastern Europe has had to face these combined challenges". Given the fact that the Dayton Accords provisions represented *the lowest common denominator*, both security and defense arrangements were delegated to the Entities' authorities, whereas the Dayton Constitution (1999: 53) provided for one state-level



defence body whose role was vague and uncertain. Pursuant to the Article 5b, members of the Presidency, who by virtue of their office were also members of the Standing Committee, were the authority for the appointment of members of the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) whose role was to “*coordinate activities of the Armed Forces in BiH*”. Still, on BiH’s way towards a self-governing and self-sustaining political system, the Defense Reform, usually functioning as a driving force for other reform undertakings, played an important role in the establishment of the current state-level security system. Along with the pressure from international organizations and the political will demonstrated by political and defence players in the country, the very organization of this system demanded a reform to respond to new challenges and requirements.

Title of the strategy	Adopted – date	Amendment
1. General Framework Agreement for Peace	21 November 1995	
2. Security Policy	8 February 2006	No
3. Defense Policy	May 2001	26 November 2008
4. Military Strategy	May 2009	No
5. Military Doctrine	27 November 2003	ongoing
6. Defense Review	Started in April 2009 (ongoing)	
7. Defense White Paper	June 2005	No
8. Strategy for Combating Terrorism	May 2006	No
9. Strategy for Preventing Money Laundry and Financing Terrorist Activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina	2009	No
10. Strategy for Fighting Organized Crime	September 2009	No
11. Strategy for Fighting Corruption	2009	No
12. Strategy for Controlling, Preventing and Fighting Drugs	March 2009	No
13. Mine Action Strategy	2002	2009

Table 2: Strategic documents of BiH

In May 2001, the Presidency of BiH adopted the Defense Policy which defined BiH goals in an area of defence for the first time. The aim of the document was to define BiH defence policy as a “part of the Security Policy, based upon Dayton Agreement and BiH’s needs to participate in global and regional integrations” as a “transparent commitment of BiH constituent peoples, citizens and both entities in pursuing the lasting peace, security and prosperous life” (Defence Policy, 2001: 6-7). BiH Presidency, on 10 July 2001, officially announced BiH’s commitment to join the PfP and NATO, which implied that all political structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina should undertake a series of steps, reforms and changes in order to meet all necessary conditions and requirements for the accession to the Alliance. BiH commitment to Euro-Atlantic integrations was additionally reinforced by the

“General Direction and Priorities for Pursuing BiH’s Foreign Policy”, signed by the Presidency in March 2003.

BiH’s specific path to international security organizations included their engagement in the situations which were not seen in other countries. The Decision of the then High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, of 8 May 2003 (DRC, 2003: 255-9), helped a lot in overcoming certain weaknesses and problems in functioning of the BiH’s security system. This Decision was augmented by the then NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, in December 2003, when he set the following benchmarks which BiH must meet in order to join the PfP:

1. Develop BiH Security Policy;
2. Ensure a state-level democratic and parliamentary oversight over the BiH armed forces;
3. Ensure a state-level command and control over BiH armed forces, which will include the state-level Ministry of Defence;
4. Ensure a full transparency of plans and the budget;
5. Develop a common doctrine and common standards for training and equipping of armed forces;
6. Fully overcome the internal political divisions, support the strengthening of the state-level institutions and promote cooperation, reconciliation and stability in the region;
7. BiH political leadership should fully support the return of refugees and displaced persons;
8. Meet the requirements under the Dayton Peace Agreement pertaining to the detention of persons indicted for war crimes.

The Defense Commission submitted proposals for the new BiH defence structure and mission of its Armed Forces vectored towards the Euro-Atlantic integrations. These proposals were accommodated by the Law on Defense and the Law on Service in the Armed Forces of BiH entering into force in 2003 and 2005.

At its 4th session in June, the SCMM accepted the Military Doctrine and it was endorsed by the BiH Presidency in November 2003. This document “sets forth the tenets and principles that govern the Armed Forces of BiH in the implementation of the tasks described in the Defence Policy” (DRC, 2003: 72).

In February 2006, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina endorsed the Security Policy of BiH as a document which defines the overarching state goals in the area of security and the role of its institutions in pursuing these goals.

According to the Presidential Decision on the Size, Structure and Locations of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted in July 2006, BiH’s Armed Forces were confirmed as a professional, single military force organized and controlled by the State.

Finally, the updated BiH Defense Policy was endorsed by the Presidency in November 2008, its goal being “the establishment of basic parameters for the functioning of the elements of the defence system in achieving BiH’s defence goals, as well as the general state security objectives and priorities in pursuing its foreign policy” (Defence Policy, 2008: 6).



## Security Policy

The development and adoption of the Defence Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a starting point and the basis for the development of BiH security policy and security system, despite the fact that the security logic and principles require the reversed order. In other words, the elements of special policies which are integral parts of the security policy should be derived from the security policy, whereas the security policy should be taken into account in the process of development of the security-related legal documents, while defining missions and tasks of the newly established security structures, etc. In drafting the elements of the BiH Security Policy, efforts were made to achieve a consistent approach on the basis of which the Council of Ministers was responsible for the shaping and integrating those elements. At its 82<sup>nd</sup> session, the Council of Ministers established an inter-agency working group for drafting the BiH Security Policy. After the working group had finished its work, the Council of Ministers compiled a final version of the BiH Security Policy in December 2006, and the BiH Presidency adopted it on 8 February 2006.

The Security Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2006: 1) is a document that “defines a long-term and coherent strategy, and provides a framework and directions for the establishment of the system, structures and all mechanisms necessary for the efficient functioning of the security sector”. The executive authorities of BiH will be responsible for developing the document, given their inherited capacity to coordinate proper utilization of intelligence and security, military, economic, diplomatic, technological, information and other resources in achieving the security goals.

In strategic terms, the Security Policy, “as part of the state policy, implies an organized implementation of measures and activities” that ensure a successful and long-term protection of fundamental values in BiH and the “optimum employment of available resources”. It defines security goals on the “basis of the identified challenges” and, by implementing all elements of power, strives to “build peace, security and prosperity of the citizens of BiH”.

As far as its realization is concerned, the institutions and bodies at all levels of legislative and executive authorities in BiH are responsible for the implementation of the Security Policy. More specifically, the Presidency adopts the Security Policy (2006: 18) with the “aim of providing strategic guidelines in the fields of foreign affairs and defence”, while ensuring the BiH Parliamentary Assembly’s timely information on strategic security and defence issues. The parliamentary bodies at State, Entity and Cantonal levels represent the “institutional, political level of modeling and implementing” legislative elements of the Policy, defining “legal framework and long-term guidelines” and ensuring “material preconditions for its implementation”.

The Council of Ministers and entity governments are then in charge of implementing it, thus preserving the main responsibility for the security system’s overall functionality.

It is important to note that the Security Policy provides new constitutional competencies to the state of BiH in the field of security, which were not envisaged at

all by the General Framework Agreement for the Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFPA) and Annex IV hitherto – the BiH Constitution. Commenting the relationship between constitutional and defense reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the SFOR Commander, Brigadier General Steven Schook said: “The defence reform represents a constitutional reform, though on a separate track.” (Cikotić, 2008).

### Defence Policy

The defense reform process played an important role in the establishment of the current state-level security system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both practically and politically, it became a driver of positive changes and reforms to upgrade and interconnect the system as a functional whole at state level. Along with pressure from international organizations and the political will demonstrated by political and defense players in the country, the very organization of this system demanded reform to respond to new challenges and requirements. Pursuant to the Defense Policy document (2008: 4), “The goals of BiH in the area of defence support the achievement of the general security goals defined by the Security Policy of BiH as well as foreign policy’s priorities set by the ‘General Direction and Priorities for Pursuing BiH’s Foreign Policy’”.

As such, it defines a basic defence concept of BiH; engages defence resources in addressing the long-term security challenges and risks; projects basic principles for the AF BiH’s utility linked to its future development; and it helps the establishment of the overall BiH’s defence capacities (Odrambena politika, 2008: 6).

The Defense Policy (2008: 7) recognizes BiH’s awareness and acceptance of the collective security concept as the basis for the long term military strategy. The first step in that direction would be a full-fledged NATO membership which would, by definition, help the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Even though one country’s armed forces should be developed to address military threats in the first instance, the Defense Policy of BiH (2008: 19) acknowledges the need for the development of versatile forces that will be capable of dealing with an ever-demanding environment of today’s world. There are three consolidated areas for their possible deployment: defence activities, assistance to civilian authorities and peace support operations.

In general terms, the document emphasizes the prospective participation in the European and Euro-Atlantic integrations while achieving a sufficient level of stability, which would ensure the end of the international military presence in the country and taking a full responsibility for its own security. This is why defence reform is seen a vital part of the overall security sector reform, and this is why it will be a continuous activity, unless and until these goal are obtained.

### Military Strategy

In the Introduction part of the Military Strategy (2009: 5-6), it is stated that it “supports the security policy goals and implements the BiH Defence Policy”. The Military Strategy, therefore, “emphasizes the goals, functions and required capabilities based upon the strategic guidance and security environment analysis”. Apart from the Security and Defence Policies which provide a wider strategic context for using military capabilities together with other elements of power, the Military



Strategy “focuses on the military engagement by defining the intertwined military objectives” which helps commanders to identify the necessary capabilities. An unspecified and complex environment thus requires a “capability-based approach” which is less focused on specific adversaries, possible conflict areas or the ways enemies would fight; it requires adjustable forces being capable of operating in a wider spectrum of different scenarios.

Whereas the Defence Policy sets four different strategic objectives, the Military Strategy (2009: 14-6) defines the three main military goals. defence of BiH and its citizens will be performed by deterrence; preventing surprise attack; strategic directions’ protection; defence activities within the country, and by winning over the enemy. The participation in peace support operations would be pursued by conducting peace support operations, opposing threats near the source (terrorism), promoting security; while assistance to civilian authorities will be performed under the motto “Forces of the state of BiH and all its citizens”; thus providing help in fighting fires, major flooding, earthquakes, etc.; as well as in conducting the humanitarian de-mining.

### Military Doctrine

As already mentioned, the “current” Military Doctrine document was accepted by the Presidency in November 2003. Since then it has almost lost all its credibility, given the fact that it has been outdated by the events while a new document is in its preparation phase. The Doctrine (2003: 3) deals with the “necessary capabilities of the Armed Forces in BiH”, such as “the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, aid to civilian authorities and participation in peace-keeping operations”.

While the Protection of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity issues are related to the major military operations representing artificial symbiosis of the Army of the Federation of BiH’s US-like concept combined with the elements of the ex-Yugoslav Army’s approach and cherished by the Army of the Republic of Srpska, the Aid to Civilian Authorities was promulgated by the Presidency Conclusion from September 2002, dealing with the procedures in the case of “Passing Through the Territory of Another Entity” or “Support of Another Entity Armed Forces” (Military Doctrine, 2003: 51-3). As for the Participation in the Peace Keeping Operations, it was an adjusted version of the Allied Joint Publications – 3.4.1, named “Peace Support Operations”.

However, some elements are still relevant for this article and these are enumerated defence-military and ecological risks being drawn from the then Defence Policy (2001).

Defence-military risks include:

- The failure of BiH to join or delay joining the Euro-Atlantic, European and sub-regional security and other integration structures and processes,
- Insufficiently developed or not fully applied procedures for international cooperation and early warning,
- Illegal armament transfers, creation of maintenance of risky armament accumulation, as well as potential spread of weapons of mass destruction,



- Terrorism represents a permanent threat, just as the potential creation and activities of illegal armed groups represent a real threat to BiH and its citizens;
- while ecological risks comprise:
  - Earthquakes, forest fires, floods, landslides and other natural disasters,
  - Technical and technological disasters such as industrial pollutions, disposal of nuclear waste, solid waste and military waste in BiH territory or in its immediate vicinity,
  - Degradation of arable land and destruction of forest resources,
  - Pollution of the sources of potable water, slow development and application of generally accepted environmental protection standards and conventions may slow down inclusion of BiH into wider integration processes.
- The vast areas still contaminated with land mines (Military Doctrine, 2003: 19).

#### Defence Review

Among 31 Partnership Goals that BiH has agreed upon within the Partnership Review and Planning Process (PARP), the Ministry of Defence of BiH initiated the Defence Review process which particularly aimed at reviewing the AF BiH's current structure and its ability to address all challenges and risks facing BiH. The process should help the AF BiH's optimization with concrete Modernization Plan. A very first draft is to be submitted by mid-2010, after which it would be pending endorsement by the Council of Ministers, Presidency and Parliamentary Assembly of BiH.

Given the deteriorating political situation and the upcoming elections in October 2010, the document does not embrace the whole security system, in which case it would have been called the Strategic Defence Review, but only defence structure the Ministry of Defence is responsible for.

Despite this, the reduced scale has engendered the need for conducting analyses that are relevant for a wider security system, particularly the analysis of the BiH's strategic environment, as well as of threats, challenges and risks.

#### Police Reform

Even though there is no Ministry of Interior of BiH as the top state institution dealing with all aspects of internal security, some relevant factors are worth mentioning when considering the topic of research. The Ministry of Security that has been established as a part of the overall Security Sector Reform in BiH has got only a coordinative role when it comes to any sort of deployment of the regular police forces in BiH. This practically means that the police forces belong to the entity, district and cantonal levels of state organization lacking proper capacities for addressing the cross-country risks and challenges.

On the other hand, there are several institutions which are being designated to operate at the state level, such as: the State Investigation and Protection Agency, the Intelligence and Security Agency, Border Police, BiH Interpol, etc. Such a compartmentalization has resulted in lacking a consolidated and harmonized approach in dealing with different threats in the field of internal security, as well as in the non-existence of a single comprehensive strategy in that regard.



Still, the whole spectrum of risks and threats has not been left unanswered, given the fact that there are several individual strategies addressing the issues of terrorism, organized crime, corruption, de-mining, etc.

### The Strategy for Combating Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

As it has clearly been admitted in the Strategy's Introduction (2006: 3), "the problems in the field of combating terrorism in BiH are evident", while "the existing infrastructure (both legislative and institutional)" is insufficient to address a growing threat "posed by potential terrorist attacks". This is why the Strategy aims to review the current situation and "set priority tasks whose realization will contribute to establishing a comprehensive system for combating terrorism."

Pursuant to the Strategy's (2006: 12-5) provisions;

The Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for "investigations and prosecution of crimes under the CPC BiH". In addition, the Council of Ministers of BiH established in 2004 a Task Force for combating terrorism and strengthening capacities, which operates under the leadership of the Prosecutor.

The Intelligence and Security Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for "collecting and analyzing intelligence related to security threats" to Bosnia and Herzegovina, both within and out of the country, "including terrorism and international terrorism".

The Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina pursues its responsibility directly or through its subordinate units or agencies.

*The Anti-Terrorism Department* monitors the "implementation of international conventions and executes international cooperation."

The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), by means of its *Financial Intelligence Unit* (FIU), "collects, receives, analyzes, investigates and forwards to BiH Prosecutor's Office the information and data in accordance with the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Funding Terrorism."

*The Criminal Investigation Department* provides "operational assistance to FIU, discovers and investigates crimes of terrorism, finds and apprehends perpetrators and collects intelligence and information on crimes." The *Anti-terrorism Unit* is a part of this department. The *Witness Protection Department* implements "protection of witnesses in accordance with laws and regulations" of BiH in this field. The *Special Support Unit* provides assistance to the FIU and other departments by "ensuring additional police tactics, equipment and staff, when stronger security measures are called for."

The Border Police of BiH (BP BiH) performs "supervisions and control of state border and implements the Law on Movement and Stay of Aliens and Asylum."

Within its jurisdiction, the Interpol NCB Sarajevo undertakes a number of activities with the view to "realizing efficient cooperation and exchange of information between law enforcement agencies in BiH and the corresponding agencies in other countries, members of the Interpol."

The Ministry of Defence of BiH's competencies, with regard to combating terrorism, are: "establishing the procedure for approving military assistance to civilian authorities in case of natural disasters, under the authority granted by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; activating reserve units for all operations, except planned training; and deployment or use of any part of armed forces outside Bosnia and Herzegovina for all operations."

The Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH is responsible for issuing "citizenship, entry and registration of citizens, protection of personal data, registering places of permanent and temporary residence, personal documents, travel documents, de-mining."

The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH is responsible for the "implementation of the Law on Import and Export of Arms and Military Equipment and Controlling Import and Export of Products with Dual Purpose, and the Law on Production of Arms and Military Equipment."

The Ministry of Transport and Communications of BiH's *Civil Aviation Directorate* (BH CAD) is responsible for the "civil aviation safety in BiH."

At the Entity and District levels there are several institutions and bodies such as: The *Ministry of the Interior of BiH* with its departments: Department for Combating Terrorism, Intelligence Department, Anti-terrorism Unit; The *Ministry of the Interior of RS* with its departments: Department for Criminal Intelligence Analysis, Counter-Sabotage Department of the Criminal Police Administration; *Police of Brčko District*. With regard to countering funding terrorist activities at the Entity level, the following institutions are involved: The *Ministry of Finance of FBiH* - Financial Police, and The *Ministry of Finance of RS*; also, the *Banking Agencies of FBiH and RS*. Entity *Civil Protection Directorates* actively cooperate with the Ministry of Security's Sector for Civil Protection.

#### Strategy for preventing money laundering and financing terrorist activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina

As a subordinate strategy to the Strategy for Combating Terrorism in BiH, the Strategy for Preventing Money Laundering and Financing Terrorist Activities (2009: 17-9) provides the main input for the Action Plan which is to be implemented over the period 2009 – 2013. This input comprises several objectives to be achieved:

- Developing mechanism for reporting and cooperation between the public and private sectors,
- Strengthening the information exchange among BiH's authorities,
- Ensuring a comprehensive investigation, criminal prosecution and court processing,
- Development and implementation of a pro-active approach to international cooperation,
- Developing and harmonizing the legal framework of BiH, and
- Enhancing public information and development of joint educational programs for the public and private sectors.



### The Plan for Civil-Military Cooperation in Answering Terrorist Attacks and Dealing with the Consequences

The most detailed document providing a clear distribution of designated tasks to be performed in different phases of the response is the Plan for Civil-Military Cooperation in Answering Terrorist Attacks and Dealing with the Consequences. The Plan (2-3) aims to preventing or minimizing consequences of possible terrorist attacks through elevating readiness of the BiH's institutions, entities and Brcko District for addressing this global challenge."

### BiH's Strategy for Fighting Organized Crime

Organized crime, in accordance with the Strategy's (2009: 3) provisions, "among all other kinds of crime, represents the most complicated and most dangerous type of crime due to its ability to adapt to different conditions and situations linked to the possibility of using the contemporary scientific-technological achievements in pursuing different illegal activities. The Strategy therefore introduces three basic principles in fighting this threat: preventive action, repression and confiscation of illegally obtained property. By endorsing this strategy, the Council of Ministers of BiH regulates the policy in the area of establishing an efficient system for fighting organized crime, defines strategic goals, all involved actors' role and responsibilities and sets up the framework for developing implementation plans.

As a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the organized crime threat to BiH has, unfortunately, not been done, this still represents an insufficiently researched field. This is all "enforced" by the "belated and irresolute political decisions, a slow reform process, and poor efforts in harmonizing the criminal code system with the law enforcement agencies' activities" (Strategy, 2009: 8-12).

This is why organized crime groups represent "a very harmful influence on the economic development of BiH", particularly by "investing great sums of illegally earned money into legal businesses, as well as in corrupting the state administration's personnel in order to obtain the classified information and influence the outcomes of criminal procedures".

Given the BiH's geo-strategic position, especially with respect to the importance of the so-called "Balkan Route", the illegal drug trafficking represents one of the most important activities conducted by criminal groups operating in BiH.

As a consequence of the recently waged wars in the Balkans, BiH has become a place for weapons trafficking, being not only transit but also the country of origin and destination as well.

A kind of crime that is becoming more and more popular, due to the modern life style and sophisticated criminal equipment, is car theft.

Human trafficking, the most common forms of which are sexual and labor exploitation, represents yet another type of organized crime widespread in BiH as a part of the "Balkan Route".

Money laundering and falsification, illegal trade of high value goods, cyber crime,

robberies and other criminal offences such as: taking hostages, extortions, and blackmails could be seen as important indicators of the BiH's current social and economic situation.

The Strategy (2009: 3) has been developed in accordance with the state obligations specified through the EU's Stabilization and Association process, the Road Map for visa regime liberalization as well as contemporary reform processes, particularly those stated in the document called "European Partnership" and it is conceptually and functionally linked to strategies dealing with different problems such as: integrated border management; fight against corruption; preventing money laundering and financing terrorist activities; human trafficking; illegal drug trafficking and preventing illegal migrations.

When it comes to institutional capacity, organized crime has been dealt with by almost the same institutions as terrorism (the State Investigation and Protection Agency, Border Police, NCB Interpol Sarajevo, the Intelligence and Security Agency, police at entity and district levels); but there are some peculiar institutions designated to fight organized crime, such as: the Special Department for Organized Crime in BiH Prosecutor's Office and Agency for Indirect Taxation, while the Republic of Srpska established the Special Prosecutor's Office in charge of organized crime. The Strategy also emphasizes the importance of the civil society in which the non-governmental organizations, professional associations, and the media in particular have a significant role to play, in terms of raising public awareness and providing additional expertise and/or information required for a more efficient fight against organized crime.

#### The Strategy of BiH for Fighting Corruption

Even though corruption as a nation-wide social problem has been discussed as a part of the overall organized crime survey, given its scale and risk potential, it "deserves" special attention within the framework of BiH's Strategy for Fighting Corruption. According to the Strategy's (2009: 3-4) Introduction, "corruption in both private and public sectors jeopardizes BiH's stability and prosperity; undermines confidence in the governmental institutions; creates a road block to the economic development and a fair market competition; endangers the rule of law, democracy and human rights; detracts good governance and social justice; facilitates organized crime and the growth of terrorism and threatens the stability of democratic institutions and the moral foundations of the society". The Strategy, therefore, aims at "reducing the level of corruption, creating a strategic framework and common standards, and strengthening confidence in the governmental institutions at all levels".

The institutions responsible for the Strategy's (2009: 7) implementation are: the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Ministers and state institutions, FBiH and RS Parliaments, the governments and institutions of the Entities, Brcko District's Parliament, Brcko District's government and institutions, public companies and institutions, political parties, universities and other educational institutions, civil society associations and institutions, citizens, the media and private sector.

The objectives to be achieved in pursuing the Strategy (2009: 8-19) are: the Agency for preventing corruption and the coordination in fighting the capacity build-



ing for corruption; the prevention of corruption; education, training and public awareness; law enforcement, coordination and implementation of the Strategy; and international cooperation.

#### State strategy for controlling, preventing and fighting drugs in BiH

The right on healthy life belongs to the set of basic human rights promulgated by the international conventions and is regarded as an individual right, as well as youth and family right in particular. Therefore, it requires a systematic approach by the society as a whole. The Strategy (2009: 5-6) represents the first effort ever undertaken by BiH in this respect. The main reason for creating the Strategy is the existence of different threats, risks and challenges which this evil causes to the BiH's society. Some of them are "a great level of accessibility to drugs, a growing percentage of consumers within the young and female population; a great number of traffic accidents caused by drug use; a high level of correlation between drug use and suicide, poisoning, crime and violence rate; a high number of population at risk as the consequence of the recent war, such as: disabled persons, displaced people, war orphans, demobilized soldiers etc.; scarce resources invested in the prevention, education, repression and treatment efforts." Even though BiH has been mostly seen as a transit country, there is a real possibility that in the future it could become a suitable terrain for growing and producing of drugs while, at the same time, it will remain a transit route frequently used for temporary storing of significant international transports.

In accordance with the Strategy (2009: 7), and apart from the police institutions at the entity and district levels, the Ministry of Security has created a Department for Fighting Drug Use in conjunction with other agencies that are covering this field as one of their activities, such as: SIPA, the Border Police and the Interpol Office. Their work is supported by the BiH's Court and Prosecutor's Office. The main activities ensure the Strategy's comprehensive approach in dealing with the problem. The prevention is supposed to be implemented through the health and social care systems; education; judiciary; information; etc.

#### Land Mine Action Strategy of BiH

As it is stated in the Strategy (2009: 3), fifteen years after the war, BiH is still considered a highly contaminated area when it comes to land mines and other unexploded objects. This particular problem still poses a tangible threat to the population's security as well as to the economic development of the state. The national authorities took responsibility for de-mining activities in 1998, and are still receiving financial, expert and technical support from the international community to this end. They created the centers within the entities for de-mining (RSMAC and FMAC) which are coordinated by BHMAC<sup>1</sup>. The international de-mining agencies are still the main de-mining provider, while local capacities are gradually developing.

The main responsibility in this area lies with the Council of Ministers and the Entities' Governments. The Law on De-mining, which entered into force in 2002, established the central de-mining structure at the state level (BHMAC) which now

---

<sup>1</sup> Mine Action Center (MAC)

operates under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The first Strategy for De-mining, for the period 2002 – 2009, was adopted the same year, which consequently significantly improved the structure functionality, as well as the quality enhancement and efficacy of the whole process. In order to achieve the vision of “Bosnia and Herzegovina without mines in 2019”, a clear mission statement has been put forward: “To ensure the conditions for conducting a stable and efficient de-mining program aimed at establishing a safe environment for normal and prosperous life of all BiH citizens, while having the mine victims fully integrated into the society” (Strategy, 2009: 9).

The Strategy (2009: 10-3) depicts seven strategic and operational goals to be achieved, and they could be interpreted as: continuous humanitarian de-mining operations; providing stable financing; raising public awareness; the social inclusion of the victims; continuous partnering with all relevant subjects; improving communication with the public; and a continuous revision of the current Strategy.

#### The Framework of the Law on Protection and Rescue of People and Material Goods from Natural and Other Accidents in BiH

With regard to dealing with natural and other disasters, this Law regulates international obligations and cooperation in pursuing civil protection; the responsibilities of BiH institutions and bodies; coordination of the state, entity and Brcko District civil protection institutions; establishment of the Operational-Communication Center – 112; harmonization of plans and programs; etc.

### **Characteristics of the Strategies**

#### Security Policy

The challenges that BiH (Security Policy, 2006: 6-9) is facing need to be considered both in the context of global environment and the context of the totality of regional and internal developments. The seemingly distant trends and developments might influence the BiH security, sometimes in quite unexpected ways. Some trends that necessitate the examination of the BiH security include:

Global challenges: the security challenges that BiH is facing have to be observed in the context of the overall relations in the global surroundings. The challenges brought by modern global developments are mostly the consequences of the ever-growing differences in the level of economic and social progress; the differences between rich and poor parts of the world; international terrorism in all its forms; constant environmental threats from industrial and technological progress; uncontrolled production and trade in weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (nuclear and biological); the increase in forced migrations resulting from armed conflicts, racial conflicts and discrimination, ethnic intolerance, or political pressures in autocratic and non-democratic regimes. There are also challenges related to various forms of organized crime that generate a lasting social and political instability in certain countries of the region, which results in general poverty and the spread of various diseases that endanger the entire population.





One of the regional challenges is the instability caused by the transition to the market economy. At the same time, BiH lies on the essential route between Europe and Asia, which is by its nature vital for trade, thus providing a great opportunity for an illegal trade in weapons, narcotics, and human trafficking, as well as for the transit of terrorist groups and materials for terrorist activities. Furthermore, certain ethnic groups in this region have tendencies towards secession, self-rule and independence, which, given the relatively high concentration of military capacities, makes the security situation even more complex.

BiH is a country burdened with internal problems, caused mostly by various political factors that pose a serious threat to social, political and other forms of stability in the country. Some of the internal challenges are:

- The legacy of political and social animosity, caused by the 1992-1995 war, instigated by the elements that advocate various kinds of nationalistic extremism;
- A failure to fully implement the Dayton Peace Agreement;
- Insufficient financial resources for the implementation of the sustainable return of displaced persons and refugees;
- Political transition resulting in a slow development of efficient and effective executive, legislative and judicial bodies;
- Transition to trade economy, which causes a huge drop in domestic and foreign investment and leaves room for the grey economy and black market; procrastination and troubles in the process of privatization, technological regression and deterioration of production capacities and an uneven pace of repairing the infrastructure destroyed in war;
- Border protection still not harmonized with the Schengen, i.e. European standards, which renders the fight against organized crime even more difficult;
- A high unemployment rate, which leads to an increase in general poverty, social divisions, social instability, and a higher number of financially disadvantaged citizens in need of welfare, causing intensified migration of the population, brain-drain in particular;
- Weapons and ammunition stored in inadequate storage sites and illegally held in individual possession;
- A huge number of land mines and UXO throughout the country, which poses physical danger to citizens and an obstacle for progress of agriculture, tourism, and foreign investment; and
- Various ecological challenges, problems of technological, civilian and military waste, degradation of arable land and forest, water and air pollution etc. insufficiency of resources for prevention, response and repair in cases of possible natural and technological disasters, and a slow development and application of standards and conventions for environmental protection - create additional challenges.

### Defence Policy

The challenges and risks in the area of general security and defence, both globally and regionally, which may have an impact, indirectly or directly, on the internal stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina are (Defence Policy, 2008: 3-4):



- Instability as a result of transition to the market economy, which resulted in differences in the level of economic and social development of the countries;
- Asymmetric threats, including all forms of terrorism, uncontrolled weapon production and sale, illegal arms trade, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, possible creation and activities of illegal armed groups and organized crime;
- Increased threat from natural and other disasters and large scale accidents as a consequence of endangering the environment due to industrial and technological development;
- Forced migration as a consequence of armed conflicts;
- Discrimination and intolerance on racial, ethnic, religious, social-economic, cultural, political and other grounds;
- A relatively high concentration of military capacities in the region that makes the overall security risks even more complex.

Internal challenges that Bosnia and Herzegovina faces within the framework of general security (that also could be reflected in the defence area) are:

- Existing political and social animosities, originating from the retrograde elements that advocate ethnic extremism;
- Incomplete implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Problems of political and economic transition of the society resulting in a slow development of the efficient authorities, economic instability and illegal activities;
- Problems of border protection;
- Problems related to the excess of armaments and ammunition, inadequate weapon and ammunition storage sites and illegal possession of armaments and ammunition;
- Contamination of territory by anti-personnel mines and unexploded objects;
- Natural and other disasters and accidents.

#### Military Strategy

While addressing the key aspect of the security environment in which the Armed Forces of BiH operate, the Military Strategy (2009: 9-10), based upon the Security and Defence Policy of BiH, lists the global challenges as follows:

- Inter-state conflicts
- Civil wars
- Ethnic violence
- Secessionism
- Terrorism
- Religious extremism
- Border disputes
- Illegal migrations
- Proliferation
- Human trafficking
- Organized crime
- Drug trafficking
- Corruption



- Money laundering
- Energy resources dependency
- Poverty
- Low standards of living
- HIV infection increase
- Pandemics
- Environmental degradation
- Global warming consequences

In addition, the characteristics of contemporary Europe are:

- A still present possibility of a general war, since permanent peace and security are not in place yet
- The process of creating independent states out of previously multinational federations has not been finished yet
- The slow pace of democratization and structural adjustments in the post-socialist countries which entails a threat of a strong economic crisis and internal degradation, giving way to the escalation of possible national, religious and economic differences
- Local crisis causing mass migrations
- Intensified trends of human trafficking, organized crime, etc.
- Proliferation of weapons, WMD in particular, with possible utilization for terrorist purposes

When it comes to the region of the Western Balkans, it is stated that any predictions are hard to make. However, the concept of “greater states” should certainly be abandoned and replaced by the regional cooperation and security integration in NATO and the EU.

Since most of the documents avoid the exact naming of possible threat sources, the Military Strategy deals with a wide spectrum of possible adversaries, such as:

- States with traditional militaries wishing to control some regions in the World, some supporting terrorist organizations
- Non-state actors including terrorist networks, international criminal organizations and illegal armed groups
- Individuals wishing to jeopardize international order
- They will be targeting civilian population, economic centers or regions, symbolic locations with targeted population

### Defence Review

As it has already been mentioned, the Defence Review is still ongoing, but the analysis of the risks, threats and challenges is more than relevant for the research purposes.

According to the working document (Chapter on Threats, Risks and Challenges, 2009:1-4), the circumstances that contribute to the increasing number of global security risks include primarily a huge difference in economic and social development, which results in poverty and social threats to the part of population in some countries, even regions as a whole. As a consequence, the negative social phenomena emerge and jeopardize security.

The most important global challenges and dangers today include: international terrorism, ethnic and religious extremism, secessionism, border disputes, illegal migrations, proliferation of weapons, human trafficking, organized crime, organized trade in narcotics, corruption, money laundering, dependence on energy sources, poverty, emergence and spreading of new diseases, and environmental degradation.

International terrorism is one of the biggest risks and threats to the global, regional and national (state) security. From the security point of view, particularly important is a link between terrorism and all forms of organized trans-national crime. Global terrorist acts can indirectly affect BiH as well (national and international organizations in BiH), but also directly – by the use of its territory for preparation and execution of terrorist acts in other countries.

The end of bloc confrontation resulted in a significant reduction of the global military conflict risk.. However, the world is still faced with a number of security challenges, risks and threats, both traditional and new. Global threats, challenges and risks can have a direct or indirect impact on the stability and security in South East Europe. A specific challenge or regional challenge that the whole South East Europe is faced with is the instability as a consequence of the transition to the market economy, which resulted in economic underdevelopment of the region. Important roads between Europe and Asia go across the area of South East Europe, in particular in terms of market exchange. At the same time, these are the roads of illegal weapon, narcotics and human trafficking, and they can be used for the transit of terrorist groups and means for the execution of terrorist acts.

In the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, the region was the stage of many conflicts with economic, psychological, social and other consequences. The aspirations for secession, autonomy and independence of certain ethnic groups still exist in the region, which additionally makes security situation in the region more complex. The accession of the Western Balkan countries to NATO and the EU would improve the security in the region and have a significant influence on their economic stability and prosperity. Building mutual confidence and co-operation, as well as the feeling of affiliation to the family of democratically developed countries in Europe and the world, through partnerships within the Euro-Atlantic integration, is a priority of the utmost importance for the region. This would make a significant influence on the further development of the process and achievement of the required inter-operability standards in all areas of interstate co-operation, particularly in the area of security.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is burdened with many internal problems mainly caused by different political factors that pose a serious danger to social, political and any other stability of the country.

Internal challenges include the following:

- Residues of the political and social animosity as a result of the war (1992-1995), encouraged by those elements that advocate different forms of nationalistic extremism;
- Incomplete and selective implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord;
- Insufficient funds for the implementation of a sustainable return of refugees



- and displaced persons;
- Problems of the political transition, which result in a slow development of effective and efficient executive, legislative and judicial authorities;
- Problems of the transition to market economy, which result in a low level of domestic and foreign investment and are favorable for the grey economy and black market;
- Procrastination, difficulties and irregularities in the implementation of the privatization process, technological underdevelopment and the decline of production capacities, and unbalanced dynamics in the reconstruction of the infrastructure damaged by the war;
- Inadequate protection of borders, which makes the fight against organized crime more difficult;
- High unemployment rate that increases general poverty, social division, social instability, rising numbers of impoverished citizens requiring social welfare, and causes increased emigration of the population, particularly of the young people with the university education;
- Armaments and ammunition being stored in inadequate storage sites, but also being kept illegally by individuals;
- A huge amount of anti-personnel mines and unexploded objects on the territory of the entire country, which poses physical danger to citizens and hampers the development of agriculture, tourism and foreign investment; and
- Different environmental challenges, problems in the management of technological, utility and military waste, degradation of arable land and forest resources, and water and air pollution. These challenges also include insufficient resources for the prevention, response and recovery in case of potential natural and man-made disasters, and a slow development and application of standards and conventions for environmental protection.

## Consequences

The question whether strategies have been causing reforms is somewhat complex and sometimes ambivalent. In the aftermath of the war 1992-95, it was the international community pressing for the reforms much more than the forces within the country, trying to create better functioning state institutions as its proper counterpart in discussing the future of BiH as a country naturally belonging to the Euro-Atlantic family of states. Once the authorities of BiH had officially expressed their willingness to steer BiH towards the Euro-Atlantic integration, it was again the international community, both in and out of BiH, which strongly and resolutely continued exerting its influence but with a gradual participation of the BiH legal institutions. The best example would be the Defence Policies of 2001 and 2008, where, in simplified terms, the former was mostly prepared by the international community and endorsed by the Presidency, whereas the latter was completely prepared and endorsed by the local institutions and the international community was facilitating the process.

The Defence Review will probably mark the end of the transition phase, given the fact that it is being developed in accordance with the best Euro-Atlantic practices. Furthermore, it will have an established proper vertical and horizontal relationship with other related documents. This all being related to a purely defence sector, it is to be stressed that a wider security sector is maturing; particularly

having in mind that the main logic of establishing the hierarchical pattern has been established. It means that the subordinate politics are proceeding from the higher, superior ones (e.g. the Defence Policy is absolutely correlated to the Security Policy). By the same token, the strategic routine of balancing ends, ways and means has been established through a pattern: Policy – Strategy – Action Plan, which at the end of the day provides answers to all questions related to who and how will be addressing different risks, threats and challenges.

In pursuing such process, there is a need for a driving force which would be perceived by all relevant factors as a final goal and this is the membership in NATO and the EU. The membership has been articulated as a “main frequency” which is to synchronize all efforts in this regard. This objective has clearly been set forward in all relevant documents, so that the fulfillment of certain standards that these two institutions require for a full membership is now a part of all reform processes. The stability in the region and the wider area is a long-term interest of BiH. The promotion of good relations and co-operation with the neighbors and countries in a broader region and the development of democratic processes in those countries and their integration into Europe will also have a positive impact on strengthening of the internal security in BiH.

In case of BiH, the membership in the Euro-Atlantic and regional integration processes would certainly help the country in its efforts to overcome a whole array of internal risks, threats and challenges. This is particularly important in terms of not only acquiring, but assimilating these standards which would eventually create better living conditions for all peoples and citizens of BiH, thus making BiH a reasonably good place to stay and live in.

As far as the capacities of both state institutions and the society for the implementation of different strategies are concerned, it has already been mentioned that these are insufficient, which makes their capacity-building one of the primary goals of the strategies.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a very unique country in many ways. It is a country which faced with several changes and reconstructions; the change of the political and economic systems along with the reconstruction of its infrastructure ruined by a devastating war, the building up of industrial capacities, and most importantly, its social structure. The geo-political position of BiH also influences its destiny, as it is situated in an unstable region of the Western Balkans, augmented by its history and its multi-regional character, which leaves room for another set of challenges. Geographically, BiH stretches on 51,129 square kilometers of land, has about 1600 km of borders and 89 border crossings, with the terrain which allows for a number of potential illegal crossings, facilitating all kinds of cross-national organized crime and terrorism.

On the other hand, if security policy is to be viewed in the context of other elements of the security system, it should be noted that the entire security system of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been completely established yet. At the state level, there is no consensus for many political decisions, and there is a lack of ad-



equate legislation, police forces, organization of the civil protection, etc. It is hard to say whether the already established structures of the security system are capable of serving the designated purpose, due to the fact that the reform processes have not been implemented and verified in practice yet. This refers to both the functionality of individual security structures as well as to the inter-operability and functional relationship among various inter-dependent segments of the security system. However, bearing in mind the fact that at the time immediately after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement there was no security system at all, one can say that it is the security field which saw the major step forward in building of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its institutions through building and fostering of its security system.

It could actually be said that the security and defence reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been giving an impetus, in both the political and practical sense, to all reforms of the post-Dayton state structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though the reforms conducted until now were faced with many obstacles and challenges, their positive impacts are creating a realistic basis for a stronger and faster pace of further reform steps not only in the security field, but also in other fields in which the reform processes are underway.

The answers to the questions raised in this research can serve as a summary which provides the main features of the strategic-doctrinal framework of BiH. In contextual terms, we have portrayed all policies and strategies that have been adopted so far with an emphasis on the fact that all documents have undergone the process of evolution - from documents resulting from the political consensus and a strong pressure by the international community to locally owned documents that are widely harmonized with international standards and best practices. This has also resulted in establishing a proper hierarchy, in terms of their contents, scope and importance. As already mentioned, although it was the international community who was initiating the development or changing of the documents, at least in the case of the Defence Sector, it was the change in the security environment that caused the adjustments of the strategies.

As far as the actors in charge of preparing the policies and strategies are concerned, the inter-governmental and other expert working groups<sup>2</sup> have been drafting proper documents to be endorsed by the proper level of authority. The Security Policy, Defence Policy, Military Doctrine (and the Defence Review and Modernization Plan as its sub-product) are endorsed by the BiH's Presidency, while the Chief of Joint Staff is in charge of endorsing the Military Strategy. As for different strategies, the relevant ministries endorse those falling into their area of responsibility, while the leading inter-agency working groups consisting of the representatives of the relevant ministries endorse other strategies. It has to be stressed that the elements of the civil society in BiH have very poorly, if at all, participated in this endeavor.

When it comes to the characteristics of the policies and strategies, "despite the process of globalization across the world, which reduces the possibility of conflict and increases a wider stability, conflicts and certain high-level intensity crises in some regions cannot be fully excluded" (Defence Review - Chapter on Threats,

---

<sup>2</sup> Interview with Mr Ahmet Hadžiomerović, Assistant to the Minister of Defence for Policy and Planning.

Risks and Challenges, 2009:1). The danger of a global armed conflict has been reduced significantly; but war as a means in resolving disputes in international relations cannot be completely ruled out. At the same time, the use of military factor, which was a dominant element of power during the Cold War, is increasingly giving up the primacy to a number of other non-traditional threats to global security, though still preserving its relevance to a certain extent. For example, “disturbed economic system and corruption, negative demographic trends, including the reduction of active population, and high unemployment rates contribute to such socio-economic environment that makes a fertile ground for development of all forms of organized crime, money laundering, terrorism and funding terrorism” (Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006: 3).

All strategic-level documents that we have analyzed do not use terms “risks and threats” in naming different problems that BiH is facing in the global, regional and internal environments. The subsequent strategies addressing those problems in a more concrete manner qualify them as risks and/or threats still keeping them in a more general framework, particularly in terms of exact naming their sources. There are certainly different reasons for such an approach, but one of them could be a sensitive political situation which frequently, in trying to reach the lowest common denominator known as a consensus, fails to address the essence of particular problems. Still, given the BiH’s recent historical experience in all spheres of life, one could expect this would be an element of the developmental process as well.

Regarding the issue of defining the instruments used by the state in answering the risks, threats and challenges, we can safely say that the pattern “Policy – Strategy – Action Plan”, in which concrete actions are explained in detail (who is to do what an when), has been adopted as a general rule and it is out of the boundaries of this research to deal with so many details. Despite the fact that the main responsibility delegated to specific institutions and actors in terms of the implementation of the strategies is elaborated in the related Action Plans, we have, for the sake of providing an example, explained very concrete actors in charge of implementing the Strategy for Combating Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As for the harmonization of the strategies, the conclusion is that the strategies are mostly synchronized, for at least two reasons: first; given the fact that the strategies are the products of related policies, it is quite natural that they are in line with the “superior” documents; and second, the strategies that are the particular responsibility of the same ministries are completely harmonized, both formally and contextually. By the same token, if there is a need for addressing the threats, risks or challenges stemming from the same deficiency (e.g. porous borders) there is a certain level of overlapping in pursuing the respective strategies (e.g. terrorism and organized crime). Concerning the fact that all strategies discussed in this research are yet to be introduced, none of them have been updated yet, which leaves no room for the analysis in this regard.

In conclusion, to quote the Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006: 3): “the stable security environment requires equally good security conditions in BiH”, which implies the need to resolve the problems in the field of security as one of the fundamental conditions for the inclusion of BiH in the EU and NATO. It is not only the security situation in BiH that depends on the fast and efficient resolution of





these problems, but also the general progress in BiH, which is seen as a main indicator for the association and accession processes. That is why the Strategies are of the paramount importance for BiH, particularly in ensuring the changes that will resolve the issue of different security problems in a long run, but they are also the instruments that set up the “framework for the incorporation and application of European standards and regulations in BiH legislation and constitutional system”.

## Bibliography

Beridan, I. (2008) *Politika i sigurnost*. Sarajevo: Fakultet političkih nauka.

Defence Reform Commission, (2003) *Defence Reform Commission 2005 Report. AFBiH: A SINGLE MILITARY FORCE FOR THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY*. Sarajevo. (Komisija za reformu odbrane, (2003) *Izveštaj komisije za reformu odbrane za 2005.godinu. AFBiH: VOJNA SILA ZA XXI VEK*. Sarajevo.

Defence Reform Commission, (2003) *Report of the Defence Reform Commission. The Path to Partnership for Peace*. Sarajevo. (Komisija za reformu odbrane, (2003) *Izveštaj Komisije za reformu. Put ka Partnerstvu za mir*. Sarajevo)

Dujović, J. (2005) *Teorija strategije*. Sarajevo: Fakultet političkih nauka.

Federalno ministarstvo pravde, (1999) *Ustavi Bosne i Hercegovine*. Sarajevo.

Ministarstvo civilnih poslova Bosne i Hercegovine, (2008) *Strategija protivminskog djelovanja Bosne i Hercegovine(2009-2019)*. Sarajevo. [http://www.mcp.gov.ba/zakoni\\_akti/strategije/Archive.aspx?template\\_id=19&pageIndex=1](http://www.mcp.gov.ba/zakoni_akti/strategije/Archive.aspx?template_id=19&pageIndex=1) [10.02.2010].

Ministarstvo sigurnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, (2006) *Strategija Bosne i Hercegovina za borbu protiv terorizma (za period 2006 – 2009)*. Sarajevo.

Ministarstvo sigurnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, (2008) *Okvirni zakon o zaštiti i spašavanju ljudi i materijalnih dobara od prirodnih ili drugih nesreća u BiH*. Sarajevo. [http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template\\_id=44&pageIndex=1](http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template_id=44&pageIndex=1) [10.02.2010].

Ministarstvo sigurnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, (2008) *Plan civilno-vojne saradnje u slučaju odgovora na terorističke napade i saniranje njihovih posljedica*. Sarajevo. [http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template\\_id=44&pageIndex=1](http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template_id=44&pageIndex=1) [10.02.2010].

Ministarstvo sigurnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, (2008) *Strategija Bosne i Hercegovine za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala (period 2009. – 2012)*. Sarajevo. [http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template\\_id=44&pageIndex=1](http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template_id=44&pageIndex=1) [10.02.2010].

Ministarstvo sigurnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, (2008) *Strategija i akcioni plan za sprečavanje pranja novca i finansiranja terorističkih aktivnosti u Bosni i Hercegovini*.



Sarajevo. [http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template\\_id=44&pageIndex=1](http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template_id=44&pageIndex=1) [10.02.2010].

Ministarstvo sigurnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, (2008) *Strategija za borbu protiv korupcije (2009. – 2014.)*. Sarajevo. [http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template\\_id=44&pageIndex=1](http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template_id=44&pageIndex=1) [10.02.2010].

Ministarstvo sigurnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, (2009) *Državna strategija nadzora nad opojnim drogama, sprječavanja i suzbijanja zloupotrebe opojnih droga u Bosni i Hercegovini za period 2009-2013*. Sarajevo. [http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template\\_id=44&pageIndex=1](http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/Archive.aspx?template_id=44&pageIndex=1) [10.02.2010].

Predsjedništvo Bosne i Hercegovine, (2001) *Odbrambena politika Bosne i Hercegovine*. Sarajevo.

Predsjedništvo Bosne i Hercegovine, (2008) *Odbrambena politika Bosne i Hercegovine*. Sarajevo.

Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2004) *Military Doctrine of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Sarajevo. (*Vojna doktrina Oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine*)

Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2006) *Decision on the Size, Structure and Locations of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Sarajevo. (*Odluka o veličini, strukturi i lokacijama Oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine*)

An interview with Mr Ahmet Hadziomerovic, assistant to the Minister of Defence of BiH for policy building and planning, conducted on February 3, 2010.

NUMBER	CHALLENGE, RISK or THREAT	CATEGORY			LEVEL OF ANALYSIS – SCOPE OF THREAT/PRETINUE					THE SOURCE OF THREAT (AS STATED BY THE PROPOSER)	SECTOR (AS STATED BY THE PROPOSER)	OBJECT OF REFERENCE (WHAT IS PROTECTED)
		Challenge	Risk	Threat	Global	Regional	National	Sub-national	Individual			
		C	R	T	G	R	N	S	I			
1	Differences between rich and poor parts of the world	x			x					differences in the level of economic and social progress		Security of BiH
2	Interstate conflicts	x			x	x				general war low probability still not disregarding its possibility since permanent peace and security are not in place yet		Security of BiH
3	International terrorism in all its forms	x			x					Problems in the field of combating terrorism in BiH are evident, while existing infrastructure (both legislative and institutional) is insufficient		Security of BiH
4	Constant environmental threats	x		x	x		x			industrial and technological progress, technological, civilian and military waste, degradation of arable land and forest, water and air pollution, pandemics, global warming, etc		Security of BiH
5	Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	x			x					uncontrolled production and trade in weapons, including weapons of mass destruction		Security of BiH
6	Increase in forced migrations	x			x					armed conflicts, racial conflicts and discrimination, ethnic intolerance, or political pressures in autocratic and non-democratic regimes		Security of BiH
7	Various forms of organized crime	x			x					human, weapon and drug trafficking, money laundry and falsification, illegal trade of high value goods, cyber crime, robberies, car theft		Security of BiH
8	Transition to market economy	x				x	x			Huge drop in domestic and foreign investment; slowness and troubles in privatization, technological regression and deterioration of production capacities and uneven pace of repair of infrastructure destroyed in war		Security of BiH
9	Trade route between Europe and Asia	x				x				great opportunity to illegal trade in weapons, narcotics, and human trafficking, as well as transit of terrorists groups and materials for terrorists' activities		Security of BiH

10	Tendencies towards secession, self-rule and independence	x				x		certain ethnic groups. Process of creating independent states in the area of then multinational federations has not been finished yet.	Security of BiH
11	Legacy of political and social animosity	x				x		elements that advocate various kinds of nationalistic extremism	Security of BiH
12	Concentration of the military capacities in the region	x				x		relatively high concentration of the military capacities in the region	Security of BiH
13	Failure to fully implement the Dayton Peace Agreement	x				x		incomplete and selective implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord	Security of BiH
14	Return of displaced persons and refugees	x				x		insufficient financial resources	Security of BiH
15	Political transition	x				x		slow development of efficient and effective executive, legislative and judicial bodies, slow pace of democratization	Security of BiH
16	Insufficient border protection	x				x		inadequate protection of borders, which makes the fight against organized crime and terrorism more difficult	Security of BiH
17	High unemployment rate	x				x			Security of BiH
18	Weapons and ammunition storage	x				x		stored in inadequate storage sites and illegally held in individual possession	Security of BiH
19	Large number of land mines and UXO throughout the country	x			x	x		BiH is still considered highly contaminated area. This particular problem still poses a tangible threat to the population security as well as to the state's economic development.	Security of BiH
20	Corruption	x			x	x		being a part of the organized crime, corruption in both public and private sector poses a real threat to the society	Security of BiH

*Challenges, risks and threats as defined by strategic documents of BiH*



# Croatia

Zvonimir Mahečić

## Strategic Documents - Context

The process of preparation and passing of the strategic documents in Croatia was a long and troublesome affair. From the second half of the 90s, some political and scientific circles gradually became aware that it would be necessary to pass the main strategic papers in order to offer state institutions, and the society as a whole, some sort of anchoring point from which to shape the main parameters of security, foreign affairs and defence policies. However, until the year 2000, this awareness did not gain ground among all predominant political sector players.

The most common reservations occasionally expressed were that Croatia defended itself in the war without strategic papers, that the existence of the strategic papers did not guarantee the shaping of and pursuing a sound state policy (all the above mentioned policies included), that strategic papers, if accepted and passed by the state bodies, could even prevent pursuing adequate and necessary activities in the ever-changing global and regional environment, and finally, that for the well being of the society it was much more important to have quality people within the political process and sound, battle-proven professionals within the framework of the security and defence structures than just a sheer piece of paper.

The fact that the then President was not satisfied with sporadic drafts and strategic papers offered and presented to him was certainly one of the reasons why Croatia did not have strategic papers developed and adopted by that time. He believed that, with his political and historical scientific background, he was better suited to shape, direct and answer all strategic questions and issues Croatia might be confronted with.

It was only when the previous opposition in the form of the coalition of six parties, led by the Social Democratic Party, won the parliamentary elections in January 2000 that the issue of passing strategic documents became ripe for resolving, one way or another.

## Croatian Strategic Framework

After many years of deliberations, the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (National Security Strategy, 2002) was adopted by the parliament in March 2002. On the very same day, March 19<sup>th</sup>, the parliament also adopted the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (Defence Strategy, 2002). Exactly one year later, on March 19<sup>th</sup> 2003, the President of the Republic adopted the Military Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (Military Strategy, 2003). However, in order to understand fully the Croatian strategic documents, we have to go back to the past to shed some light on the process of their development.



Very soon after coming to power, in the summer of the year 2000, the Coalition Government started the project entitled “Croatia in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”. Within the framework of this project the most important strategic documents were to be proposed and passed in order to take effect<sup>1</sup>. It was not only about the security and defence. Health care, economy, culture, foreign affairs and all other established and crucial state-related fields of activities were supposed to develop their strategic documents in order to decide on state policies and shape state activities in the future. This was an overwhelming and very serious task.

What was very important at that moment was the fact that the Government did not want ministries and assorted state agencies to develop their respective strategic papers. Instead, the Government contracted independent teams for each specific field of activities and tasked them with preparation of the strategic papers. State ministries and agencies were to offer all available support to all those teams in the initial phases of the project, and to review proposals of the strategic documents at the closing stages of the project when eventual discrepancies or different opinions between independent teams and state representatives were to be sorted out.

<b>Title</b>	<b>Adopted</b>	<b>Amended or updated</b>
National Security Strategy	March 2002	No
Defence Strategy	March 2002	No
Military Strategy	March 2003	No
Strategic Defence Review	September 2005	No
Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan*	June 2006	No

*Table 3: Strategic Documents of the Republic of Croatia*

\* Although theoretically speaking not really strategic document, part of its content covers some strategic considerations.

It must be said that the Government and its structures generally did not interfere with the work of the team that was tasked with covering the security of the state and society. However, at the end of the project, in the winter and early spring of 2002., after almost a year and a half of invested time and effort, some circles within the Intelligence Community and the Ministry of Defence were not satisfied with the outlook of the security sector offered by the National Security Study, and managed to reverse the situation. All the main ideas and concepts offered by the independent team were tacitly shelved, and a small group of people (five or six) from the main state ministries were tasked with drafting the strategic documents within a few weeks' time.

---

<sup>1</sup> The intention of the project was for the teams to propose strategic concepts, main strategic ideas, even more or less comprehensive and overarching drafts of the strategic documents, based on which official state structures would prepare the final documents to be passed in the Parliament.

## Strategic Hierarchy

As we have already seen, in the case of the Republic of Croatia, two out of three security and defence related strategies, namely the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy, were prepared in haste, over the same period, and passed in the parliament on the same day.

Consequently, it would be very hard to claim that the level of generalization and importance of these strategic documents is following any kind of smooth transition from the more general and important documents to more specific ones. This could apply only to the relation between the Military Strategy and the two strategies already mentioned, as the period of one year theoretically left enough room for the Military Strategy to be more specific and more rooted in the accomplishments of the two strategies passed before.

However, this observation is valid only if we bear in mind the timeframe and the more specific topic and area of responsibility of the Military Strategy. Judging by the results, i.e., the resolution of some important topics in the Military Strategy (which will be dealt with to some extent in the further text), it could only be said that the time between its adoption and the adoption of two earlier strategic documents could have been used better.

Apparently, this explains some overlapping of the contents of the three strategic documents. What is even worse, reading the texts can become an arduous task, as they were all written in a very bureaucratic language which is often very hard to follow. For an average citizen and even some professionals, such as media reporters and scientists, reading the documents, understanding them and reaching conclusions from them can be a difficult task. This can partly be explained by the educational and professional characteristics of the group that drafted the texts.

## Key Factors in Adopting and Updating of the Strategic Documents

The general social and political framework which influenced the final attempts at preparation and adoption of the first set of security and defence strategies have been explained to some extent in the first chapter. However, there is more to it.

Shortly after the coalition centre-left wing Government came to power in 2000, Croatia joined the Partnership for Peace Program. The Coalition Government soon realized that the existence of the key strategic documents is one (certainly not the only one and probably not even the most important one) of the pre-requisites for Croatia in order to prove the validity of its attempts to make up for the time lost in the first ten years of independence. The executive and parliamentary officials involved in security and defence affairs soon realized that all other countries had already passed or were in the process of passing their strategic documents. Thus, a logical conclusion was that Croatia had to do the same. Furthermore, strategic documents were seen as panacea that should prove to the then NATO member countries and western governments that the Coalition Government meant business. In that sense, strategic documents were expected not only to serve their purpose, but even to redress some shortcomings in other areas of domestic policies and international affairs and relations.



A quite similar situation occurred a few years later with the Strategic Defence Review. The plan for the preparation of such a document was first announced in the Annual National Program for 2003, despite the fact that no legal, procedural, strategic or doctrinal foundations existed for the adoption of this document. At that time there was no clear idea regarding the Review's content or its place in the hierarchy of security and defence documents. Its purpose, apart from emulating and copying other states, was equally unclear, as well as what state institutions should be involved in its preparation and adoption. The series of constitutional and legal changes and adjustments undertaken in the period 2000-2002 did not include provisions for preparing, passing and execution of such a document. All of a sudden, the Ministry of Defence officials realized this was a very important document in many countries, which resulted in its incorporation in the body of strategic documents. However, the preparation, adoption and execution of this document, not to mention the responsibilities of the state institutions, ministries, agencies and organizations involved in the process, was full of ambiguity for quite a while, because there were no legal provisions in any of the recently updated laws. In the end, the Strategic Defence Review was adopted in the spring 2005 and very soon became *ersatz* replacement for obsolete strategic documents hastily adopted a couple of years before..

### **Institutions Tasked with Preparation of the Strategic Documents**

Generally speaking, during the first round of preparations of strategic documents there were very few legal provisions clearly stating tasks and authorities of selected state institutions in the process of drafting. Later, in the process of adapting security and defence legal framework, these authorities were introduced in the new versions of the main security and defence laws.

As mentioned before, it is also interesting that in the year 2000 the Coalition Government did not want sections, departments or individual experts from the governmental organizations to be significantly involved in the process of preparation and drafting of the strategic documents. They offered two reasons for such an approach.

First, they wanted a fresh approach in the preparation of the strategic framework; an approach that the majority of those who were involved in the then decision-making process believed could not be expected from established structures and institutional approach. Second, it was hypothesized that professionals working in the selected state institutions on various levels were simply involved too much in every-day operations and activities of their institutions and did not have time, strength and focus for the preparation of strategic documents.

Consequently, the work related to the preparation of the strategic documents was mostly completed by predominantly independent group of experts. As the preparation phase was nearing the end, certain problems arose threatening to jeopardize the whole process. It was decided that a specific set of strategies should be drafted independently from the work already done by the group involved in the preparation of the strategic framework. However, this task was assigned again to just a group of a few people from selected institutions who prepared the strategic documents almost overnight, without significant involvement of the structures as such.



Domestic NGOs were not involved in the first round of drafting of the strategic documents. This was partly due to the unwillingness of the official structures to give the NGOs a significant role in the process. But in truth, it was not really hard for the official structures to take such a position because almost none of the NGOs active and operational at that period managed to profile themselves as a significant and important subject in the security and defence matters.

It is estimated that there are approximately 20000 NGOs in Croatia. Out of this number, less than 1000 are operational and have only a few members. The security and defence oriented NGOs are almost non-existent. Some of them were established as the more or less private or family ventures. It is still not clear whether they will develop into real NGOs or remain just small security and defence related enterprises. Some others can hardly be considered NGOs due to their strong political ties with the political parties, especially those from the right-wing political background.

The influence and the role of NGOs, as an instrument for establishing the civilian oversight and influence of the civil society on the operations of the national security structures, including the process of preparation and adoption of the strategic documents, cannot be overestimated. But we still have to wait for them to develop up to the desired level and take the role that belongs to them in establishing democratic and civilian control and oversight over the defence and security structures.

The situation was somewhat different regarding the involvement of the international organizations or other states. On one hand, all support, advice and recommendations that was obtained from international sources were welcomed either by the independent expert group that was drafting the strategic framework or by the official state institutions. The contacts with their representatives were established on almost daily basis and both sides were paying serious attention to anything coming from these sources. This does not necessarily mean that every advice was readily accepted.

On the other hand, the official state institutions and structures did not want the international subjects to be involved in the process of preparation of the strategic framework. Both state institutions and the independent group felt that we should be able to prepare, draft and pass the strategic framework on our own. This was not the consequence of any antagonism towards any particular side, but simply the result of the belief that there must exist within the society a critical mass of expert knowledge reliable enough to safeguard the preparation of the strategic framework on our own.

As for the public, the media followed very closely all the steps leading to the preparation of the strategic framework and offered to the public and the citizens a lot of information along the way. The public, although not directly involved in the process of the preparation of the documents, was at least well informed about it. The media represent an important corrective instrument in the operations of the security and defence structures. Unfortunately, it is more than obvious that reporters and editors do not have the necessary knowledge to cover the security and defence issues. It is sometimes frustrating to read the articles in the newspapers, only to find out that their authors are not comfortable even with the security and



defence related legal framework. If they cannot keep the track of the laws that are accessible to every citizen, it is almost impossible to expect them to have any deeper knowledge about the security and defence structures, operations, reforms, changes in the security and defence environment, etc. Furthermore, we have to face the truth that the media are mostly interested in scandals and political struggles resulting from or influencing the security and defence structures and functions. It is noticeable that almost every daily newspaper has a favourite political option which is used to filter the information according to political affiliations.

The general public is too concerned with the survival and its economic well-being to pay much attention security and defence issues. There is also a serious lack of security and defence related knowledge among the general population that prevents the establishment of any coherent views on the part of the general public. In addition, what has already been said about the media is also true for the public. People tend to take sides according to their political views, disregarding any information that might shed a different light and perspective on certain security and defence related issues. The necessity of the defence reform is a clear sign. Most people do not understand all the intricacies of the reform and the fact that some people might be 'hurt' by undertaking the process of the reform.

Lastly, there is no regular annual publication covering the security and defence matters with the objective of informing and educating the public about all important events regarding the armed forces' operations. It has been already noticed that more information is available to the international organisations and other states than to our own public. This is partly the consequence of the lack of interest on the part of the general public and the weak position and influence of the NGOs, and partly the result of the lack of understanding and initiative in the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, but above all the political institutions responsible for the security and defence operations. This will hopefully change in the future.

On the other hand, the academia and the scientific community were represented in the independent team, though not at the level that some scientists, from state or other institutions believed was necessary. This very fact at the end of the process of preparation of strategic framework proved to be decisive in its tacit demise. Some professionals and scientists started an organized attack on the resulting study containing strategic framework and managed to find support among the officials in some of the key state ministries and agencies. In the end, they succeeded in abolishing the results of the eighteen months long work. It should be mentioned that the core of the independent group tasked with the preparation of the strategic framework consisted of thirteen professionals, scientists, experts and officials, while nearly two hundred other professionals, scientists, experts and officials were involved, one way or another, in the preparation of the strategic framework. But obviously it was impossible to involve everybody who felt hurt by the omission.

Croatian parliament adopted the strategic documents which had been prepared overnight, within only a couple of weeks, by even smaller group of people from various institutions and without any significant public, professional or scientific involvement and review, without public workshops and round tables that would enable representatives of different social groups to have a say regarding the re-

sults of the work. A discussion in the Parliament's Committee about the content of the proposed strategic documents was organised when the work had already been over and just before the adoption of the documents in the Parliament.

### **Responsibilities in the Process of Preparation and Adoption of Strategic Documents**

The Croatian parliament has a significant role in shaping the security and defence policy. Its key authorities and responsibilities regarding the main strategic documents are as follows:

- It adopts the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy;
- It approves the Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan, etc.

According to the then and present Constitution, the President's authorities and responsibilities regarding the preparation and adoption of the main security and defence-related strategic documents are as follows:

- To approve the proposal of the Defence Strategy,
- To adopt the Military Strategy.

The Government's responsibilities and authorities, as the main operative body tasked with the management of the state affairs, at the time of preparation of the first round of strategic documents included:

- proposal of the Defence strategy to the parliament,
- proposal of the Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan to the parliament,
- presenting of the Annual Report on the Defence Readiness to the parliament,
- control of the operations of the security structures, etc.

At that period, the civilian Minister of Defence represented the first step in exercising democratic control of the Armed Forces. The change of the Constitution and defence-related laws did not alter significantly the competencies and responsibilities of the Ministry of Defence, though it did introduce more streamlined relations with the General Staff. Also, these changes created a relatively clear position of the Ministry as a middle step between the General Staff as a professional body and the Government, the President and the parliament as the top political institutions responsible for the national security and defence of the country. The strong position of the Ministry was evident from the fact that basically all proposals, acts or documents of the General Staff had to get the minister's signature or at least consent, before being presented to the above mentioned political institutions.

The responsibilities of the Ministry of Defence included:

- the preparation of the Defence Strategy draft;
- the Military Strategy draft had to be approved by the Minister;
- the preparation of the Annual Report on Readiness,
- the preparation of the Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan,



- contributing to the process of preparation of the National Security Strategy, etc.

A revised legal framework also made the role of the General Staff much clearer in preparing all major acts and documents regarding the security and defence of the country. In the past, the position was not so clear because the General Staff's responsibilities and its relation with the Ministry and the top political institutions were in most cases not mentioned in the laws. The roles and responsibilities of the Armed Forces or the General Staff were to:

- prepare the Military Strategy,
- participate in the preparation of the Defence Strategy,
- participate in the preparation of the Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan, etc.

According to the provisions of the Security Services Law, the National Security Council (NSC) exercises democratic control of the security services. This is a political body tasked with facilitating the co-operation between the President and the Government in directing the operations of the intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies. The members of the NSC are the President, the Prime Minister, a member of the Government responsible for the National security, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice and the Chief of the General Staff. Other politicians, scientists and professionals can be invited if necessary.

### **Internal coherence and soundness of the Strategic Framework**

The preparation of the first round of strategic documents brought to the light certain elements of vital importance for the future security of the state and the nation, as well as other elements, some positive and some negative, which directly influence the future cooperation of state institutions.

Regarding the relations between the government and the parliament, it has to be taken into account that the parliament's role is not to take the operational lead in state affairs. The duty of the parliament is to exercise democratic oversight - not democratic control - of the security and defence structures. Democratic control belongs to the Executive branch, which in turn can be held responsible to the parliament for any action taken. A common practice in this area is that legislative bodies set the legal framework for the development and execution of strategic documents, discuss them and give their opinion on the documents. The top executive level usually gives approval for these documents and bears responsibility for their application.

According to the Constitution and the security and defence related laws, it is a responsibility of the parliament to pass both the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy. This seems to be a common solution in the countries in transition, as they have the same historical background. It is true that, in the case of Croatia, the parliament was overly neglected in the past (the first ten years of independence) and the Government was responsible more to the President than to the parliament. However, since the year 2000, when the Coalition Government

came to power, the pendulum has obviously swung in the opposite direction. At the time of adoption of the strategic documents there were clear signs that the parliament was intent on taking certain competencies that did not belong to the legislative body. Actually, this statement would hold even more truth if some intentions, proposed in the drafts of the security and defence laws, were not stopped at the last moment. For instance, during the process of drafting the laws there was an attempt to put Internal Intelligence Control directly under the parliament's oversight. It has finally been changed in the last version of the Security Services Law. If it gets approval, it would mean that the top representative body elected by the people would have the part of the repressive apparatus and armed officials at disposal as well as operational control, which would lead to the establishment of some sort of the parliamentary autocracy or dictatorship. Unfortunately, this was also one example of the political thinking supported by the professionals ready to trade their professional expertise which leads to a complete distortion of the democratic principle of separation of the powers within the society.

The current constitutional regulation by which Croatian parliament is authorized to approve the National Security and Defence Strategy is illogical, because it enables the legislative body to enforce basic documents of the executive branch. The consequence is that the executive body is in the long run practically not responsible for the contents of strategic documents, and can always avoid responsibility or put the blame on the parliament. If the parliament has any issue with the content of the strategic documents it can use its power and authority to demand the resignation of the respective ministers. However, putting the decision making on the content of the fundamental policy documents in the hands of the executive branch seriously undermines the parliament's credibility and dignity and renders it powerless should any issue with the content of the strategic documents occur in the future.

In order to make the national security structures operate successfully, it is necessary to fulfil the following:

1. Every institution and organization of the national security system should participate in preparing the strategic documents. This should be the provision of the National Security Law.
2. In the preparation phase, the parliament should develop basic principles and directions and pass them in the form of the Declaration on National Security. These principles and directions should be respected in the final version of the strategic documents.
3. After the proposals of the strategic documents have been prepared by the executive branch, Croatian Parliament opens discussion and gives its opinion.
4. The President and the Prime Minister, as the Chairmen of the National Security Council approve the strategic documents.

It is essential for the national security system that organizations of the national security structure participate in preparing legal proposals, strategic and planning documents, and carry out an objective evaluation. In addition, they must be empowered or accountable for enforcing by-laws and other doctrinal documents that must be at some point approved by state authorities.



The right of the parliament to discuss the strategic papers is definitely not to be questioned, but on the other hand, it is somewhat puzzling that provisions of the Constitution and the laws, which envisaged that the parliament is in reality the institution which approves and adopts the strategic documents, were not seriously challenged by scientists, professionals, the media and NGOs. Unfortunately, the President, bearing in mind his (or, one day, her) authorities in the defence area, foreign policy and security affairs, does not have a say in this process. Moreover, it is strange that the President has no legal or institutional influence on the process of allocating parts of the state budget to the security, intelligence and defence sector, while on the other hand the President shares responsibility for the security and defence of the country with the government. In this light, the accepted legal provisions might have serious consequences on the development and execution of the security and defence policies, as they logically should be based on the approved strategic documents. How and to what extent this is going to influence the security and defence of the nation remains to be seen.

### **The results of the Risk Analysis**

A complete (with some reservations explained later) list of challenges, risks and threats identified in the still operational and valid Croatian strategic framework is provided in the Table 1 in the Annex to this text. There are, however, some very important remarks that have to be made and taken into consideration in the evaluation of the results of the risk analysis process within Croatian state institutions during the process of preparation of the strategic documents.

The Risk analysis identified nearly twenty different issues that should be included in the content of the National Security Strategy. The first seven issues listed in the Table 1 were actually a part of the Chapter I - *Security Environment and Challenges to the Republic of Croatia*. The rest were the part of the Chapter II -: *Challenges, Risks and Threats to the Republic of Croatia*. One can wonder if this was done by accident or on purpose. Chapter I was meant to offer a more conceptual approach to certain security issues and Chapter III should have been devoted to the enumeration and description of the challenges, risks and threats. The author of this text wonders why some elements were mentioned in Chapter I and then the same ones were partly rephrased later in Chapter III, nor does he understand if this was a sort of message to both local and international readers. But the end result was a somewhat confusing content of the National Security Strategy. This also leaves room for speculation about a possible prioritization of the enumerated threats. It is probably true, although it is not specifically stated anywhere, that the order in which the threats were listed actually represents a certain level of prioritization. Consequently, bearing in mind what has been said about the same threats mentioned in two different chapters, it could be concluded that first seven threats were considered priorities by the authors and MPs. However, this is just a speculation as there are no clear statements in the text of the strategy that might explain this.

If the Risk Analysis description is read carefully, it soon becomes obvious that the authors of the strategy, and later, of course, parliamentary representatives who approved of this document, did not bother too much to specify whether some

of the elements in the Table 1 were considered to be threats, risks or challenges. Consequently, the author of this text was forced to make his own conclusions from the wording and the general idea of the text whenever a clear distinction was not given in the description.

This applies to the subject of the threat as well. Except for some parts of the text that stated more or less clearly that the objective of the strategy was to protect the nation and the citizens from certain threats, in many cases it remains unclear as to what extent certain challenges, risks and threats represent a threat to the state, nation or the society in general. Correspondingly, it is very hard to find a clear statement as to what or who the object of protection is.

The sources of threats were in most cases also not clearly specified. However, when dealing with certain regional affairs and relations and the security environment shaped by them, the strategy does specify some states in the region or the region as a whole as a designated source of threat. This also applies when we try to find information related to the sector where the listed threats belong or are coming from.

In conclusion, it can be said with certainty that the authors and the parliament did less than a satisfactory job in providing the state institutions and the society, as well as partners in the international community with a clear and unambiguous vision of the security and strategies pertaining to it.

### **Instruments That Provide Security**

Strategic documents, especially the National Security Strategy, offer different tools for providing and building the necessary level of the security to the nation. The first tool represents a relatively comprehensive list of the National Security Objectives that should serve as security policy framework for all the state institutions involved. The second tool should have been the security concept, but in the end there is no security concept as a higher level of conceptualization of pursuing the security policy. Instead, the strategy requires the security concept to be derived from security objectives, so that every reader is left to his or her own devices and imagination in trying to synthesize strategic conceptual premises of the Croatian security policy. And third tool is represented by the Principles of pursuing the national security, among which the most important is the understanding of necessity of cooperation between all the state institutions if desired level of security is to be reached.

This immediately answers one very important question which can be summarised as an understanding and intention that most, if not all, state ministries and agencies should cooperate in pursuing a desired level of national security, each of them within the range and scope of its authorities and responsibilities, and the whole work is integrally managed and coordinated by the highest state institutions, the parliament, the President and the government. These are the most important and responsible state institutions for providing the state and the nation with a reasonable, expected and desired level of security.





## Strategies vs. Strategic Defence Review

Ever since their coming into effect in 2002, and despite all changes in the global and regional security environment, Croatian strategic documents have not been modified. However, as Strategic Defence Review actually became more or less a new strategy, it was interesting to notice the main strategic provision which was clearly and openly stated in the Spring of 2005, that this document had been prepared on the premises that Croatia was already a member of NATO. As we know now, though it was quite obvious even then, this stand had been taken four years before Croatia really became the member of the alliance.

The main arguments for considering this document a replacement for the national security and defence strategy lies in the fact that it provides an incorporated assessment of the security environment, the analysis of the national interests and objectives of the Republic of Croatia, risk and threat analysis, as well as the analysis of international obligations and international geopolitical and geo-strategic environment.

Therefore, this document partly follows the key provisions and statements of the previous National Security, Defence and Military strategies, but partly defines some new elements that should remain within the framework of the possible new set of the above mentioned strategies. For example, military missions and tasks were significantly revised. Such a development led to the conclusion that the previous set of strategic documents was tacitly abandoned and was mostly forgotten, whereas the Strategic Defence Review became a new holy scripture of the Croatian strategic security and defence thinking. The conclusion is obvious. While strategic documents have not been changed and adapted to the new security environment, in reality Croatian strategic outlook has changed. This is evident from the list of challenges, risks and threats accepted in the Strategic Defence Review which differs significantly from the same list accepted in the National Security Strategy three years earlier.<sup>2</sup>

The reason for such development can partly be found in the sphere of political power, influence and interests. In 2002, there was a clear understanding that something had to be done in terms of strategy. Political differences were put aside and key political institutions worked together, albeit hesitantly, to provide the nation with the first set of strategic documents. After that there was no more internal or external impetus strong enough to force them to repeat the process. And then, at least in the last couple of years, Croatian accession to NATO has become the strongest element in preventing the preparation and adoption of the new set of strategic documents. Both the security and defence institutions believed that it would be useless to adopt strategic documents and then change them after joining NATO. So the work was postponed first for the time after joining the alliance, and then for the time after the new NATO Strategy will have been passed (which is actually expected to happen this spring).

It is very interesting that the Strategic Defence Review was quite optimistic in enumerating all sorts of military missions and military tasks. It is quite obvious that Croatia does not have the necessary resources to provide for all these missions

---

<sup>2</sup> The information about this differences can be found in the column "Remark" in Table 1.



and tasks. At the time of the adoption of the Strategic Defence Review there was a clear dilemma whether our tasks and objectives should be measured according to the available or realistically reachable resources, or vice versa. The prevailing attitude is that by adopting such a list of tasks and missions the state institutions will burden themselves with obligations that will be hard to fulfil eventually.

### **Relation between Strategic Framework and Security Sector Reform**

Since the elections in January 2000 the Croatian Parliament adopted two changes of the Constitution. Moreover, after prolonged preparations, it finally passed new security and defence related laws in March 2002, exactly at the same time when the strategic documents (two out of three) were approved. Among those were the Defence Law, the Law on Armed Forces, the Security Services Law, the Law on Deployment of the Armed Forces Personnel and Units Abroad, and others.

Apart from the change from the semi-presidential system to the parliamentary system (but with the strong role of the President of the Republic in the security and defence matters), the most important change was that there were always two, sometimes even three instances involved in the process of preparing and approving of some of the key decisions regarding the operations of the security and defence structures.

These laws, although not ideal (there were some serious flaws which have already been or will be considered later in the text), represent an acceptable starting point for achieving co-operation and co-ordination of the security and defence structures and political institutions. But this did not happen without a cost. The process of changing the laws started in the second half of the year 2000. Hence, it took almost two years for the institutions to finally pass the new laws. This happened mostly because it took too much time to reach the consensus about the security and defence-related legal framework among the institutions involved. This was the result of different political interests of the key political players, interests much more related to specific personal and party goals and objectives than those of the nation as a whole.

In addition, there was a fundamental flaw regarding the background of the legal changes, the flaw that also prevented the legal changes to be prepared and approved sooner. The ruling coalition politicians have explained many times that the change of the legal framework is a precondition for the necessary security and defence reforms. Actually, the previous laws by no means hindered the work on the security and defence reform. The reform could have been and should have been started very soon after the governing coalition won the elections without waiting for some magical legislative changes to happen.

So the answer to the question of the degree of interrelatedness between the strategic documents and Security Sector Reform would be at best very ambiguous. The reform process followed the adoption of the Strategic Documents and public statements of the highest-rank state officials. One almost philosophical issue that deserves a completely separate analysis is whether the activities could really be called reforms. Nevertheless, disregarding this issue, it can be concluded that the reform process in Croatia was nominally based on the set of the Strategic Docu-



ments passed in the first round of their preparations in the years 2002.-2003.

In reality, the reforms were carried out quite randomly and represented various political and ideological views and ideas. The reason for this is twofold. First, at the time of preparation and adoption of the Strategic Documents, the top priority was to prepare and adopt whatever set of documents could be prepared in the very short period of time. That is the reason why it is very hard to find coherent reformative ideas and visions in the finally accepted set of the Strategic Documents.

Second, when the Security Sector Reforms finally came to the fore, it became quite obvious that the Strategic Documents represented a very weak foundation for serious and coherent reforms which paved the ground for the forthcoming reforms to be individually, politically or ideologically driven.

### **Conclusions**

A clearly defined framework is a precondition for every social activity to be carried out successfully, no matter whether it is a legal, procedural, behavioural or doctrinal activity. Legal regulations create a socially acceptable framework for the functioning of the national security system. This refers to constitutional and all other laws and by-laws, either of domestic or international origin. The pivotal role in its enforcement is attributed to the legislative body consisting of representatives selected by the people and among the people. They are appointed to pass regulations and exercise democratic guidance and oversight over the functioning of the state administration system.

Strategic, doctrinal and planning documents set framework for the functioning of the national security system and specify the implementation framework of activities. They must be harmonized with current regulations, i.e., proclaimed goals and adopted aims of strategic and doctrinal ideas. The executive authority must have the most important role in preparing, enforcing and implementation of these documents. This, however, does not undermine the importance of the legislator in providing necessary approval, supervision and guidance. Moreover, such correlation and cooperation is a key to successful functioning of the national security system.

Strategic documents are the basis for the proper functioning of the national security system. Their nature is such that the turn of events and a passage of time confirm or deny their validity. This is why if proven wrong, in urgent and unexpected situations, their modification is impossible, overdue or irrelevant. In order to achieve their goals, the strategic documents need to be clear, conceptual statements of the security-related intentions and visions of state institutions. This is the reason the author believes that in the case of the Republic of Croatia we have strategic documents that are overlapping while at the same time failing to identify all the necessary strategic and security parameters. The fact that, in the end, we produced three strategies is partly due to the education and the way of doing business inherited from the previous state and political system. For all security purposes it would be enough to have just two strategies, the National Security Strategy and the Military Strategy. Defence Strategy is the relict of the past and in

contemporary global and security environment all necessary defence parameters crucial for the state and the nation are, and should be, encompassed within the National Security Strategy.

The widest possible participation of the public is necessary in the process of the preparation of strategic documents. This would guarantee that different opinions and interests of all parts of the society are represented in the process. Moreover, it is required that every institution, body and organization provide answers to key issues relevant for the functioning of the national security system.

Strategic documents in this area are based on the evaluation of the security environment. Professionals and scientists from independent and non-governmental organizations should be used as a corrective pool of knowledge and experience in supporting official institutions, state administration bodies and organizations of the national security system. Equally important is the estimate of available resources and abilities which the nation can rely on in carrying out its activities.

The strategic concept is a brief and clear sublimation of how the national security system uses economic, diplomatic, military and other instruments in accomplishing its goals and implementing a well-defined policy. Strategic documents clearly define goals to be accomplished by institutions using the measures of security, foreign, economic, defence policy and others. A hierarchy and priorities of goals must be provided, according to the level of importance and time schedule, whenever possible.

The mechanism of regular periodical review of these documents is another tool for starting timely actions and correcting falsely defined strategic concepts. The same process is applied in elaborating every other document developed from strategic documents to make it consistent and applicable. Goals will be reviewed in case of a large discrepancy between the needs and wishes based on estimations of the security environment and the lack of resources. It is vital to balance the goals with existing instruments and skills. Any change in this respect will initiate changes in the use of certain instruments which the society and state administration have at their disposal.

In setting up strategic documents, the system will consider multiple choice options for accomplishing its goals. Only those offering best chances, minimum expenses and burden to citizens, institutions and a whole society will be selected. Also, strategic documents are worked out by applying different methods. Only the parallel use of different methods, while taking into account the national resources, makes the potential risk of committing errors acceptably low.

The main intention of the nation's top political decision-makers concerning the national security should be to enable every institution or individual involved in the national security issues, to articulate their opinion in order to add extra value. Consequently, they would set the preconditions which will make it impossible for any important or knowledgeable factors to be left without a chance to voice their opinions.

In order to be able to do so, we need to have clearly defined security and defence structures. Their general layout has to be defined in the Constitution and



corresponding laws (Defence Law, Security Services Law, etc.). Also, authorities and responsibilities of the political institutions and professional organizations of the security and defence structure have to be clearly defined in the same legal acts mentioned above. It is not enough to have defined and created institutions only, without putting a serious effort in order to distinguish their authorities and responsibilities. This is the only safeguard against their attempts to take someone else's job and influence the outcome of the tasks that were not supposed to belong to them. This is true for the political institutions and professional organizations of the security and defence structures alike, and it is probably nowhere else as important as it is in the field of preparation, passing and execution of the security and defence related strategic documents.

At the everyday operational level regarding the execution of the strategic documents, we have to make sure that the existing procedures of co-operation are observed and followed by all the institutions involved. Finally, we have to secure the proper use of information by the key players of the security and defence structures. This does not only mean that we have to safeguard the information from improper use. Even more importantly, we have to educate and train the personnel (the representatives in the parliament, members of the executive branch, soldiers and intelligence services officials, but also independent scientists, members of the media and NGOs, etc.) to use the information to the best benefit of the society.

One very serious shortcoming of the legal framework regarding the process of preparation and passing of the basic security and defence strategic documents is that there are no clear provisions for the timeframe in which strategic documents have to be renewed and adopted. It is quite irrelevant if that is a fixed period of roughly four years, or immediately starting after regular parliamentary elections, or any other timeframe, for that matter. What is crucially important is that without such legal provision there is no obligation for the institutions to undertake a periodic process of renewal and updating of the strategic documents. This is the reason why, in the case of the Republic of Croatia, it was possible for the President of the Republic, certain Prime Ministers and even Ministers of Defence to turn a blind eye to the need for the adaptation of basic strategic documents, in the midst of serious and fundamental changes in the international security environment. The strategic documents of the Republic of Croatia are in fact waiting for the new NATO strategy to be adopted and only then will domestic political institutions, most likely in haste and more than willing to copy the new NATO strategic provisions, prepare and adopt new security, defence and military strategies, without putting much effort in serious considerations about their appropriateness with regard to the needs of the Croatian society and the state in the future.

## **Bibliography**

Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (2001) Zagreb: Narodne Novine 41/01;

Defence Law (2002) Zagreb: Narodne Novine 33/02;

Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (2002) Zagreb: Narodne Novine

33/02;

Law on Armed Forces Service (2002) Zagreb: Narodne Novine 33/02

National Security Study (Croatia in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century) (2001) Office of the Development Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Varaždinske toplice: Tonimir d.o.o.

Military Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (2003) Compendium of regulations and strategic documents form the field of defence, Zagreb: Ministry of Defence (Published in 2004)

National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (2002) Zagreb: Narodne Novine 32/02

Strategic Defence Review (2005) Zagreb: Ministry of Defence

No	Title	Category			Width					Source	Sector	Protecting	Remark
		I	R	P	G	R	N	PN	P				
1	Local and regional crisis	+				+				Unstable neighbourhood	Political Military	Croatia	
2	Globalization	+			+					Global economy and geopolitics	Political Economy Science	Croatia	
3	WMD Proliferation	+			+					Terrorist groups Organized crime	Political Criminal	Croatia Region	4. in SDR
4	Organized crime	+				+				Organized crime	Criminal	Croatia Region	5. in SDR
5	Refugee crisis	+				+				Unstable neighbourhood	Political Military	Croatia	
6	Ethnic clashes	+				+				Unstable neighbourhood	Political Military	Croatia	
7	Terrorism			+			+			Terrorist groups	Political Ideological	Croatia Region	3. in SDR
8	Aggression (military attack)			+				+		Unstable neighbourhood	Political Military	Croatia	1. in SDR
9	Regional crisis			+				+		Unstable neighbourhood	Political Military	Croatia	2. in SDR
10	Command of the transit pathways			+			+			Global economy and geopolitics	Political Economy	Croatia	
11	Transitional problems	+						+		Unstable neighbourhood	Political Economy	Croatia	
12	Domestic transition	+							+	Domestic instability	Political Economy Social	Croatia	
13	Judicial reform	+							+	Domestic reform processes	Political Social	Croatia	
14.	Protection of ethnic minorities	+							+	Unstable neighbourhood Domestic instability	Political Military Social	Croatia Region	







# Kosovo

Florian Qehaja

## Introduction

The development of a doctrinal framework in the security sector in Kosovo has been constrained by the uncertainty of the political status and its position as provided for by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. The resolution envisaged the reserved competencies of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) over the security sector during nine years of the international administration in Kosovo (1999 – 2008). This period saw no attempts in the development of a national security strategy due to the interpretation of the SRSG's responsibilities in this sector. However, the security challenges and the increased dynamics over the consolidation of the security mechanisms simultaneously required sector-based strategies. The development of sector strategies on an ad hoc basis discounted the vertical and horizontal harmonization of security sector documents in lieu of the national security strategy or concept. In this way, as it will be elaborated throughout this paper, the overall outcome of policy development in the security sector can be seen as an example of the bottom up approach.

In general, Kosovo has engendered scores of documents in the security field covering a wide range of issues indicating the needs for tackling the challenges of the Kosovar society ([www.mpb-ks.org](http://www.mpb-ks.org)). For a substantial period of time, Kosovo has been marked out as an interesting case by international organizations and consultancies for the drafting of strategic documents and bringing experience from the overseas countries. Indeed, the international assistance in this regard was widely admitted and applauded for especially in the immediate post-conflict period, even though it wouldn't be unfair to say that this completely sidelined any local ownership.

The recommendations for drafting and approving a single strategic document in the security sector were included in the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR).<sup>1</sup> However, the first international document requiring the development of the National Security Strategy (NSS) in Kosovo was the Comprehensive Proposal of the UN SC Envoy for the Final Status of Kosovo (Ahtisaari's Proposal, 2007).

After the declaration of independence on 17<sup>th</sup> February 2008, the NSS has been explicitly embedded in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. Thus, for the first time, Kosovo has the opportunity to develop an integrated security policy. It directly coincides with the development of newly founded security institutions such as the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA)

---

<sup>1</sup> The Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) in Kosovo was initiated by the Kosovo Government and UNMIK to take a holistic approach to the internal security situation. The ISSR Kosovo programme was built on a threat assessment based on the most extensive public consultations undertaken in a security sector review.



as well as the reform of the Kosovo Police (KP) and Emergency Management Structures. In addition, the unanimous public and political attitude for integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures triggered the development of the national strategic vision, therefore, on a macro scale, the need for a NSS was born as the result of the process of the security sector development and reform in Kosovo.

Bearing in mind the legal provisions, the question may arise of how far has Kosovo developed the doctrinal framework in the security sector? At the time of the writing of this paper, the Kosovo Government is in the process of drafting the NSS although it has not been approved yet. The delays over drafting a leading strategic document for guiding the security sector were criticized by the civil society actors and opposition parties. At this stage, at the institutional level, only a Police Strategy is available which has been drafted on the sector basis and, indeed, needs to be harmonized later on with the NSS as the latter is the most important document in the security sector.

The legal provisions do not recognise the defence policy of Kosovo, as defence is still the task carried out by the International Military Presence (IMP). While the KSF mandate is related to civil protection, it is supposed to fulfil security functions, which are inappropriate for the police or other law enforcement institutions (Law on KSF, 2008: 5). Despite this, it is not designed to conduct military tasks until its mandate is reviewed after a period of five years after the Constitution entered into force (Law on KSF, 2008: 5). In this way, for the time being, Kosovo will lack defence strategies or concepts on that particular subject. Consequently, this issue will not be the subject of this research.

This research relies on the qualitative analysis of the data and documents. The author used a wide variety of sources in order to gather the information required for a comprehensive study to ensure a high level of accuracy and allow for a detailed analysis of the topic. However, the inaccessibility of the public to the NSS and very limited sources on the topic prevented the author from answering the more concrete research questions. The sources mainly included:

- Kosovo's domestic legal framework
- interviews with stakeholders and security experts
- international and local sources on the topic

The first part of the research paper critically evaluates the process of the development of strategies run through three periods of security sector development and reform in Kosovo. A separate chapter analyses the recent developments related to the NSS, whereas the subsequent parts address the Kosovo Police Strategy and its objectives. A specific part highlights briefly the security challenges, risks and threats, though these are further constrained by a limited access to official documentation addressing this issue. This paper ends with the author's conclusions. An Annex on the Challenges, Risks and Threats is provided in a tabular chart.

### **The history of strategic framework development in Kosovo**

The end of hostilities in 1999 culminated in the approval of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 for the deployment of international civilian and

military presence in Kosovo. The first international attempts were purely reconstructive and predominantly based on planning to restore peace and order in post-conflict Kosovo. Indeed, the uncertain political status was heavily burdened with a robust strategic vision of the international actors present. This can be demonstrated by the approval of legal documents and other important papers specifically highlighting the validity on an all but temporary basis. Practically, this situation caused substantial confusions, especially when it came to the implementation process.

The development of strategic documents in the security sector can be evaluated through the overall developments of the security sector in Kosovo. For the purposes of this paper, this period will be split into three parts (KCSS, 2009: 5).

- First period 1999 – 2005
- Second period 2005 – 2008
- Third period 2008 and present

The *first period* highlights the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo's (UNMIK) authority as being absolute above the performance and functionality of all security institutions. The UNMIK and other international actors remained some of the most influential players vis-à-vis the development of the strategic framework for Kosovo. The strategies launched in this period were mainly sector based and they predominantly addressed specific issues that were crucial for the adoption of such a framework. That said, UNMIK's administration contributed towards the development of a strategic, bottom-up, approach. However, the absence of an integrated security policy and the lack of the NSS resulted in vagueness in the strategic framework's development. These sector-based strategies were not sufficient in addressing the security concerns and overall issues related to public security (Selimi, 2010: 2).

During this period, Kosovo remained an interesting market for international consultancies and individual consultants willing to engage in the development of strategic documents and their associated framework. Most consultants brought their experience from their home countries which reflected specific ambiguities and most of them did not correspond with Kosovo's circumstances and specific needs. Indeed, the idea of having documents with diverse contents was triggered by the policies of various donors present in Kosovo. This is exemplified in the issues of community safety and public security among the municipalities. Several ideas and models have consequently revealed that there were similar types of mechanisms operating and principally doing the same job (KCSS, 2010).<sup>2</sup> Similarly, in some cases, the models offered for security institutions caused discrepancies in the usage and structure of discordant techniques. In addition, the ambiguities regarding the content of the externally offered concepts and documents could be demonstrated from the language dimension. As the documents have been predominantly produced in English or other foreign languages, their meaning in the Albanian and/or Serbian languages was questionable. This has been found to be a consequence of the poor translation into local languages.

---

<sup>2</sup> There are at least two types of local safety mechanisms operating with a similar tasks: Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSC) and Community Safety Action Teams (CSAT)



Indeed, one may argue that the lack of local ownership does not contribute to the substantial development of policies and documental framework. In the case of Kosovo, the international presence was very reluctant to efficiently transfer the responsibility to the local actors. While it is difficult to underestimate the international community's efforts for capacity building in the security sector, an efficient and robust security sector has not been in the picture yet. Certainly, the international communities' approach towards the development of documents and policies deemed the Kosovo government dependent on the external assistance. In this way, the local intellectual and professional capacity to contribute to the development of the security policies has been questionable.

The second period, though shorter than the first one, marked the initial attempts for the transfer of competencies and reforms among the security institutions. It concentrated on the period after the end of 2005 until the declaration of the independence. However, while it does not substantially change the influence of the international presence, it increases the power of the Kosovo Government in the development of the strategic and doctrinal framework. Indeed, the establishment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Mol) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) triggered more locally based initiatives in drafting various strategic documents related to security issues, despite the lack of the NSS. In addition, new types of risks and threats required the institutional readiness of the Kosovo government to address these challenges in a coherent and holistic manner (ISSR, 2006: 26).

The third period coincides with the declaration of the independence of 17<sup>th</sup> of February and Kosovo's initial steps into statehood. The post-independence legal basis clarified the security policies of Kosovo but it does not reflect an integrated security sector. It also requires the development of the strategic papers in this sector, which will be evaluated in the next part of this paper.

<b>Title of the Strategy</b>	<b>Adopted-date</b>	<b>Amendment</b>
National Security Strategy	Expected to be adopted in 2010	
Kosovo Police Strategy	January 2008	No
KSF Strategy	Not adopted	
National Strategy for Integrated Border Management	April 2009	No

*Table 4: Strategic framework in Kosovo*

### **National Security Strategy**

As expressed above, during the UNMIK administration in Kosovo the issue of developing an NSS in Kosovo was practically banned and excluded from the agenda. There were no legal provisions requiring a strategic and doctrinal concept in the security sector. Hence, any effort to bring this issue into the discussion was highly discouraged by the UNMIK and the UN Legal Office in New York. However, the absence of the NSS does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of a similar docu-

ment being produced by UNMIK and KFOR for their internal purposes, although this would be restricted for public access.

The Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR), launched in 2005, recommended the development of the Kosovo Security Policy and security strategy (ISSR, 2006: 169) and it principally encouraged the international community to bring the subjects to discussion in relation to the future political arrangements in Kosovo. According to the recommendations, the 'Kosovo's Security Policy shall determine the specific national defence measures, priorities and activities of the institutions implementing government authority and administration' (ISSR, 2006: 170).

Moreover, the proposal for the Kosovo's Security Policy highlights that this policy should be created on the basis of a threat analysis which helps determine the basic strategic principles, priorities and measures that should be taken by the Kosovo government. However, this document could not practically 'move the stones' inter alia and attempts for designing security policies did not take place until 2008.

One of the first binding documents requiring the need for the development of the NSS is the Ahtisaari proposal. This proposal was launched after the unsuccessful political negotiations between the delegations from Prishtina and Belgrade for the resolution of the final status of Kosovo<sup>3</sup>, which directly resulted in the declaration of independence and Kosovo's statehood. The Annex VIII of Ahtisaari's proposal regulates the security sector and explicitly foresees that the "Kosovo Security Council shall develop a security strategy in accordance with this settlement". This provision can be considered as a turning point for developing a strategic and doctrinal framework in the security sector in the post-independence Kosovo.

Nevertheless, the formal discussions over the development of the NSS started simultaneously with the consolidation of the security institutions after the declaration of independence and in particular the Kosovo Security Council (KSC). Prior to evaluating the process of drafting the National Security Strategy (NSS), it is worthwhile to briefly highlight the role of the KSC. The KSC is designed to exercise a deliberative process, whereas it shall have an executive role in a state of emergency; it recommends security policies and strategies as well as providing information and assessments on the security issues in Kosovo (Law on KSC, 2008: 1). The KSC is chaired by the Prime Minister, except in the state of emergency, when it is chaired by the President. The council is obliged to hold at least four meetings per year (KCSS, 2008). In addition, the legal framework foresaw the establishment of the KSC Secretariat, which coordinates the activities of the ministries and agencies. The development and drafting of the NSS is one of the responsibilities of the KSC which are stipulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo:

*"The Security Council of the Republic of Kosovo, in cooperation with the President of the Republic of Kosovo and the Government, develops the security strategy for the Republic of Kosovo ..."*(Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008).

The inefficiency over the establishment of the KSC caused substantial delays in the development of the security policies in Kosovo. It resulted in the breach of the legal framework as the constitutive meeting of the KSC took place only eight

<sup>3</sup> The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo has been adopted in complete accordance with the Ahtisaari's provisions.



months from the time the Constitution entered into force.<sup>4</sup> This state of affairs highlighted the absence of the government's proactive approach and its limited strategic vision regarding the security sector, which was followed by unwelcoming reactions from the opposition parties and civil society in particular ([www.gazetaexpress.com](http://www.gazetaexpress.com), 2009). Moreover, it has been repeatedly stated that Kosovo remained the only country in the region lacking an NSS (KCSS, Press Release, 2009).

At the time of the drafting of this research paper, the Kosovo Government of Kosovo is currently in the process of developing the first NSS. The beginning of this process was publicly announced at the second meeting of the KSC, which took place in May 2009 (KSC, Press Release, 2009). Referring to the KSC meeting, the Prime Minister of Kosovo tasked the Minister of Internal Affairs, as a member of this council, to lead the process and to create the associated technical working groups (KSC, Press Release 2009). This occurrence makes the Kosovo case unique in comparison to other countries, as this process has predominantly been coordinated with the respective Ministries of Defence (MoD) or Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MoF) in the lead. In this way, one may ask why it was delivered to the Minister of Internal Affairs and not to other agencies and ministries. The MoI certainly plays one of the most significant roles in the decision-making process with respect to the security sector in Kosovo and its positioning is driven by the Kosovo Police having more responsibilities than any other executive institution in Kosovo. Moreover, the MoI is one of the largest Ministries in the Government and it retains more employees than five comparable European countries (FRIDOM, 2009: 20).<sup>5</sup>

The first draft of the NSS was distributed to the members of the KSC (KSC, Press Release 2009), though the access of the public was denied during its development. However, according to the press release, the members of the KSC salute the work done by the local and international experts in the short period of drafting.

According to the applicable law, upon the approval of the NSS by the Government, it is to be submitted to the parliamentary oversight committee on internal affairs and security, which shall review it and incorporate it into the agenda of the parliamentary session. The parliament shall be the final authority for approving the NSS (Law on KSC, 2008: 2).

Considering the composition of the KSC<sup>6</sup> and referring to the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, this leading strategic document in Kosovo is expected to be

---

<sup>4</sup> The first constitutive meeting of KSC took place by February 2009

<sup>5</sup> The research conducted by FRIDOM indicated that, comparatively speaking, the MoIA of Kosovo is larger than five out of six of the smallest EU countries (by population size): Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland

<sup>6</sup> The KSC is composed by the Prime Minister (Chair), Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of KSF, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Economy and Finances and Ministry of Returns and Communities. Moreover it makes up the representatives from broad range of the security sector in the advisory capacity.

implemented by the executive. The KSF<sup>7</sup> and KP are expected to take over the burden of the implementation according to their main areas of authority in protecting the security and public safety of the citizens of Kosovo. In addition, given its role in identifying, monitoring and analyzing the challenges, risks and threats, the KIA is also one of the more important institutions for the implementation of the NSS. The role of the executive does not by any means discount the oversight role of the parliament, which is stated in the Constitution, as well as the role of independent agencies and civil society. However, the measurement of the NSS' implementation in Kosovo could be covered in the future research.

On the other hand, one could interpret the supremacy of the NSS over other documents in the security sector as significant and groundbreaking in Kosovo. By the time of its approval, the NSS needs to successfully integrate all security sector strategies and documents and will be considered the main thrust of Kosovo's overarching Security Policy. Despite the harmonization of existing documents with the NSS, it requires the inherent subordination of other institutional strategies. To illustrate this point, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) Strategy will be harmonized and approved upon the approval of the NSS, therefore obeying the up-down approach (Geci, 2010). Also this will be the case with the strategies for the domestic intelligence agency and emergency management.

The consultations on and the development of the security strategy in conjunction with various actors, as well as addressing directly the concerns of the population, makes this document more legitimate (Boucher, 2009: 3). The legitimacy of the NSS could be achieved only through the participation of actors representing both public and civil society sectors. Generally speaking, the democratic oversight of the security institutions in Kosovo is still in its early stages and has a limited access (the EU Report for Kosovo, 2009: 7) to the government's policy-making in the security sector. However, on the issue of the NSS's development there was at least a leaning towards a civil society involvement in this process. Indeed, upon the announcement for the beginning of the development of strategic concept, the pressure of the civil society groups and other concerned parties directed towards Kosovo government has been revealed in the invitation of some non-governmental actors to this process.<sup>8</sup>

The outcome of the proactive approach by the civil society culminated with the invitation submitted jointly by the KSC Secretariat and the International Civilian Office (ICO) requiring professional opinions among the civil society, institutes, the media and the academia.<sup>9</sup> While most civil society experts responded positively to the invitation, this research found difficult to prove whether these inputs have been taken into consideration. Nevertheless, this might be considered a step forward in the broader involvement of actors from civil society.

<sup>7</sup> The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) is a new, professional, lightly armed and uniformed Security Force that is subject to democratic and civilian control. However it currently has a limited mandate as it is under the strict scrutiny from the International Military Presence (IMP).

<sup>8</sup> The Kosovo Centre for Security Studies was among the active one in pressuring the Government and other actors of the needs of civil society and independent experts involvement in drafting NSS

<sup>9</sup> This invitation indicated the importance of the NSS and the needs of civil society involvement in this process. Also the ICO organized a civil society forum inviting the Secretary of KSF and receiving the inputs of participants concerning the development of NSS.





It is difficult to argue the content of the Kosovo security strategy in the absence of an approved document. However, there were some statements and discussions where a comprehensive security strategy which could meet the needs of the people of Kosovo was called for. It is of crucial importance that the NSS should respond to the real threats to Kosovo and its citizens according to the so called *threatist paradigm* (Chuter, 2007: 5). That said, its content should be based on the security challenges in Kosovo, both regional and further away, and Kosovo's positioning vis-à-vis the security complexities in the region (ICO Forum, 2009). Moreover, the NSS is supposed to base its vision on the unanimous willingness of Kosovo citizens for the integration into global and regional security organizations such as the EU and NATO. This overall attitude was expressed in numerous public surveys conducted in Kosovo.

### **Kosovo Police Strategy**

The Kosovo Police (KP) remained one of the most substantial security institutions serving the citizens and ensuring the public security in Kosovo. The public surveys repeatedly showed that KP is among the most trusted institutions providing security in Kosovo (UNDP, 2008). The Mol and KP remain two most overburdened institutions with multiple strategies that need to be implemented over the coming months and years (EU Report for Kosovo, 2009).<sup>10</sup> However, as even it was argued at the beginning of this paper that the policy making was following the bottom-up approach, the Strategy for the Police was adopted 9 years after its establishment in lieu of an NSS.

The Kosovo Police Strategic Plan is designed to be implemented within the period 2008-2010. In principle, upon the first review, it gives an impression of a comprehensive document indicating vision, mission and objectives to be achieved within the envisaged period. The preface reflects the goals of this institution "based its activity on the principle of equality, impartiality, political neutrality, sincerity, accountability, merits, indiscrimination and wide-ranging" (KP, 2008: 2). Indeed, this strategy has a correlation to the security sector reform and specifically with the upcoming reform of the KP. In its strategic objectives a special attention was given to the development of the Law on Police, which could open the space for the structural and substantial reforms of this institution (Law on Police, 2008). Notwithstanding the adoption of the strategy, the reform of this institution is widely criticized and it even received low marks (EU Report for Kosovo, 2009: 51).

The beginning of this strategy highlights the methodology used for its consequent drafting, bringing a clear overview for the reader of how this process progressed. Thus, the document admits the involvement of different structures as well as the KP, however, it does not refer to the contribution of any external actors in this regard. Besides sidelining the external actors from the public institutions the civil society, academia and think tank involvement was barely imagined by

---

<sup>10</sup> We could highlight the strategies against terrorism, corruption, trafficking, SAWL collection strategy, criminal intelligence, integrated border management and other.



the drafters.<sup>11</sup> Also there is no evidence registered for a public hearing or any type of public discussion before the adoption of this strategy. Hence, the narrow approach towards the development of the police strategy questions the importance of the document prescribed in the introduction.

Elaborating further on the content of the document, the part which refers to the strategic priorities of police pillars needs particular attention. First of all, the so-called pillar approach in the strategic document caused a sort of ambiguity for the reader and it reflects a type of operational plan for the police. That said, the pillar approach addressed in the document gives an impression of a wide division among the police where none of the police officers are aware of the work done by the other colleagues (Marmullaku, 2010).

The strategic priorities of the KP document addressed the needs for development of various strategies related to policing issues, though there is no evidence that some of those strategies have been adopted so far. Since the strategy expires at the end of 2010, the accomplishment of strategic priorities set in this document is far from its objectives and, in it is essential to note that, the implementation of the approved strategies is concerning. In this way, there seems to be an absence of tracking for the implementation of these mechanisms.

This document certainly lacks one of the integral parts of a strategic document – risk and threat assessment. There is no specific part or annex indicating the challenges, risks and threats facing the KP, and as a consequence, makes this document vague. As well as this, there seem not to be any references concerning the police threat assessment apart from the message of the commissioner addressing broadly the focus on fighting organized crime. This marked the lack of a comprehensive strategy which would target specific categories of crime including crime prevention efforts in cooperation with agencies and the municipalities (EULEX, 2009: 12).

One of the positive pictures of this document is the SWOT analysis. It realistically identifies the strengths of the KP by pointing out the issues related to human resources and advanced specialized trainings and, amongst others, the good standing in the opinion of the public. It also highlights weaknesses related to lack of planning, research and development, and a high rate of voluntary resignation. It also properly addresses the opportunities and risks to operational functionality of KP (KP, 2008).

In general terms, the KP strategy serves as a good basis for the upcoming development in the security policies in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the vagueness of the content of this document could be improved by the approach in designing the sector-based strategies such as the one applied to the KP. In particular, the approved NSS could be used as the main point for the harmonization of the KP strategy based on the up-down approach.

---

<sup>11</sup> The end of the document reveal the name of the drafters who, all of them are police officers thus reflecting only the police composition in the process of drafting the strategy



## **Challenges, Risks and Threats (CRT) to Kosovo**

Similar to the other parts of this research, the unavailability of the NSS prevented us from the elaboration of CRT to the citizens of Kosovo. This document is supposed, for the first time, to unfold an official attitude and overview of the current risks and threats directed toward Kosovo and its citizens. Apart from this, the research could not prove to be an up-to-date assessment in this regard, except with regard to the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) published in 2006. While there is an absence of a qualitative assessment of CRT, there is a wide range of quantitative research that includes the public perception of the performance of the security sector and security and safety challenges. These surveys are predominantly conducted by the international and local organizations operating in Kosovo. The methodology in question usually includes face-to-face interviews based on the representative sample of between 1200-1300 respondents (UNDP, 2009). Public surveys pay significant attention to the stratification of the respondents based on the national, gender and location diversity.

Overall, Kosovo faces a wide range of CRT, both external and internal. It is important to mention that the traditional types of CRT are not perceived as an issue of concern for Kosovo and its citizens. Thus, a classical armed aggression is not a threat anymore, though it does not discount the most contemporary political means of various actors in compromising the interests of Kosovo and its citizens (INDEXKOSOVA 2009: 22). Moreover, organized crime and other types of crime remain one of the threats directed towards Kosovo and its citizens.

The internal CRT holds a significant position in any risk and threat assessment, be it qualitative or quantitative. The issue of economic insecurity remains one of the main concerns for Kosovo, with particular regard to the welfare of its citizens (UNDP, 2009). Moreover, poor economic conditions, a weak economy and a high unemployment rate (ISSR 2006: 26) characterize some crucial types of security challenges. In addition, a high rate of corruption and a very weak rule of law adversely affect the life of people in Kosovo (ISSR 2006, p.26). The wide range of crime types presents an additional issue of concern.

The integration and involvement of communities remains an issue of concern and it coincides with the societal insecurity which most often appears at the multi-ethnic countries (Collins, 2007: 172). The potential political radicalism in minority communities can destabilise entire municipalities should feelings of ill treatment and marginalisation manifest themselves. The presence of parallel structures is still a significant cause for concern and challenge ( the EU Report for Kosovo, 2009: 44), although their influence is expected to be reduced following the establishment of new municipalities and the wider effects of decentralisation that are being felt in early 2010.

On the other hand, the natural and man-made hazards are the potential challenge to Kosovo citizens. The ISSR threat assessment placed natural disasters and epidemics at the medium-level (ISSR 2006: 39). It also included industrial waste and environmental threats. Based on this threat assessment, Kosovo is at a significant risk as it sits in the middle of an active earthquake zone with seismic fault lines running along the Adriatic littoral and the Vardar Valley. (ISSR 2006: 39). The

earthquake hazard mostly applies to the Gjilan/Gnjilane region.<sup>12</sup>

## Conclusions

During the nine years of a robust international presence in Kosovo, the uncertainties over the political status and to some extent, the lack of readiness by the international community to participate in designing the leading strategic framework in the security sector did not contribute to a uniform set of security policies. The efforts for capacity building in this sector can be praised, though one may argue that it never exceeded the capability for performing elementary duties. That said, the international community's efforts in the pre-independence Kosovo were not strategically oriented and it did not direct the capacity building towards designing the necessary strategic documents and papers.

After 17 February 2008, the security sector development and reform in Kosovo began as the result of the legal framework requiring an integrated security sector serving the public safety and protecting the rights of people. In particular, the development of KSF and KIA simultaneously requires a strategic vision in this sector which could identify the CRT against the state and its citizens. The first NSS in Kosovo is supposed to be the leading and overarching document in the security sector and therefore we may see in the coming years that there is a tremendous need to harmonize it with the current available sector strategies. Indeed, the bottom-up approach in designing the documents in the security sector will cause ambiguities, unless there is both horizontal and vertical harmonization.

The main players for implementing the future NSS are these included in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. However, the presence of international civilian and military missions complements Kosovo's security institutions. The role of KFOR in peacekeeping and peacemaking, as well as protecting the borders of Kosovo, takes a significant part of the burden in providing the security and safety for the people of Kosovo. In addition to these considerations, the role of EULEX in monitoring, mentoring and advising in the field of the police, the judiciary and customs emphasises a robust EU mission that should assist in implementing the security policies in Kosovo.

In general, Kosovo is faced with a number of CRT directed towards the state and the citizens. However, the vague qualitative assessment by the government with respect to CRT does not allow the researchers to elaborate on this issue further, except to criticize this absence of the government's pro-active approach. The NSS is supposed to be one of the first documents addressing the external and internal CRT. The public surveys reflect the citizens' perceptions of their safety and security in a more than adequate manner. Indeed, the economic insecurity and social concerns indicate one of the main CRT for the public opinion in Kosovo. In this way, the internal challenges are predominately related to non-traditional security concerns. Nevertheless, the political challenge taking place and the external political and diplomatic risks and threats to Kosovo create a direct perception of challenges for the state of Kosovo and its citizens.

---

<sup>12</sup> For more information see the mapping of CRT in Kosovo, based on the available sources.



Finally, the role of civil society in the overall processes concerning security and safety can probably be considered as essential. Hence, the public involvement in the development of the strategic vision mirrors the democratic accountability and transparency of the security institutions. So far, the democratic oversight of the security sector in Kosovo has been weak, while the limited involvement of the non-governmental actors and the media reflect the narrow vision of governmental authorities. There is more to be done with respect to the civil society involvement in the decision-making processes in Kosovo.

## **Bibliography**

- Boucher Alix, *National Security Policies and Strategies; A note on current practice, Future of Peace Operations*, 2009
- Chuter David, *From Threats to Tasks: Making and Implementing National Security Policy*, *Journal of Security Sector Management*, 2007
- Collins Alan, *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford, 2007
- Comprehensive Proposal for the Final Status of Kosovo, 2007
- EU, *Progress Report for Kosovo*, 2009, Brussels, Belgium
- EULEX, *Programme Report for Police, Judiciary and Customs*, Prishtina, 2009
- FRIDOM, *Vertical Functional Review of the Kosovo Police*, 2009
- ICO, *Civil Society Organizations Forum*, April, 2009
- INDEXKOSOVA, *Raport nga hulumtimi kualitativ i perceptimeve të qytetarëve kosovar mbi situatën aktuale të sigurisë në Kosovë*, Prishtina, 2009
- Interview with Faruk Geci, *Director of Department for Policy and Planning*, Ministry of KSF
- Interview with Nuredin Ibishi, *Advisor at Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs and Security*
- Interview with Rifat Marmullaku, *Independent Analyst on Security Issues*
- Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, *Context Paper on SSR in Kosovo*, 2009
- Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, *Democratic Governance and Oversight of Municipal Community Safety Councils*, 2010
- Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, *Press Release*, May, 2009
- Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, *The importance of Kosovo Security Council*, 2008

Kosovo Assembly, *Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo*, 2008

Kosovo Assembly, *Law on Kosovo Security Force*, 2008

Kosovo Assembly, *Law on Police*, 2008

Kosovo Assembly, *Law on the Establishment of Kosovo Security Council*, 2008

Kosovo Government & UNDP, *Internal Security Sector Review*, 2006

Kosovo Police, *Strategic Plan*, 2008

Kosovo Security Council, *Press Release of the Fourth Meeting*, November, 2009

Kosovo Security Council, *Press Release of the Second Meeting*, May, 2009

Selimi Behar, *Politikat e Sigurisë në Kosovë*, 2009

UNDP, *Early Warning Reports*, 2008&2009

[www.gazetaexpress.com](http://www.gazetaexpress.com)

[www.mpb-ks.org](http://www.mpb-ks.org)

No.	NAME OF THE CHALLENGE, RISK, OR THREAT	CATEGORY			LEVEL OF ANALYSIS <sup>1</sup> – SCOPE OF THREAT					SOURCE OF THREAT (AS STATED BY PROPOSER)	SECTOR (AS STATED BY PROPOSER)	REFERENCE OBJECT (WHAT IS PROPOSER PROTECTING)	NOTA BENE
		Challenge	Risk	Threat	Global	Regional	National	Subnational	Individual				
		C	R	T	G	R	N	SN	I				
1.	Political and Diplomatic Means to Compromise the Processes in Kosovo			x	x	x				Various external actors	Non-Traditional, Political	Security of Kosovo	Political and Economic coercive attempts from certain actors with the aim of compromising the national security of Kosovo
2.	Organized Crime	x		x	x	x				Broader regional and global	Non-Traditional	Security of Kosovo and its citizens	
3.	Economic Instability and Unemployment	x	x		x	x				Weak domestic economy and potential escalations	Non-traditional , Economical	Security of the citizens of Kosovo	It includes a wide range of issues related to economic insecurity and poverty
4	Weak Rule of Law	x					x			Domestic weak consolidation of institutions	Non-Traditional, Societal	Security of the citizens of Kosovo	
5	Corruption	x					x			Spillover of corruption in the public institutions	Non-Traditional, Political & Economical	Security of the citizens of Kosovo	
6	Integration of minority communities	x					x			Challenges to the integration of minority communities	Non-Traditional, Political & Societal	Security of Kosovo and its citizens	The presence of parallel structures at the minority inhabited areas
7	Natural and man-made hazards	x	x		x	x			x	Serious or catastrophic disasters	Environmental	Security of the citizens of Kosovo	Forest-fires, pandemic epidemics, land-slides, environmental pollution, floods and other







# Macedonia<sup>1</sup>

Islam Yusufi

## I Context

### Security strategies of Macedonia: types of strategies, their adoption dates and their amendment

The strategic-doctrinary framework of Macedonia (at the time of writing this paper) includes the following national documents: The Ohrid Framework Agreement; The National Security and Defence Concept; The Strategic Defence Review – Political Framework; The Strategy of Defence; White paper on Defence; The Strategy for the Police Reforms; and the National Strategy for Integrated Border Management. (See table 9)

Title of the strategy	Adopted – date	Amendment
1. Ohrid Framework Agreement	13 August 2001	No
2. National Security and Defence Concept	11 June 2003	No
3. Strategic Defence Review – Political Framework	22 October 2003	No
4. National Security Strategy	January 2008	No
5. Strategy of Defence	September 1999	Yes, in February 2010
6. White Paper on Defence	August 1998	Yes, in 2005
7. Police Reform Strategy	2003	Yes, in 2004
8. National Strategy for Integrated Border Management	December 2003	No

Table 5: Strategic-Doctrinary Framework of Macedonia

### The hierarchy of comprehensiveness and significance in the adoption of strategies

There has been a substantial progress in Macedonia on the basis of the new hierarchy of strategies – at the top end there is a new overarching National Security and Defence Concept adopted in June 2003 and the National Security Strategy of January 2008, and the Government has started with the implementation of the recommendations that came out from the political framework of the Strategic Defence Review that was adopted in October 2003. At lower levels there

<sup>1</sup> This report has been written by Islam Yusufi, who is a former Deputy National Security Adviser to the President of the Republic of Macedonia and a founder of Analytica, a think-tank in Macedonia. Views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of the organizations that he works for.



are defence, police reform and integrated border management strategies. A Substantial work has also been done with the Ohrid Framework Agreement as a political document guiding the overall context of design of the strategic-doctrinary framework of the country.

The first ever strategy documents adopted in Macedonia include the White Paper on Defence, adopted in 1998, and the Strategy of Defence, adopted in 1999 (and later updated in 2010). At first, it may seem that the hierarchy of the significance of the strategies has not been taken into consideration. Comprehensive strategies that would guide the whole security and defence sector, both the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the National Security and Defence Concept were adopted in 2001 and 2003 respectively, followed by the adoption of the Strategic Defence Review and Police and Border Management strategies, thus overcoming the gap caused by the non-existence of comprehensive strategies that in turn will guide other sectoral or sub-strategies. Another comprehensive strategy to be adopted was the National Security Strategy. The first ever documents to be adopted include the White Paper on Defence and the Strategy of Defence, which in fact should have been documents to be adopted later than the overall comprehensive documents such as the National Security and Defence Concept or the National Security Strategy. Although the National Security and Defence Concept and the National Security Strategy would not be the first ever documents to be developed, their definition and adoption led to the updating of practically entire strategic-doctrinary framework of the country.

Another important document that, apart from the Concept and the Security Strategy, has defined the overall strategic-doctrinary framework of Macedonia was the Ohrid Framework Agreement signed in August 2001. It included a number of provisions on the issue of the security and defence which regulated the overall security policies in the country. The fourth important document, the Strategic Defence Review, has been a source of many sectoral strategies, particularly in the field of defence.

### **Key factors that have initiated the strategies and the formal players who have led the process of drafting the strategies**

Since Macedonia became an independent state in 1991, the governments have not come up with any distinctive model or a plan how to design the strategic-doctrinary framework. The strategy documents composing strategic-doctrinary framework of Macedonia have not been designed according to one generic plan. Each document has had its own specific circumstances and causes and often came about in reaction to the outside environment or as an outright necessity. However, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, there was always a widespread public consensus on the need for the development and approval of the strategic-doctrinary framework first, and then the implementation of reforms or pursuing of policies.

The experiences with the development of the strategic-doctrinary framework in Macedonia give us clues about the factors that have triggered the initiation of the strategies. The international community and its condition-setting approach made a huge impact on the design of the strategies in Macedonia. The impact was realised through the implementation of the foreign governments' assistance

programmes and their technical advisers, political foundations, international civil society organisations, the academia and others, as well as by means of setting conditions for the entry of the country into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. All this contributed to the necessity of developing and adopting the country's strategy documents. The late 1990s and early 2000s can be called 'a decade of strategies', during which the international community called for and assisted in the adoption of strategies in many major fields of the society. Conferences, workshops, and seminars on security affairs were frequently organised, and external experts advised and assisted in designing the sectoral strategies of the country. There were also examples of other countries, mainly those of NATO and EU member countries, as well as partly successful examples from the Central European countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia.

International cooperation, as a general factor in initiating the strategies, was seen in Macedonia as another means for democratising the security sector. In the years following the independence of the country, the efforts on establishing the international cooperation were considerably expanded and intensified. This activity was an expression of a broader determination of Macedonia to strengthen the international cooperation and its firm resolve for the fast and full integration into international and trans-national structures. International cooperation took many forms: the membership in international organisations; bilateral agreements and meetings with other states; agreements and meetings with specialised international organisations; contacts and meetings with diplomatic representatives; participation in the seminars, courses, trainings and other forms of education organised in the country and abroad in cooperation with foreign governments and international organisations; and bilateral or multilateral technical cooperation agreements providing assistance to the reforms in the country.

A greater involvement of the international community, following the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in August 2001, also enabled a relatively quick transfer of western experiences in the area of strategy designs; as a result, the international influence on the Macedonian strategic-doctrinary framework became significant. The already established legal and structural framework of the security sector and the presence of multinational missions such as those of the EU, OSCE, NATO and the Council of Europe, whose missions in Macedonia had a mandate to work on the transformation of the security sector, also constituted a sound basis for the design of strategic-doctrinary framework. After the 2001 crisis, the state institutions seem to have become stable again, thus opening the possibility for a greater involvement in the capacity building process, and consequently, in the design of the strategic-doctrinary framework. The international community, and in this context, NATO and the EU, played a significant role in raising awareness in Macedonia for the need of the strategic-doctrinary framework.

The "NATO factor", through its presence in Macedonia (Senior Civilian and Military Representatives and Advisory Teams starting from 2001) and its role as an instrument of the condition-setting by the international community, was an incentive for the development of the security strategies. In the process of approaching NATO, the country took on many new security-related obligations, and actively participated in the international peace operations led by NATO such as ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Adopting NATO standards and joining the peace missions put Macedonia's security sector under the international oversight, which in turn



was another trigger for the development of the strategies. The interaction with NATO established a constant positive influence, steadily pulling the design of the strategies along and giving it a clear frame of reference. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation and assistance from NATO and its member states played an important facilitating function, in terms of direct material help as well as political and intellectual support for the domestic institutions and individuals in planning and developing the security strategies. NATO's programs, such as the Partnership for Peace, the Membership Action Plan and the South East Europe Initiative, accelerated the development of the strategies and helped to expose the country's security and political leadership to the norms and operating procedures of NATO countries. Macedonia's decision to apply for the membership in NATO in 1999 was another reason to speed up the design of the strategies. NATO's South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on the Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities, launched in May 2001, was yet another impetus (NATO, 2001).

The European Union has been another factor in furthering the design of the strategic doctrinary framework of the country. The influence of the EU in the security sector has been particularly noted in the design of strategies for the police reform and for border management. The EU assistance in the framework of its Phare,<sup>2</sup> CARDS<sup>3</sup> and IPA<sup>4</sup> programmes, has undoubtedly been the key instrument in addressing deficiencies in the development of security strategies. The EU came to be involved in the development of the strategic-doctrinary framework of the country through its financial assistance in the framework of Phare programme. Later on, the CARDS program, specifically designed for the Western Balkans, included projects that assisted in the development of the security strategies. For instance, in 2001, the EU provided a package of police assistance to Macedonia from the CARDS 2001 allocation. The purpose of the assistance was to support the overall reform of the police in Macedonia by developing strategies for the reform of the police (The European Commission, 2001: 1). The incentives provided by the prospect of membership in the EU are seen as a key instrument in promoting understanding and the need on the part of the country for the design of the strategic-doctrinary framework of the country.

The EU, via the European Agency for Reconstruction (the EU agency which managed the EU financial assistance in Macedonia in the period of 2002-2008), has provided a substantial support to the field of the security sector in Macedonia since 2002. Under the 2001 – 2006 programmes, the EC provided direct support to the development and implementation of the National Police Reform Strategy,

---

<sup>2</sup> PHARE program was one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by the European Communities to assist the applicant countries of central Europe in their preparations for joining the European Union. Originally established to assist Poland and Hungary in 1989, later it encompasses the 10 candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania and countries of the western Balkans, helping them through economic restructuring and political change.

<sup>3</sup> CARDS - Community Assistance to Reconstruction, Development and Stability in the Balkans, established in 2001 has provided financial assistance to the Western Balkans until 2006.

<sup>4</sup> The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) is the Community's financial instrument for the pre-accession process for the period 2007-2013. Assistance is provided on the basis of the European Partnerships of the potential candidate countries and the Accession Partnerships of the candidate countries, which means the Western Balkan countries and Turkey.

adopted in 2003 and updated in 2004. The Strategy on Border Protection (National Strategy for Integrated Border Management, adopted in 2003) is another area where the EU has been involved. Development of border management strategy became increasingly important for several reasons. First of all, after the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty of the EU, the Schengen co-operation became part of the EU Justice and Home Affairs co-operation. It is also an area where a lot of improvement and deeper co-operation was needed by the candidate countries of the Western Balkans such as Macedonia. Another important factor was the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, which increased the importance of functional border security systems. The border control became a matter of law enforcement, rather than national defence. The military definition of border security - which characterised the Cold War era - was not relevant any longer, given the completely changed security environment. According to the contemporary democratic and western procedures and practices, border guarding became a mission that should be carried out by a special police force. Efficient implementation, continuous development and the need for a rapid reaction to the changing nature of cross-border crime required the existence of one leading authority to be responsible for the national border security (Niemenkari, 2002). Macedonia had to establish such system, and there was a need for a strategy for its establishment.

The strategic guidance came from the Presidential Cabinet of the then President Boris Trajkovski, who organised a number of intra-governmental meetings that led to the transfer of responsibility of border management from the military to the police. Later, the EU facilitated this process by engaging experts through a technical assistance programme that helped to design the National Integrated Border Management Strategy, which was adopted in December 2003. The Border Management Strategy provides strategic guidance in establishing operational plans. Another document which was adopted, the National Action Plan for Integrated Border Management, provided a significant tactical direction and added value, aiming at improving the efficiency of border management system based on intra-service cooperation (cooperation within ministries); inter-agency cooperation (cooperation between ministries/institutions); and international cooperation. With the EU's help, this was the first country in the Western Balkans to develop a national integrated border management strategy that is in line with Schengen rules – a system used by the EU to promote the free movement of people across its internal borders.

With regard to the involvement of the international community, it may be concluded that international organizations provided substantial support and certainly assisted in the development of Macedonia's strategic-doctrinary framework. However, in view of the past experience and current needs, the willingness to design and update the strategic-doctrinary framework needs to be sustained and the international community should support this process by applying suitable conditions wherever appropriate.

The leadership, inclined to new ideas and open to ideas from the civil society and international community, was another determining factor to push for positive change. For example, in 2002, the Cabinet of the then President of Macedonia Boris Trajkovski (1999-2004), organised a series of round-tables under the title "Process 2002" with the aim of discussing the national security aspects of the



country. The "Process 2002" brought together relevant national and international governmental and non-governmental authorities to discuss the security issues of the strategic importance to Macedonia that later served as a basis for the work of the President and of the government in the design of the strategy documents. The Process was under direct auspices of the President (Yusufi et al, 2002). The organisation of such a process in Macedonia, following the armed conflict of 2001, was crucial for a better understanding of the security problems, risks and challenges that the country was facing and for further discussion on the possible solutions of the problems that appeared ahead of Macedonia from the security perspective. At that moment, the security concept of Macedonia did not exist and its adoption was necessary in order to develop a more harmonised understanding and more synchronised debate on Macedonia's security policy. The aim was to think ahead about the security of the Republic, treating the issue from the multi-disciplinary perspective. Such structures have for long existed in individual countries, but a multilateral and multidimensional process in a governmental setting was lacking in the security domain in the region of the Central and Eastern Europe. The Process 2002 brought together a select group of personalities from Macedonia and abroad and its informal and open character enabled further participation of the public in the discussions and exchanging of ideas. The Process consisted of two levels: organisation of the round-tables and workshops; and publication of the results of the each stage of the Process on the Internet as well as the publication of the articles in the local media. The organisation of the Process 2002 was a reflection of a growing awareness and expertise on the part of Macedonian civilian governance structures on the issues of security and defence. Until then, it was difficult to find the civilians able to define and design security strategies.

Internal crises, such as the conflict of 2001, have made an important impact as well. In addition, the scandals related to the work of the security and defence sector were also triggers for the development of the strategies.

These factors have been of great value for understanding the importance of the development of the strategic-doctrinary framework in the country. However, in the last couple of years, a combination of internal and external factors has emerged, giving additional boost for the development of strategic-doctrinary framework. The new circumstances and a new regional and international environment, which featured absence of violence and dialogue among the countries, following the conflicts in the region of Western Balkans, also proved to be a suitable environment for the reforms, as well as for the development of Macedonia's strategic-doctrinary framework.

Domestic and regional security circumstances are inherently dynamic, and all states should be able to adapt their strategic-doctrinary framework effectively to the new conditions. Functioning democracies adapt and reform their strategic-doctrinary framework in accordance with the changing circumstances. The political pattern and inherent instability in its political system, confronted Macedonia with great difficulties in proceeding with the development of the strategic-doctrinary framework.

The process of development of the strategic-doctrinary framework in Macedonia can be divided into two periods: First, the decade of 1990s that was characterized by inadequate actions for instituting the strategic-doctrinary framework. Second,

the period just before the end of the decade and the years following the turn of the century, which witnessed favourable domestic and regional environment for undertaking the development of the strategic-doctrinary framework. In 1990s, the country was faced with the inefficiency in the functioning of the security decision-making process, inadequacy of the human factor and the conceptual and managerial ineptitude to cope with the issues of internal social, economic and political changes, which seriously affected the attempted development of the strategic-doctrinary framework and resulted in the failure of establishing one. At the turn of the century, however, the political and security environment within which the strategic-doctrinary framework was to be developed was transformed. The crises of the former Yugoslavia were over, the security vacuum that existed in 1990s was no longer there and the country started to get a perspective for the Euro-Atlantic integration. These changes forced the country to put an effort and resources in developing the strategic-doctrinary framework. The emergence of a stable, reformist-governing majorities that came to power in the late 1990s and early 2000s, allowed the implementation of the programs for the design of strategic-doctrinary framework. Moreover, and what is important, the public support was obtained for the undertaking.

The following individuals, groups, ministries and government agencies were formal players leading the process of drafting the strategies: Presidents and Prime Ministers and members of their Cabinets<sup>5</sup>; Ministers of Defence and the Interior; civilians with higher responsibilities within the Ministries of Defence<sup>6</sup> and the Interior; experts from the civil society and research institutes as well as representatives of the academia; foreign civilian and military advisors<sup>7</sup> and others.

The sources upon which the process of drafting the strategies was based include: the Constitution and related laws and implementing legislation; similar strategies of 'benchmark' countries (such as NATO and EU member states) and international organisations; defence and security policy documents at the national level; personal knowledge and experience of drafters; internal assessments concerning national values, interests and requirements; conclusions and recommendations from research reports; theoretical national and international literature; similar documents published in other international, regional and national defence and security establishments; advice and recommendations from international or bilateral experts and others.

### **Institutions that defined the strategies, the involvement of institutes and international organisations in drafting the strategies, the role of the public in the process of defining the strategies and the process of reaching consensus in defining the strategies**

The Cabinet of the Prime Minister took the lead in drafting the National Security and Defence Concept. The Ohrid Framework Agreement was drafted by domestic

<sup>5</sup> Names such as Stevo Pendarovski, Islam Yusufi, Ljubomir Frckoski, Vlado Popovski from Presidential Cabinet; Names such as Lazar Kitanovski from Prime Minister's Cabinet.

<sup>6</sup> Names such as Aleksandar Matovski.

<sup>7</sup> Names such as James Baxter, Dennis Blease.





leadership, including the Cabinets of the Presidents and of the Prime Ministers, the leaders of political parties and their advisers as well as international representatives (EU, USA) and their support staff. The signature of the Agreement on 13 August 2001 was preceded by discussions in Ohrid, a series of talks that started in July 2001 between Albanian and Macedonian representatives, along with representatives from the EU and the United States. The Agreement<sup>8</sup> that was negotiated upon set forth tangible benchmarks and measures to be implemented in order to rectify those conditions that led to hostilities, fighting, and general unrest leading to paralysis of parts of the country throughout much of 2001.

In drafting the Strategic Defence Review – Political Framework, it was the Ministry of Defence who took the lead with the expertise provided by NATO Advisory Team and the team of Booz Allen Hamilton present in the country. The process of defining and adoption of the Review provided an opportunity for the establishment of an intellectual and political basis for the role and goals of the armed forces. It was a means for determining what kind of armed forces Macedonia could really afford, while at the same time securing the value of the taxpayers' money. It was also a medium for the transformation of Macedonian army from the 'national army' into a modern, relevant and professional one. Before the launch of the Review, there were two alternatives how to go after it: the first one was to have it 'internalised' within the Ministry of Defence, where the existing capabilities would be reviewed, precise costs of defence outputs developed, and defence plans would be continually improved. This was supposed to be done by means of working groups already established for the implementation of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. This process would show that 90% of the defence budget was spent simply on soldiers to be paid and therefore future reforms would not be possible without a fresh approach. The second alternative was to launch a politically- led review which would become a fundamental review of the defence sector of the country, with aspects that would include the elements from the first approach as well. It was this approach that was chosen. This politically-led process acquired governmental and presidential support and their commitment to the process. The Review started by basing itself on the relevant and updated strategic analysis contained in the National Concept. It had a strong leadership from the Defence Minister who maintained the role of an overall coordinator of the work. The first phase of the Review, which lasted for two months (October 2003), consisted of defining the political framework, based on the National Concept, providing foundations for defence reform plans.

The political framework defined national, regional and strategic interest and goals of the country and defined challenges, risks and opportunities of the strategic environment. The process of defining the Review also included the contributions from other ministries, civil society, the academia, etc. The second phase, which lasted for 3 months and the results of which were promulgated in March 2004 and approved by the Resolution in the Parliament in May 2004, consisted of the review of the existing forces, their capabilities and equipment. The work was carried out by working groups, composed of military and civilian personnel and representatives of other ministries. This phase looked specifically at the issues such as defence missions and responsibilities; potential threats for operations; capacity of

---

<sup>8</sup> The full text of the Ohrid Framework Agreement is also available at: [http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal\\_affairs/legal\\_co-operation/police\\_and\\_internal\\_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp).



the potential enemies; sustainability and equipment; military crisis management; rapid-response units, etc. The third phase of the Review, which is still on-going, consists of the adoption of sectoral strategies in the field of defence, consisting of more than 3000 pages. One of the main outcomes of the third phase was the production of the Dynamic Plan for the Transformation of the Armed Forces 2005-2007, with detailed programmes covering logistics, personnel, education and training, defence diplomacy, reserve forces and equipment procurement.

The Defence Strategy and the White Paper on Defence were drafted by the Defence Ministry and were update with the assistance of the NATO's Advisory Team and the team of Booz Allen Hamilton experts. The National Security Strategy was drafted by the Government. The Police Reform Strategy and the National Strategy for Integrated Border Management were drafted by the personnel of the Ministry of the Interior who used the expertise obtained through the police reform projects funded by the EU and managed by the European Agency for Reconstruction.

A wider public debate was also included in the development of the strategies. Process 2002 was the starting point for the debate. Generally speaking, there was an internal debate at the bureaucratic level with the input from the civil servants. The results were forwarded to the political decision-makers. In addition, a horizontal debate was going on as well among various government agencies and ministries.

In general, the process of drafting the strategies begins when the Prime Minister or the Ministers of Defence and the Interior give the green light for it, that is, after their advisers or the international community advise them that the drafting is necessary and the persons leading and coordinating the work should be appointed. Once the first drafting process is completed, the relevant ministries, cabinets and agencies participate in reviewing the drafts. Once the comments are received and integrated, an updated version of the drafts is provided and handed over to the Government or to the Ministries of the Interior and Defence for adoption.

The inter-ministerial cooperation through inter-ministerial working bodies has been a part of the decision-making process in the formulation of the security strategies. These working bodies are established either on a permanent or temporary basis. While reviewing issues within the area of competence of the Government, the working bodies cooperate with ministries and other administrative bodies. The Government's commissions and special commissions are permanent working bodies. The permanent inter-ministerial working body (commission) in the area of defence is the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security working body. Membership is restricted to ministers from the relevant ministries and, where appropriate, high-ranking officials. The commission meets at least once weekly, before the meeting of the government. The commission is serviced by officials from the office of the Government under the supervision of the General Secretariat. The commission's deliberations and reports feed directly into decision-making in the centre. The special commission in the area of defence is the Defence Production and Services Commission.



## **Adoption of strategies**

Macedonia's defence and security sector is managed by the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia (Sobranie), the President of the Republic, the Government, the Ministries of Defence and the Interior and the Crisis Management Centre.

The Parliament (Sobranie) enacts the highest legal acts, including the strategy documents. Once the government has approved a strategy, where necessary, the same is also enacted by the Parliament. The President approves the defence strategy. The Government (or Council of Ministers), headed by the Prime Minister, endorses strategy documents and approves them and/or submits them to the Parliament for approval/enactment.

The Minister of Defence endorses all defence documents issued by the Chairman of the Chief of Staff and the departments in the Ministry of Defence. It issues defence policy documents that are submitted for approval to the Parliament, after endorsement by the Council of Ministers. Moreover, the Minister of Defence may issue defence policy documents that are compulsory to the entire defence establishment under his/her authority without parliamentary endorsement, after approval by the Council of Ministers. In addition, there are occasions where the Minister of Defence can issue defence policy documents that are compulsory to the entire defence establishment under his/her authority without the endorsement of the Parliament or the Council of Ministers.

## **II Characteristics of the strategies**

### **Challenges, risks, and threats (CRT) as defined by strategies, the ranking of CRT, and the sources and the carriers of CRT**

All the strategies that compose the strategic-doctrinary framework of Macedonia include an assessment of challenges, risks and threats (CRT) to the country.

(1) The Ohrid Framework Agreement does not explicitly define CRT, but implicitly it refers to the following CRT:

- Use of violence in resolving inter-ethnic disputes;
- Pursuit of territorial solutions to ethnic issues;
- Damage to the multi-ethnic character of Macedonia's society (Ohrid Agreement, 2001: 1).

The Agreement does not rank the CRTs according to their significance.

(2) The National Security and Defence Concept on CRT evaluates that 'though in the long run there is no danger of conventional war in Europe, the demise of the bi-polar world, the residuals and the consequences of the dissolution of certain former socialist states, the negative consequences of globalisation, the national, religious, greater-state, and territorial confrontation are potential and realistic risks and dangers that can lead to crises and conflicts' (Government of Macedonia, 2003: 9). Specifically, the Concept defines the following CRT:

- The possible manifestations of extreme nationalism, racial and religious in-

- tolerance;
- The forms and activities linked to international terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration, illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons, people, strategic and two-fold use materials, as well as consequences of the use of means for massive destruction;
- Possession of large quantities of illegal weapons;
- Transitional problems such as corruption, urban terrorism, serious crime including blackmail, racketeering, murders and attacks on the property of citizens, economic crime, tax evasion, underdeveloped institutions of the democratic system, problems in the functioning of the judiciary, social problems and unemployment;
- Activities of foreign special services directed toward worsening of the security situation, and thus slowing down the democratic and integrative processes, especially those toward NATO and the EU;
- Consequences of clashes of interests in the use of the sources and the routes of strategic energy materials, as well as obstructing and blocking their import into the Republic of Macedonia;
- Natural and other disasters, technical and technological catastrophes, contagious diseases of people and animals caused by domestic and/or external actors;
- Computer crime, piracy and abuse of information technology, especially concerning personal data of the citizens, business, service and state secrets;
- Degradation and destruction of environment (Government of Macedonia, 2003: 11).

The concept does not explicitly rank the CRTs according to their significance, however, the sequence of written CRTs is assumed to be listed according to their significance.

(3) The Strategic Defence Review notes that there is 'no longer a fear of massive invasion and total war' and that the country over the long term is not under the threat of conventional war. Yet, it emphasises that the country is prone to 'new challenges and threats to peace and international stability, caused by the dissolution of the bi-polar world, the residues of certain former socialist states, the negative consequences of globalisation, the national, religious, greater-state and territorial confrontation' (Government of Macedonia, 2003: 10). The Review includes the following in the CRT in more detail:

- Conventional war-aggression;
- Possible manifestations of extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance, international terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration, illegal trade with all types including trade with strategic and dual use materials, insufficiently secure and efficient borders, etc.;
- Possession of large quantities of illegal weapons, transitional problems such as: corruption, urban terrorism, serious crime, economic crime, tax evasion, etc.;
- Activities of foreign special services directed toward worsening the security situations, consequences of conflict of interests in using sources and routes of strategic energy materials;
- Natural and other disasters, technical-technological catastrophes, epidemics, etc.;



- Degradation and destruction of environment;
- Computer and network-related crime and attacks on computer systems.

The CRT of 'extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance, terrorism and organised crime' is ranked as the most significant CRT in the Review. It states that there are no great dangers that threaten the sovereignty and integrity of the country from other non-conventional threats, risks and dangers. In the Review, the CRTs are ranked in importance by looking into the medium and long-term periods. It is stated that in the medium term (3-5 years), the threats, risks and dangers caused by extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance, terrorism and organised crime, as well as by the implications of the situation in the immediate surroundings of the country will exist but decrease in intensity. For this period, it also states that 'security and defence of the border will remain to be one of the major issues until regional border security reaches an adequate level'. In the long term (5-10 years and beyond), the Review anticipates 'a decrease in threats, risks and dangers caused by extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance, terrorism and organised crime, as well as of the implications of the situation in the immediate environment'. In the long term (10 years and beyond) 'conventional threats will remain minimal as well as other non-conventional and asymmetric threats, risks and dangers', states the Review.

The assessment of CRT summarised and ranked by degree of intensity is given in the Review in the following table:

THREATS, RISKS AND DANGERS	LEVEL OF INTENSITY		
	Currently	Mid-term	Long-term
Conventional war - aggression	VERY LOW	VERY LOW	VERY LOW
Possible manifestations of extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance, international terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration, illegal trade with all types including trade with strategic and dual use materials, insufficiently secure and efficient borders, etc.	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW
Possession of large quantities of illegal weapons, transitional problems such as: corruption, urban terrorism, serious crime, economic crime, tax evasion, etc.	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW
Activities of foreign special services directed toward worsening the security situations, consequences of conflict of interests in using sources and routes of strategic energy materials. As well as	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	LOW
Natural and other disasters, technical-technological catastrophes, epidemics, etc.	LOW	LOW	LOW
Degradation and destruction of environment.	MEDIUM	MEDIUM	MEDIUM
Computer and network-related crime and attacks on computer systems.	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH

Table 6. The Assessment of CRT given in Review

(4) The National Security Strategy refers to the following specific CRT:

- Terrorism that jeopardizes the peace, security, interests of the country and the world. It is a serious threat for the personnel deployed in the international operations;
- Trans-national organised crime in all forms, corruption and misuse of strategic materials and technologies with double use;
- The proliferation and use of weapons for mass destruction is a global threat with greatest consequences and harmful effects
- Regional conflicts and crises;
- Manifestations of radical nationalism and extremism;
- Ethnic and religious intolerance;
- Possession of major quantities of illegal small and light weapons and ammunition;
- Illegal activities of foreign intelligence services;
- Computer crime and threat to the information systems and technologies;
- Natural disasters, technical and technological (industrial) accidents of larger scale;
- Epidemics;
- Degradation and destruction of the environment and the ecological potentials; internal economic and social problems, economic crime, poverty and unemployment (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2008).

The Strategy does not rank the CRTs according to their significance.

(5) The Defence Strategy, its initial version of 1999, as it has been among the initial strategy documents adopted just after the break up of communism and of the Yugoslav federation, refers to mainly CRT that relate to the collapse of the cold war (Ministry of Defence, 1998: 4). The new updated version of the Strategy of February 2010 refers to CRT included in the Security Strategy (Ministry of Defence, 2010: 6).

The Strategy does not rank the CRTs according to their significance.

(6) The White Paper on Defence focuses on the following CRT: the legacy of a decade of hostilities in the region; the unfinished process of reconciliation; ethnic and religious extremism and intolerance; remaining stockpiles of weapons; international terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration; corruption and tax evasion; and hostile activities of foreign special services. (Ministry of Defence, 2005: 17-18).

(7) The Strategy Police Reform Strategy refers to the emergence of new forms and types of crime with elements of violence and organised and trans-national crime emergence as a CRT (Ministry of the Interior, 2004: 2).

(8) The National Strategy for Integrated Border Management, when referring to CRT, notes that the danger of a military attack on Macedonia from the neighbouring countries is small and therefore, at the moment, it is not necessary for the service of border management to be prepared and trained for defence from aggression. As a potential CRT, it emphasises the possibility for hostile individuals and groups to enter the country through border areas and perform attacks



on the Macedonian security forces and the existing infrastructure. Another CRT mentioned in the document is the existence of a large amount of light weapons possessed by individuals as well as the accessibility of the weapons through the well organised smuggling channels. Other potential CRTs mentioned are: illegal trafficking in narcotics, cigarettes, human beings, weapons and excise goods and organised groups of criminals with international connections being in a position to bribe public servants and governmental members (Government of Macedonia, IBM Strategy, 2003: 14).

The National Strategy for Integrated Border Management does not rank the CRT according to their significance.

### **The way the strategy defines the instruments to be used by the state and the society in response to the CRT and the way in which security is to be achieved**

(1) The Ohrid Framework Agreement lists separately the actions to be taken with regard to the improvement of the security in the country. Its strategy consists of the improvement of the position of the minorities in the country through a decentralised government, non-discrimination and equitable representation in the public service, special parliamentary procedures for the defence of the status of the minorities, as well as the education and use of minority languages and the possibility for expression of minority identities, etc.

(2) The National Security and Defence Concept for responding to CRT determines that it is necessary to undertake and permanently maintain and promote the following measures and activities:

- Maintenance and improvement of the efficiency and objectivity of the means and methods for collecting data and information of significance for the security; good quality and continued expert analysis of the security environment for the purpose of active participation in prevention of risks and dangers;
- Maintenance and improvement of adequate security capacities and capabilities for prevention, minimisation and elimination of the security risks and dangers, as well as for resolution of conflict and crisis situations;
- Maintenance and improvement of the level of readiness of the bodies of state authority, of the regulations, rules and procedures for a timely coordination, management, as well as for the purpose of efficient, timely and adequate response to the security risks and dangers;
- Development of a border service capable of efficiently controlling the border and the border zone beyond the legal border crossing in order to prevent all types of illegal trade, as well as to build the capacity and unique procedures for cooperation and mutual assistance with the neighbours, the region and the remaining international community. The border service is to provide a continual improvement of the relations of confidence and mutual cooperation with the local population, as well take action with regard to the ethnic representation in the service itself;
- Directing the security system toward the achievement of inter-operability with other, similar systems in the democratic states of Europe;
- Active involvement in the international efforts for the improvement of peace

and security, considering that security is indivisible and does not depend on one state only;

- Sovereign right to self defence and guaranteeing of own security with the right to own decision making and joining various alliances;
- Individual right to non-accepting certain obligations and agreements which would be assessed as ones that can threaten the security of the Republic of Macedonia and/or negatively influence the security of other states;
- Compatibility of the national security with the constitutional and legal solutions, as well as the international standards and ratified international agreements;
- Incorporation of common norms and standards of international law in the national legislation, their consistent enforcement in practice, and diplomatic efforts for such incorporation by all neighbouring countries;
- Despite the fact that special institutions in charge of security still hold a key place and role in the modern understanding of security, they are no longer the only ones in charge of protection, maintenance and development of the security environment and situation. Therefore, the assessment, measures and activities for protection, maintenance and improvement should be seen as a system of complex interdependent factors such as political, economic, defence, internal security, social, environmental, etc.;
- Permanent democratic and civilian control and oversight of the institutions and forces responsible for the security and defence of the country;
- Prevention, i.e. measures and activities that enable prevention of risks, dangers and crisis, their timely identification and removal;
- Coordination of the measures, activities and security capacities with the application of timely and useful use of capabilities and resources for dealing with crisis, as well as a possibility of extending and receiving assistance and cooperation;
- Permanent responsibility of the state actors, the local self-government, the political parties and the other legal and economic actors, the non-governmental sector and other associations, as well as of all citizens for participation in the realisation of the national security policy.

(3) The Strategic Defence Review, with regard to the CRT, proposes that the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) should continue to develop its skills in the area of internal security, fight against terrorism and armed incidents on the territory of the country. Acknowledging the increase of capability and responsibilities of the police and customs primarily in the tasks of border protection, the Review suggests that the ARM should maintain the capacity to defend and secure the border and should possess capacities in certain cases to provide support to the police.

(4) National Security Strategy, with regard to the CRT, refers to measures that are already part of the Concept and the Review.

(5) Defence Strategy calls for special attention to be paid to building instruments for management and commanding in the defence area, and especially of the armed forces; restructuring, dimensioning, equipping and training of the Army in accordance with the human resources and the economic capabilities of the country; redesigning the military education system based on the knowledge in NATO and the size and the needs of the regular and the reserve components of





the Army; taking care of the officers' and the civilians' standard of living, as well as the living and the working conditions of the soldiers. Another measure included is the improvement of informing the public about the situation and the trends in the development of the Macedonian defence.

(6) The White Paper on Defence refers to having available forces for the protection of the territorial integrity of the country. These forces should be able to deal with humanitarian crises and should have the military units in the state of readiness in case of any regional conflict and crisis. In addition, they should be able to operate within the structures of NATO, the EU, and the UN-led operations.

(7) The Police reform Strategy, with regard to the CRT, calls for the establishment of a new structure of the police, the establishment of the border police and a new organisation and working methods for fighting against crime and suppression of all of its forms, especially the trans-national one, as well as the change in the relations between the police and the public, with the purpose of joint actions in the area of crime prevention. The central issue, according to the Police Reform Strategy in response to the new environment, is the identification of the need for defining the basis for building a contemporary model of police organisation and the shift of its focus in accordance with the new democratic processes.

(8) The National Strategy for Integrated Border Management states that the Border Management Service must be adequately prepared for dealing with criminal armed groups. For this reason, the priority in the process of establishing the integrated border management is to identify and control the channels of small arms and light weapons.

All above-mentioned strategies refer to the following actors as the ones responsible for their implementation: the Parliament, the President, the Government, the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Interior, international community and municipalities.

In principle, these seven strategies do have a harmonised content and build on each other in terms of timing and significance. Both the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the National Security and Defence Concept are the basic documents that guide other related strategies in the field, including the Strategic Defence Review and the Police and IBM strategies. For instance, both the Review and the White Paper on Defence mention explicitly that they are based upon the views, positions and guidance set out in the National Security and Defence Concept. The Defence Strategy refers mainly to the National Security Strategy.

The Strategic Defence Review in itself has been a point of reference for a number of sub-strategies adopted within the Ministry of Defence for the transformation of the Army, including the Dynamic Plan for Transformation of the Armed Forces. The Review provided a political framework and a more detailed guidance for carrying out further reforms in the armed forces. Sectoral strategies were adopted for the management of the defence at all levels of decision-making, as well as in the areas related to the personnel (including the training of civilian experts), its professionalisation, qualifications, careers with equal opportunities for all, as well as an adequate ethnic representation in the army, training and education, including the civilian personnel in the ministry of defence, inter-operability, mod-



ernisation and procurement, logistics, standardisation, as well as development of the strategies for improvement and inter-operability of the intelligence capacities and crisis management.

The White Paper refers explicitly to the National Security and Defence Concept of 2003, as the basic guidelines for Macedonia's security and defence needs within the new strategic and security environment. It also refers to the Strategic Defence Review as a political framework that has provided a more detailed guidance for carrying out further defence reforms.

All the above-mentioned strategies start with the assessment of the international, regional and national security environment and the position of the country in it, continue with the assessment of the CRT in relation to the security and, based on the findings, propose the measures to be undertaken for the pursuance of the national security policy.

### **III Consequences**

#### **Reforms as a follow-up to the strategies and correlation between the strategies and the security sector reform**

(1) In terms of legislation and with regard to its practical application, the Ohrid Framework Agreement has been implemented and the envisaged reforms have been carried out. The implementation of the provisions of the Agreement took on the form of constitutional and legislative amendments presented to the Assembly. The amendments indicated in the Agreement were adopted by the Assembly in the course of 2001 and 2002. Among major changes envisaged in the Ohrid Agreement, police reform was among the most expected reform areas, envisaging a complete overhaul of the police system, as the police behaviour was seen as the major violator of human and minority rights in the country (Human Rights Watch, 2001). In order to ensure that police are aware of and responsive to the needs and interests of the local population, local heads of the police, according to the Ohrid Agreement, were envisaged to be selected by the municipal councils from the lists of candidates proposed by the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of the Interior retained the authority to remove local heads of police. Also, particular attention would be given to ensuring as rapidly as possible that the police services will generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia.

(2) The specific reform suggestion of the National Security and Defence Concept was the establishment of the Crisis Management Centre. Later, the Centre was established with the aim to enhance the security capacity as an important segment of the country's capability to deal with crises and as a part of the adaptation of the security system to that of NATO.

(3) The Strategic Defence Review led to a complete overhaul of the country's defence system, including: the development of capabilities for a rapid deployment outside the country; inter-operability with NATO at the highest military levels of decision-making as well as operational and tactical levels; introduction of cost-effectiveness across the defence sector and the allocation of resources within the framework of the defence budget in accordance with the standards that exist in



the NATO member states for the purpose of providing more funds for modernisation and development, training, operations and operational capabilities; and the establishment of a multi-year planning, programming and budgeting system.

(4) The National Security Strategy was mainly an update of the overall strategies in the field.

(5) The Defence Strategy did not lead to specific reforms as the plans included in the Strategy had already been a part of the reforms undertaken according to other defence policies of the government.

(6) The White Paper on Defence provides mainly the reference to the reforms envisaged in the Strategic Defence Review.

(7) The Police Reform Strategy provided amendments in the organisation of the Ministry of the Interior, strategic settings and principles, the change of the personnel policy and education processes, the introduction of methods for control and measuring of the police efficiency and the upgrading of its technical equipment. It introduced new organisational units, eliminated the overlapping of competencies, freed the police from the so-called “non-police work”, etc. Following the recommendations of the Strategy, the new structure of the Ministry of the Interior consists of services responsible for coordination, international cooperation and the relations with the public of the Ministry: the Directorate for Public Security, within which there are services of advisory nature, competent for the strategic, conceptual planning and determination of general directions and standards of operations; the Operative Services (Central Police Services, Border Police and Territorial Police Services), responsible for the operative work of the Ministry of the Interior through the implementation of specific activities and actions, focus on the implementation of the basic functions of the Ministry of the Interior. The Directorate for the Security and Counterintelligence’s activities were limited to the work in the field of counterintelligence and terrorism, whereas the competences concerning organised crime were transferred to the Department for Organised Crime within the Central Police Services.

(8) The National Strategy for Integrated Border Management envisaged that the Army of the Republic of Macedonia would not have the sole responsibility in the field of border management. The Strategy led to the establishment of the new National Border Police Service within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as the basic service for border management in the country which will undertake the responsibility of supervision of the state border. The new national coordinative mechanism for border management was also set up, led by the Border Police Service in cooperation with other national services for border management, with the aim of establishing cooperation, coordination, common support and exchange of information among them. Over the years, and as a result of the adopted strategy, the country gradually reorganised the structures of the border guard, changing it from a military organisation with conscripted staff into a police organisation with purely professional staff. It completed the process of transferring responsibility for the management of the country’s borders from the military to the police – a precondition for joining NATO and a condition for the liberalisation of the visa regime with the EU allowing the entry of the country’s citizens to the EU countries without visas.

With regard to the correlation of the security strategies with the security sector reform, the common objective of the security strategies has been to point to the need for adapting the security sector to the new environment and making the security sector able to meet the challenges mentioned in the strategy document. Another common objective of the strategies has been increasing the accountability of the security sector.

In a changing society, the security sector cannot be left aside and must keep pace with the economic and social reforms in the country. Security threats and risks are in a constant flux, making the security strategies tools for improving the security sector's capacity for dealing with contemporary threats and risks, such as organised crime, terrorism, the smuggling of weapons and drugs, etc. Also, making the security and defence sector ready for new missions, e.g. peacekeeping missions and those in support of national law enforcement institutions has been one of the objectives.

When Macedonia started, immediately after gaining independence in 1991, with the *first generation of the security sector reforms* which included the establishment of new institutions, structures, and chains of responsibility for the security sector and appropriate structures for the democratic control of security sector actors, there were no security strategies in place. The country laid the basic principles and structures for the oversight of the security sector issues, empowered the parliament to oversee and approve security sector budgets, and made attempts for civilianisation of the security sector bureaucracies. All this happened as a result of the overall democratisation processes in the country. However, the later environment required more reforms than that of the first generation and this called for the *second-generation security sector reforms* to be introduced. The second generation reforms were concerned with further consolidation of the democratic control of armed forces, strengthening of procedures of transparency and accountability, enhancing the way structures and institutions implemented policy and improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency in the work of the security sector, a wider involvement of the civil society and establishment of a strong civilian defence and security community, development of community policing processes, enhancing the ability for effective border protection, reforming the intelligence agencies; disarmament, demilitarisation and reintegration; sustaining the reforms of the judicial and legal reform; and fighting corruption and organised crime in the security sector.

A key element of the security strategies was to provide the political ground for reforming and professionalising of the security sector formations. These entailed defining missions, tasks and structures for the security sector actors in line with the new environment, challenges and priorities.

In general, it should be stressed that the security strategies, despite the ways in which they were initiated and the objectives they accomplished, had their own merit, bearing in mind the difficult period that the Macedonian society and security institutions were going through in the transition period. The impact of the strategies has been compromised by the continuous identification of the strategies with the simple promotion of the government or of other institutions which participated in developing the strategies.



Important improvements were made with the security strategies in Macedonia regarding the promotion of the democratic forms in the security sector. The real question Macedonia was confronted with was whether the current government would be guided by the logic of the specific security reforms in the development of strategies or by the logic of assessment of current circumstances. The security strategies guided by the overall security reforms would to a great extent serve to the overall goals of the security sector reforms and institute a sound basis for the start or for furthering of reforms in the area. The security sector reform concept in itself recognises that strategies should be in place that will guide the reforms (Yusufi, 2003: 44).

Changes that were supposed to be undertaken in the security sector could not be introduced overnight. Not only the procedures and the legislation had to be changed, but also the attitudes and mentalities of the people. In addition, the changes had to be made slowly and had to include all levels of the security sector in the reform agenda. To adjust practices to the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic environment of the country was another challenge. All of these could be achieved with the development and formulation of the security strategies.

### **Correlation of the strategies with the integrations (regional, European, and transatlantic)**

All above-mentioned strategies refer clearly to the commitment of the country to realise its future as a part of the European family and as a member of the EU and NATO. The development of the security strategies made an impact on the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country. Macedonia has signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, has become a candidate country for the EU membership and is expected to start accession talks in the near future. With regards to NATO, Macedonia is a candidate country for the membership and it has received invitation for accession, which is subject to the resolution of the name dispute with Greece. The security strategies reviewing the changing domestic and regional environment, highlighting challenges and priorities and laying down the reforms to be undertaken in the direction of Euro-Atlantic integration, have been turning points for Macedonia's undertakings in the direction of the EU and NATO integration. The security strategies have been building blocks for entrenching the Euro-Atlantic values in the society and motivating the population for further reforms. The strategies have laid down the importance and urgency in initiating reforms that in turn have had a serious impact in integrating it into the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies. The strategies opened the possibility for a more active engagement in the debate about the security issues of the country that has resulted in the development of participatory methods in the debate of the country's Euro-Atlantic integration.

The security strategies also include a clear commitment to regional cooperation by stating that the aim of the strategies is to foster it. Some of the strategies have even devoted special sections to this topic. The regional cooperation in the Western Balkans is an essential factor for the security, political stability and economic prosperity and the only way for the countries in the region to successfully address the key common security challenges. Also, bearing in mind that the country's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures is conditioned with the readiness of

the country to cooperate with other countries in the region, the strategies had to encompass the methods for contributing to the regional stability and security. This commitment in the strategies has emerged as the important point in the entire process of the country's policy towards regional cooperation as it has acted as an important confidence-building measure. For the successful regional cooperation, the countries have to be committed to this process and this commitment has been included in the security strategies.

### **Capacities of the state bodies as well as of the society to prepare and implement the strategies**

An important issue concerning the initiation and implementation of the strategies is the capacities in both the government and in a wider society to do so. Capacity problems with regards to the strategies have manifested themselves in a number of ways in Macedonia. These have all been evident in Macedonian governments' attempts to adopt the major security strategy documents.

In Macedonia there has been a growing civilian interest for issues concerning the security sector. The governments and the civil society have gradually recognised the need for the establishment of a strong community of civilians with expertise in the security and defence, consisting of both governmental and non-governmental individuals and institutions. For this purpose, the centres and/or faculties for the security have been established, where special educational and training programs for the civilians have been organised in order to provide them with the skills and expertise in the field of the security and defence sector management. However, the post-communist society of Macedonia of 1990s was still a relatively closed society closed to civilians. During this period, the security services lacked the capacity to implement the policies, and the civil servants lacked the expertise in the security sector bureaucracies.

The development of a strong community of civilian intellectuals that would be engaged in the initial phase of the security strategies building was a challenge for the country and central for the start of defining of the security strategies. Starting from the late 1990s, the establishment of the security community was central for acquiring the public support for the security reforms envisaged in the security strategies and for other issues that required a wider public support for their successful realisation and implementation. The scarcity of legitimate civilian or military security and defence experts capable of making the defence and security case to their legislatures and a broader public was the reason why there were few security-related documents available in the country at that period (Simon, 2003: 95). The Ministries of the Interior and Defence particularly needed responsible and capable civilian personnel to perform the security policy-making functions and to ensure that the country had proper security strategies. Efforts were made to overcome the difficulties and existing problems by training a corps of civilian defence and security professionals, which led to some progress in developing a viable civilian security and defence community that would be able to adequately develop and implement the security strategies. Moreover, the politically appointed civilians within the Ministries of Defence and the Interior did not have, compared to their military or police counterparts, a desirable level of technical expertise, nor did they have a staff of trained civilian professionals to assist them. Consequently,



the staff of the government and of the Ministries of Defence and the Interior did not, for a long time, effectively assume the policymaking function required to ensure the adoption and implementation of the security strategies. The EU and NATO provided a substantial assistance in the institution-building process by organising trainings for the public administration staff to make them capable of fulfilling their country's commitments and the Euro-Atlantic integration priorities. The trainings were a part of almost all EU and NATO assistance programs in Macedonia and they were also an integral part of other types of assistance, such as technical assistance, Twinning program, grants, works and supplies.

The major difficulty with the trained staff was the high politicisation of the public administration and frequent changes of the staff following the change of the government. The education of people on the security matters has remained an important challenge to the country. One could not expect the needed level of expertise on security issues if there was no investment in the training of relevant experts. It is also essential that the initial focus of the reform was to work in the top-down manner in order to empower the key decision makers and officials in charged of the implementation of the change. Moreover, for a long time, Macedonia had not had the stabilised institutions in place. Therefore, the imperative was to increase the strength of the public institutions in order to come to terms with the demands for the development of the strategic-doctrinary framework of the country. In this context, the security sector reforms could not be effective without the adequate human resources' capacities.

The human resources issue did not initially attract the attention of the policy makers. The country also too often ignored the fact that there was a pressing need for educating the civil society in the defence and security matters. While the government put a lot of effort in adapting the old structures to the new realities, the reform requirements were rarely adequately identified or discussed as part of an inclusive and transparent public debate. The paucity, as well as often partisan and poorly informed media reporting on the security issues, was partly to blame. Due to the insufficient involvement of the public, the non-governmental sector seriously lacked the capacity to make a contribution to the checks and balances required in the civil-military and civil-security sector relations. However, once the reforms were achieved, a large community of the security sector reformers was established, which led to a growing interest in the society and the media for the overall reforms in the security and defence sector. The country, as a result of the reforms achieved, can count on many local competent NGOs and political parties ready to discuss and offer their support for the security reforms. The media have also gradually developed the competence and expertise on the issue, and local businesses have become supportive of the security reforms. The media coverage constituted a substantial part of the process of the security sector reform and its function is to provide the information.

As a result of investments made in the professionalization of the public administration as well as in the training of the personnel in the related governmental ministries, the country moved towards professionalization of its security and defence sectors, and attracted suitable candidates for professional positions who possessed a high level of communication skills, who were able to understand the importance of the security strategies, assist in designing them and take forward the implementation of reform recommendations provided in the strategies.

The overall reforms, including those in the political, security and economic sectors, not only have overcome the legacies of communism, but also, greatly helped in overcoming the lack of independent local policy-making infrastructures. A frequently neglected aspect of the security sector reform in Macedonia is whether the governments are actually competent to decide on and implement a defence and security policy and direct the course of the security reforms. For example, the working assumption of Macedonia's White Paper on Defence of August 1998 and related defence planning documents was that the threats would come from outside the country. The conflict that happened in 2001, however, changed those assumptions and basically stalled defence reform plans, as the source of the crisis was not from the outside but from the inside. Thus, it is in this context that we can understand the significance of civilian governance in evaluating and defining the security strategies.

## Conclusion

One decade of the development of the strategic-doctrinary framework in Macedonia has shown the importance of security strategies and capacities of the country in initiating and implementing the strategies. The record of the transformation of the security sector in Macedonia underscores the importance of the development and continuous update of the strategic-doctrinary framework of the country. So far the country has been able to lay down the main pillars of its strategic-doctrinary framework. It may be concluded that the country has made a quite substantial progress with the strategy documents and that an adequate and ambitious security policy agenda for the medium term has been established. However, the challenges still exist and the key for fulfilling the need for an updated strategic-doctrinary framework lies in the degree to which the success that the country has enjoyed in the past in this regard can be maintained. Current difficulties include maintaining the success established through the development of the strategic-doctrinary framework and sustaining the ability for a continuous re-design, planning and implementation of the new strategy documents, as well as for updating the existing ones. The accessibility of the strategies to the wider public still remains a problem. The existing security strategies are not accessible on the websites of the relevant institutions. Macedonia was successful in erecting the pillars for the design of the strategic-doctrinary framework and implementing them. It is also important to note that it has made a rapid progress toward the goals set out in the security strategies to develop a security sector that is far more efficient and flexible. However, the momentum needs to be maintained for a continuous update of the strategy documents, their accessibility and their implementation.

## Bibliography

European Commission (2001) *Support Program for Police Reform in Macedonia in 2001*, Brussels: European Commission.

Government of the Republic of Macedonia (2003) *Strategic Defence Review - Policy Framework*, Skopje.





Government of the Republic of Macedonia (2003) *National Security and Defence Concept*, Skopje.

Government of the Republic of Macedonia (2003) *National Strategy For Integrated Border Management*, Skopje.

Government of the Republic of Macedonia (2008) *National Security Strategy*, Skopje.

Human Rights Watch (2001) "Macedonia Crimes against Civilians: Abuses by Macedonian Forces in Ljuboten, 10-12 August 2001"; [Online], Available: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/macedonia/>.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia (1998) *Defence Strategy*, Skopje.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia (2005) *White Paper on Defence*, Skopje.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia (2010) *Defence Strategy*, Skopje.

Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia (2004) *Police Reform Strategy*, Skopje.

NATO (2001) *South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP)*, Brussels: NATO.

Arto Niemenkari (2002) "EU/Schengen Requirements for National Border Security Systems", Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper Series – No. 8, Geneva.

Ohrd Framework Agreement (2001) [Online], Available: [http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal\\_affairs/legal\\_co-operation/police\\_and\\_internal\\_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp](http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp).

Jeffrey Simon (2003) *Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations*, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc..

Islam Yusufi, Kiril Nejkov and Stevo Pendarovski (2001) *Proces 2002: Bezbednost na republika makedonija*, Skopje: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Islam Yusufi (2003) *Security Sector Reform in South East Europe*, Budapest: International Policy Fellowship, Centre for Policy Studies.





No	Name of the challenge, risk, or threat	Category			Level of analysis – scope of threat				Source of Threat (As stated by proposer)	Sector (As stated by proposer)	Reference Object (What is Proposer Protecting)	Nota Bene	
		Challenge	Risk	Threat	Global	Regional	National	Subnational					Individual
		C	R	T	G	R	N	N	S	I			
1	Use of violence in resolving inter-ethnic disputes			X			X				Security	Peace and security in Macedonia	/
2	Pursuit of territorial solutions to ethnic issues	X						X			Security	Peace and security in Macedonia	/
3	Damage to the multi-ethnic character of Macedonia's society		X				X				Political	Peace and security in Macedonia	/
4	Crises and conflicts		X		X	X					Political	Regional and National Security	/
5	The possible manifestations of extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance	X				X					Political	Regional and national security	/
6	International terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration, illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons, people, strategic and two-fold use materials, as well as consequences of the use and the use of means for massive destruction			X		X	X				Political and Military	Regional and national security	/
7	Possession of large quantities of illegal weapons		X			X					Military and security	Regional and national security	/
8	Transitional problems such as corruption, urban terrorism, heavy criminal including blackmail, racketeering, murders and attacks on the property of citizens, economic crime, tax evasion, underdeveloped institutions of the democratic system, problems in the functioning of the judiciary, social problems and unemployment	X				X					Political	national security and prosperity	/





# Montenegro

Rajko Radević

## The Context of the Strategic Documents

The formulation of Montenegrin strategic and doctrinal framework has begun soon after the country renewed its statehood on the referendum held in May 2006. For a better understanding of the current situation within this field, we will shortly reflect on the period before the independence.

After the dissolution of SFRY (1990), Montenegro, decided on the 1992 referendum to remain in a joint state with Serbia, which was first called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and later the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SaM). The first period of the existence of the new federation, from 1990 to 1997, was predominantly marked with conflicts, international sanctions and the overall social crisis. Naturally, there was no interest or possibility for adoption or serious discussion on strategic documents of any kind. The year of 1997 is very important in recent Montenegrin history. At that time the Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, strongly backed up by the international community, began to distance from Milosevic, and to create Montenegrin defence capacities based on the Police Force, which increased in number and became militarised for this purpose. Montenegrin authorities started to take over federal competences, one by one, and to transfer them to the national level.

The process continued even after the overthrowing of Milosevic in October 2000. From that period on, Montenegrin position in the international community has significantly changed. The EU did their utmost to preserve the State Union – Serbia and Montenegro. The outcome of those initiatives was that the Union existed on paper, but not in reality. For example, the Supreme Defence Council of Serbia and Montenegro adopted the Military Doctrine in March 2006. However, at the same time, the Council agreed that the provisions from the Doctrine were not to be applied on the territory of Montenegro (Voice of America, 2006). Montenegro tended to neglect all strategic or legislative documents adopted at the level of the State Union. Its ruling elite was strongly determined to use the opportunity which was made available in the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro (2003), and to organize the referendum on independence, after the period of three years. To sum up, after gaining independence (May, 2006), Montenegro found itself in the position of having no strategic and/or doctrinal framework. These very important documents had to be created and adopted in the period that followed.

## Montenegrin Strategic Framework

It appears that in the period after the independence had been established there was no clear plan as to which documents and strategies needed to be adopted



first. This could be concluded from the fact that prior to the adoption of the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy, the country had not created similar strategies for the economy, environment, health care etc. All these documents were created later on and haphazardly. From the present perspective, it seems that the adoption of a Plan of State Reform would have been a good idea, the plan from which all other strategies would have been derived. However, this did not happen.

Montenegrin strategic – doctrinal framework consists of two main documents: the National Security Strategy (Government of Montenegro, 2008), which was adopted by the Parliament on November 27, 2008, and the Defence Strategy (Government of Montenegro, 2008), adopted shortly after the NSS, on December 17, 2008.

<b>Title of the strategy</b>	<b>Adopted – date</b>	<b>Amendment</b>
1. National Security Strategy	June 20, 2006	<i>Yes</i>
2. (New) National Security Strategy	November 27, 2008	<i>No</i>
3. Strategy of Defense	June 14, 2007	<i>Yes</i>
4.(New) Strategy of Defense	December 17, 2008	<i>No</i>

*Table 7: Strategic documents of Montenegro*

It should be noted that the first versions of the two documents were created a few months after the country had become independent. These strategies were supposed to be the corner stone for a further development of the security capacities of Montenegro, and for the reform of its domestic security sector. However, they were adopted in a hurry and without a clear vision of goals to be achieved, hence they had many deficiencies. First, from looking at the text of strategies, one could not conclude what the Montenegrin position in the geopolitical sense was as no coordinates of the Montenegrin position were given. Furthermore, this shortcoming made it impossible for the reader to connect the security, challenges, risks and threats which were stated in the documents with the geopolitical position of Montenegro. Second, the old strategies failed to recognize the EU as the security actor, which, apart from NATO, is important for Montenegrin security. This was rather contradictory, since one of three Montenegrin foreign policy goals (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, 2006), is the membership in NATO and the EU.

Third, the old strategies were not clear enough in defining the security challenges, risks and threats. They were just briefly touched upon and not stated precisely. The fourth main shortcoming related to these documents was the fact that they were adopted not by the Parliament, but by the executive authority, the Government of Montenegro. In addition, there was no public debate before the adoption. This made the legitimacy of such documents questionable.

The practice in the old democracies, and in the post-socialist countries that underwent the transition process toward democracy, was that before the adoption of the main strategic documents a public debate would be organized, where

all interested parties (individuals, civil society organizations, institutes, experts, etc.) were given an opportunity to express their opinions. In these countries, after the debate was over, the draft paper was first submitted to the Parliamentary Committee in charge of the security issues, and upon the Committee's approval, the Parliament usually gave its final word through voting of the deputies 'for' or 'against' these documents. This was not the case with Montenegro in 2006. For this reason, the two fundamental documents in the area of national security had to be modified in accordance with the country's needs and in respect to the procedures regarded as the best practices of Western democracies, where Montenegro wishes to position itself.

### Strategic Hierarchy

The new strategies (National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy of Montenegro, 2008) represent a broad framework for determination of the means by which Montenegro provides security for its citizens. The author of these documents (Ministry of Defence) tried to be more concise and concrete than in the first versions (2006) in identifying the security challenges, risks and threats, as well as the means and instruments with which the state will respond to them. By adopting the strategies, Montenegro has also made a step forward towards the integration of all the actors within the field of national security, so that their contribution to the security of the state is maximized. The documents also tried to position and define the Montenegrin role in the regional and international environment.

The hierarchy of the importance and geniality was respected in the process of the adoption of the documents. The National Security Strategy was first adopted, and it represents the starting point which all other important documents within the field of security should be derived from. This can be identified from the text of the document where, in the concluding remarks, the author states that: *The strategy (NSS) is the basis for building the system of the national security of Montenegro, it defines security threats and is a basis for the creation of strategic, normative and other documents within the area of functioning and development of the security and defence system.* The Defence Strategy of Montenegro was developed and adopted on the basis of the NSS. In addition, by following the hierarchy, the MoD experts are expected to complete the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in the first six months of 2010.

The language of the Strategies is mostly detached, administrative and bureaucratic. This makes the understanding of the authors' intentions difficult and it can partly be explained by the writers' possible lack of knowledge and understanding of contemporary security issues. Moreover, there is also some overlapping between the two documents. This becomes evident first in the part where the components of the national security system were listed. This part is almost identical in both documents, with the Defence Strategy paying more attention to the military. Similarly, the provisions referring to resources are identical in both documents.



## **Key Factors in passing and updating of the Strategic Documents**

As for the key factors which influenced the adoption of the strategies, it can be concluded with some certainty, and based on a deeper insight into their content, that the motives for the adoption were mostly exterior. It seems that the authors of the strategies were more concerned with fulfilling (at least on paper) the conditions set by NATO and with trying to be in line with similar documents that NATO members have. This is most evident in the part where the strategies define security challenges, risks and threats, where instead of pointing to those that refer directly to Montenegro, the documents define remote regions (North Africa, Caucasus etc.) which are a part of NATO's strategic documents. Therefore, we believe that the strategies are lacking the connection with the real situation *"on the ground"*, and perhaps the identification of the regions and places which are more likely to endanger Montenegrin security, especially when we are aware that Montenegro is situated in the region of Western Balkans.

## **Institutions tasked with the preparations of the Strategic Documents**

The Ministry of Defence was in charge of drafting the strategies. The documents were then forwarded to the Government, and afterwards to the Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security, which, after a brief discussion, adopted them on the plenary meeting of the Parliament. The public did not know who precisely (inter-ministerial working group, two or more working groups, permanent or ad hoc groups) had created the strategies. Nor did it have any insight as to whether certain institutes, international organizations or experts were involved in the process. Another issue which could be questionable from the point of view of democratic standards and principles is that there was no public debate before the adoption of documents. No round tables, seminars or public hearings, where individuals and/or experts could express their opinions, were organized.

Still, in comparison to the documents from 2006, certain improvements are evident. However, the fact remains that the creation of these documents was an inclusive process, reserved for the executive branch, instead of being more open for the civil society. It is obvious that the state did not want any influence from the civil society in drafting the strategies, or that it tried to diminish its influence to the lowest possible level.

On the other hand, one has to be honest and say that Montenegro lacks NGOs or independent experts in the field of security who could give a proper input in drafting the strategies. This is the field which will require time to develop. The same applies to the media. There are few journalists who are knowledgeable in the security matters and are able to write competently on these issues. Unfortunately, this means that the civil society within the area of security is not developed enough in Montenegro. Still, this does not provide a justification for the government for not making the process more transparent and open for the interested public.

The Minister of Defence declared that the Strategies supported the policy of the Montenegrin government to undertake all necessary actions in order to meet the conditions for its integration into the European, Euro-Atlantic and other international security structures. On the other hand, the opposition parties have mostly



criticized the Strategy. The Serb People's Party (SNS, now - NOVA) believes that the Strategy is a poorly written document which offers incomplete and vague solutions to the challenges set before the security sector of Montenegro. Furthermore, the SNS believes that, through the Strategy, Montenegro wishes to "merge" into NATO, without putting the issue to a referendum. The Movement for Changes (PzP) was slightly less critical of the Strategy and estimated that many things needed to change in Montenegro in order for that document to be enforced. The Socialist People's Party (SNP) mainly objected to the section of the Strategy in which its goals are defined, and it also criticized its "insistence" on seeking accession to NATO, i.e., prioritizing the accession to the Alliance to joining the European Union (WBSO no 11, 2009).

### **Challenges, risks and threats defined by the Strategic Framework**

Further in the paper we will try to thoroughly analyze the contents of the two documents. First of all, we will identify the challenges risks and threats stated in the NSS, since this was the first document to be adopted. The author clearly positions Montenegro in the geopolitical framework. The document points out to the security environment in the region of the Western Balkans, which is the region burdened with numerous problems stemming from the war heritage. However, it seems that the challenges were not ranked by importance, in the sense which of the listed challenges is more likely to jeopardize the country's security. Additionally, it seems that the document does not make a clear distinction among the challenges, risks and threats. This is a serious shortcoming of the document, because it means that possible dangers for the security of the country were not graded and assessed by the possibility and probability of danger to the Montenegrin security. It is unclear whether this was done on purpose or not.

The NSS identifies the regions that represent a possible source of threat for the Montenegrin security, such as: The Middle East, Caucasus, and North Africa. It does not specify which challenges, risks or threats the country could face from these regions but states instead that these regions are unstable and that this instability could spread to the European continent. Therefore, the sources of threats are not clearly defined. Apart from these remarks, the document elaborates on the threats that could come from international terrorism and organized crime which represent real and possible threats and risks to Montenegrin security. However, it seems that the NSS has omitted to point out to organized crime and corruption within Montenegro, as a risk, challenge or threat. It rather focuses on its external dimension.

A foreign (not informed) reader, when reading this provision in the document, can be misled into thinking that there is no organized crime within the state, that rather it exists somewhere outside of Montenegro and as such represents a threat to the country's security. The strategy lists the following threats (again in a broad sense): smuggling of drugs and weapons, illegal migration, human trafficking and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The negative consequences of globalization and the process of transition could also bring certain challenges, but the strategy does not identify which. Whether the term *challenge* is used intentionally or by mistake is beyond the author's knowledge. However, there is no doubt that this formulation could be directly related to the fact that the strategy



does not identify internal dangers coming from corruption and organized crime. It identifies possible dangers from the process of transition (corruption, organized crime, 'taylorization', etc.) as challenges, therefore, in terms of the hierarchy, the least possible ones to endanger Montenegrin security.

Similarly, the NSS identifies the threats to Montenegrin security: natural, technological, chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological disasters as well as pandemics as a cause of terrorism. At one point the authors do touch upon real and "on the ground" possible threats to Montenegrin security, when referring to a surplus of arms in possession of the Army. It also refers to ecological disasters as a source of threat. In the end, the author identifies the threats that could come from the cyber criminal activities.

The overall impression is that the NSS has missed its point, that is, it failed to identify the security challenges, risks and threats which are likely to endanger Montenegrin security. It should have dealt with the dangers coming from organized crime and corruption within the state, as well as the potential threats coming from the region of the Western Balkans, which could be identified as a "neglected" region in the security sense. This region could produce either short-term or long-term threats, challenges or risks for Montenegrin security, however, the identification of the region in these terms was left out from the document.

There are many possible reasons why the strategy failed to include these topics. We will make an attempt in identifying some of them. First, the author/s of the document might have wanted to avoid the topic. For him/her, or them, it was more important to adopt the strategy in accordance with the NATO strategic documents than to have the document which will reflect the country's needs. Second, it seems that the ruling structures tend to minimize the impression (of not just the local public, but of relevant international institutions as well) that country has problems with corruption and organized crime. Third, the reason for not listing the security threats which could come from the region of the Western Balkans could be a desire to maintain good neighbourly relations with all the Western Balkan countries, and not to "spoil" those relations by pointing to the possible threats which could come from certain countries (E.g., BiH, Kosovo).

Now we will comment on the Montenegrin Defence Strategy. This document is very limited in terms of identifying the security threats. There is only one paragraph devoted to this issue. The document states that at the present moment, and due to the integration processes to the EU and/or NATO, the risks and threats coming from the Western Balkan countries are few, though the danger of military aggression on the territory of Montenegro cannot be completely excluded. Instead of naming the security challenges, risks or threats, the Defence Strategy elaborates only briefly and in general terms on this issue. It stresses a well-known fact that on global level the threats do not refer only to the use of the military force. It also determines that the possible crisis coming from other regions and asymmetrical threats could endanger Montenegrin security. Therefore, the Defence Strategy defines the challenges, risks or threats even less precisely than the NSS. It does not rank them by importance.

The strategy does not identify the regions, states, or actors which are the sources of those threats. It stresses the need for the coordination and cooperation on

both national and international levels. The cooperation on national level is to be achieved through the integration of efforts of the state, the municipalities and other institutions. As for the international dimension, it consists of the preventive or reactive engagement. The Strategy emphasises the need to contribute to keeping peace in the region burdened with wars and crises. The Defence Strategy also recognizes the need for investment in the modernization of the Armed Forces of Montenegro. However, it seems that the author failed to define the concrete instruments with which the state and the society should respond to the security challenges, risks and threats.

Nevertheless, the strategy has one positive novelty in comparison to the previous document. It names and clearly defines the three states of security: regular, the state of emergency and the state of war. These provisions were taken from the Constitution (Parliament of Montenegro, 2007), and included in this strategy.

The strategy is also clear in the part where it defines the missions in which the state should be involved. There are four missions that constitute Montenegrin readiness to deal with the risks and threats to the national security: 1) defence of Montenegro; 2) protection of internal security; 3) crisis management; 4) participation in the peace and humanitarian operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the EU. Furthermore, the Defence Strategy elaborates on the means and responses to the challenges. The strategy states that, in order to achieve a full security, Montenegro is directed toward: 1) building credible defence capacities; 2) development of inter-operable capacities; 3) contribution to the creation of a stable security environment in the region; 4) development of partnership and cooperation with other democratic states; 5) building the capacities in order to join the EU and NATO.

The Defence Strategy lists all the actors in the field of security and each of them has a specific role in that regard. The Strategy specifies that the system of the national security represents a functional unity of all the elements for securing the protection of national interests and values of Montenegro. There is also a paragraph in which a special role of the civil society is emphasized, along with the civil-military and civil-police cooperation in the area of security. There is also a clear provision that the Montenegrin system of national security is under the democratic and civilian control. The system of the national security consists of the Parliament of Montenegro, the President, the Government, the Council for National Security and Defence, the police, the military, the Forces for the State of Emergency, the Agency for the National Security (ANB), the Prosecutor's Office, and the judiciary.

The Army of Montenegro is the bearer of the defence of Montenegro and is established to protect the independence and the state territory. It also contributes to the peace operations in the world in accordance with the principles of the International Law. The military can be engaged as a support to the police forces in the cases of the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, the police provide the general, personal or material protection of the citizens. The police are the bearer of the internal security, do the work related to combating crime, especially the corruption and organized crime, human rights protection, and protect the state border, public order and security, traffic security. Police forces are identified as the main agent in the fight against terrorism. The strategy also defines the role of the



Forces for the State of Emergency and their role in the system. The Agency for the National Security is another important actor in the area of the national security. According to the provisions of the strategy, it performs the tasks related to the protection of the constitutionally established order, security and territorial integrity of Montenegro, protection of human rights as well as other tasks concerning the national security of Montenegro.

The state prosecution is another important factor in the chain of actors that create the system of national security. It is responsible for prosecuting persons who committed criminal acts. The State Prosecutor is the head of this institution. There is also the function of the Special Prosecutor, who deals only with the criminal acts of organized crime, corruption, terrorism and war crimes. The next important element of the system is the judiciary. The strategy states that the management of the system of national security is in accordance with the Constitution and the law. The actors who perform the management of the security system are the parliament, the president, the government and the Council for National Security. The competences of the parliament in the area of the national security are as follows: it adopts the laws, the Strategy of National Security, Defence Strategy, declares the state of emergency, decides on sending the troops to international missions, and controls the army and the security services. It is responsible for legal preconditions for the functioning of the defence and security sector.

The strategy also clearly defines the role of the President of Montenegro in the area of providing the national security. The president is the chairman of the Council for Defence and Security, commands the Army, based on decisions of the Council for Defence and Security and decides on the military engagement in accordance with the law. The government is in charge of leading the national security policy through various competences. It sends the proposal of the Strategy of National Security, and Defence Strategy and laws related to this field to the parliament. It is in charge of implementing the Strategy of National Defence, monitoring of the state of the national security, etc. The Council for Defence and Security is an ad hoc body which is in charge of commanding the military. It also analyzes the security environment in Montenegro and decides on certain measures. It gives recommendations for sending the troops to international missions. The Council for National Security consists of the President of Montenegro, the President of the Parliament and the Prime Minister.

The strategy also elaborates on the resources (human and material) for achieving the national security. It also points out to certain limitations in regard to the resources related to economic capacity, demographic and other factors. The document points out that the budget for security affairs will be planned and realized in a transparent manner and in accordance with the standards and criteria of the EU, the UN and NATO, according to Montenegrin economic capabilities. The Defence Strategy of Montenegro also has the provisions which are referring to the actors in charge of the realization of the security policy of Montenegro. The document, more or less, uses the provisions from the NSS. It brings in the MoD as the actor in the area of security and its competences, as a part of the Government.

## The Relation between the Strategic Framework and the Security Sector Reform

In the preamble of both main strategic documents of Montenegro (Strategy of National Security, and Defence Strategy) there is a provision stating that the documents represent the foundation for further plans and reform of the security sector of Montenegro. The NSS is the document that all other documents in the area of the national security should derive from. On the other hand, the Defence Strategy is the document which is mainly focused on the military reform. These documents are supposed to serve as guidelines for: the Military Doctrine, the Defence Plan, the Military Development Plan, the Strategic Defence Review, and all other main documents within the area of the functioning and development of the defence and military system of Montenegro. Therefore, the strategies, at least formally, do represent the basis for the development of the security sector reform plans in Montenegro.

However, the documents do not pay too much attention to identifying the areas within the security sector which should be included in the reform. Nor do they provide a priority list, namely, which actors within the sector should be reformed and in what way. Too much text is devoted to emphasizing the need for Montenegro to become a part of the European and Euro - Atlantic community, that is, to become a member of the EU and NATO. The documents only name all the actors and their role in the area of the security of the country, which is good, but there are no directions and guidelines as to what further steps should be taken to make the security sector reform in Montenegro successful.

From the time when these two documents were adopted (November and December 2008) until today, February 2010, the overall reform of the security sector in Montenegro has been rather modest. The police reform and the reform of the Agency for National Security (ANB) have seen the least progress. Still, there are no strategies or documents which would represent the guidelines for the reform of these two institutions. In the concluding remarks of the EC Progress Report for 2009, the author states that *"The police reform in Montenegro has moderately advanced"* (The EC Progress Report, 2009).

The report states that in 2009 some progress was made in the area of policing and police reform. The SSR of the police forces is more focused on the internal reorganization than the reform. The report emphasizes a good cooperation of Montenegrin police with other police forces from the region and the world, as well as the cooperation and exchange of intelligence with the police services of neighbouring countries. Still, the reform is not close to a satisfactory level. The police and the "secret service" (The Agency for National Security) are in an urgent need for reforms. This is due to previous SSR contexts which strongly affected the work and organization of these two institutions. We mostly refer here to the period of the 90s, when the politization and a strong militarization of these forces occurred. The consequences of that period are still a burden for these two organizations.

However, some positive steps have been made in this regard. In December 2009 Montenegro was granted a visa-free regime. This means that Montenegrin citizens can travel without visas to the Schengen countries. The process of fulfilling the criteria was mainly the task of the police of Montenegro and the Ministry of



the Interior and Public Administration, which performed an excellent job. The process also implied certain modernizations within the police.

On the other hand, both strategies, especially the Defence Strategy, refer to and represent certain foundation for the reform of the Montenegrin Army. It is evident that after the adoption of the strategies more reforming processes have been carried out in the Army than in the police or the ANB. This can partly be explained by the fact that some (general) guidelines (NSS, SD) for the reform of the military do exist. Furthermore, we must not exclude the possibility that there is much more political will for the reform of the military, which is a new organization and has not been affected by the previous negative contexts as were the police and the ANB. However, the statements given by NATO officials reinforce the idea that the reforms within the military are going in to positive direction. The National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy of Montenegro are currently being used as basic documents for the development of the most important document regulating the development and future vision of the military – The Strategic Defence Review.

Both documents state that the security sector in Montenegro is under a democratic and civilian control. Nevertheless, when analyzing the work of the MoD and the military officials, the impression is that everything is over after a short debate in the Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security. For example, in 2008, the State Auditing Agency identified some irregularities in the work of the Ministry concerning certain procurement procedures (NATO Watchdog, NDC, 2008). However, there were no consequences for any MoD officials. The same applies to any important topic which is brought before the Committee. Therefore, the civilian and democratic oversight does exist on paper, but it is much different in practice.

However, as stated before, the reforms in the military are going in the positive direction and the fact that the country received the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which represents a significant step towards NATO membership, supports this trend. By giving the MAP to Montenegro, NATO officials demonstrated approval, and in a sense rewarded Montenegro, for the reforms in the military. Still, much is yet to be done before the country meets all the criteria and becomes NATO member. It will be interesting to examine the SDR. This document should provide clear guidelines for the development, and reform of Montenegrin Armed Forces. It will be also interesting to see whether its adoption will imply the reforms in this field.

Even though the strategies exist, they do not guarantee that the reform will be carried out in a desired manner. Even certain steps backwards in the SSR are easily observable. For example, the new Law on the Military (December, 2009) contains the provision on the establishment of the Security Agency within the MoD, whereas the draft law stipulated that it should be under a direct control of the Minister of Defence. This was changed later and now, by the provisions of this Law, the Agency is a part of the Agency for National Security (ANB). The competences and the field of work of this newly established body still remain obscure. The provisions in the law are rather unclear. Consequently, this can be identified as a certain step back in the SSR and in the efforts to place the sector under the democratic and civilian control.

The conclusion is that the relationship between the strategies and the process of the SSR of Montenegro is rather formal. Everything seems to be smooth on paper, but not in practice. Montenegro will need to change and improve the existing documents, or adopt the new ones which will hopefully reflect the real needs. The new guidelines for the reform of the domestic security sector, along with the identification of the security risks, challenges and threats, as well as the means and instruments with which the state and the society could respond to them are also needed.

### **The capacities within the state institutions and the society for the adoption and implementation of the strategies**

In the end we will tackle the issue of the capacities for making and implementing the strategies. Montenegro has been identified by the EU institutions as a country which lacks administrative capacities. This can also be applied in the area of security. As a young country, which has not fostered the tradition of dealing with security issues, it lacks the capacities in this field. The same is true for both state and civil society actors. The authors of the strategies tend to rely on similar solutions of other countries of the Euro-Atlantic Community. This is in most cases counter-productive, since every country has its specific features which require different solutions. The problem arises when they need to be implemented in practice. Another issue is the lack of competent individuals capable of writing these documents, as well as the lack of material resources for their implementation.

However, both documents, the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy, identify the limits in terms of material and human resources. This is a positive observation, as it points out the problem. Both strategies emphasize the need for cooperation between the institutions in the system and with other countries. It should also be noted that the MoD, together with the partner countries, is putting much effort in the education and training of its staff. On the other hand, there is the issue of the civil society as it also lacks the capacities to take part in the creation of the strategies and monitoring of their implementation. This is mostly visible in the lack of the Institutes, NGOs and experts that would deal with the security issues.

The fact remains that the development of these capacities is a process. Some positive steps forward in this regard have definitely been made. The process of building capacities for the creation of the strategic-doctrinal documents and its implementation both within the state and the society will take time and will require much more financial resources in order to be achieved.

### **Conclusion**

The adoption of the strategies that will contain realistic provisions in addressing the needs, goals and possibilities of the country, is a *sine qua non* for the success of every reform process. This especially stands when the security sector reform is concerned.

In an ideal scenario, a country embarking on the reform process of its domes-





tic security sector should first (starting from the local context) define the goals, means and, most importantly, the cost and time that the reform will require.

This was not the case in Montenegro. The current strategic – doctrinal framework is better than the one from 2006. However, it has many shortcomings which we have been identified in this text. These are the most important ones:

- The framework is too general and therefore hard to apply in Montenegrin context;
- The public was deprived of the right to articulate its opinion in the process of creation of the documents. This is a serious flaw because such an important, corrective mechanism as the civil society was not involved in the process;
- The documents have a significant number of provisions that overlap;
- The strategies do not make a difference between the challenges, risks and threats;
- There is no strategy which would refer to the reform of the police and/or the Agency for National Security (ANB).

To conclude, it seems that the framework has missed out its point. It is too general. The provisions should be adjusted to the domestic environment and context, which makes it possible for such solutions to function in practice. However, there is hope that the most important document within the area of the security which is expected to be adopted soon – the Strategic Defense Review - will correct these deficiencies, make Montenegrin Strategic – Doctrinal Framework more complete and in line with the country's needs, realistic possibilities, and goals in the field of the national security.

## Bibliography

CEDEM (2009). *Political Public Opinion in Montenegro*. Available at: [www.cedem.me](http://www.cedem.me)

Vlada Crne Gore (The Government of Montenegro) (2008) *Strategija nacionalne bezbjednosti Crne Gore, (The National Security Strategy of Montenegro)* Available at: <http://www.gov.me/odbrana/vijesti.php?akcija=vijesti&id=168693>

Vlada Crne Gore (The Government of Montenegro) (2006) *Strategija nacionalne bezbjednosti Crne Gore. (The National Security Strategy of Montenegro.)* Available at: <http://www.gom.cg.yu/files/1170082263.doc>

Skupština Crne Gore. Ustav Crne Gore. (The Parliament of Montenegro. The Constitution of Montenegro) Available at: [www.skupstina.me](http://www.skupstina.me)

Montenegro 2009 Progress Report, Commission Staff Working Document; Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 14/10/2009, SEC (2009) 1336. Available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/enlargement/39f\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/enlargement/39f_en.htm)



Nansen Dialogue Centre – Podgorica. Watch Dog: NATO – Montenegro. Report No. 5, March 2009. Available at: <http://www.infoizbor.ndcmn.org/>

Nansen Dialogue Centre – Podgorica. Watch Dog: NATO – Montenegro. Report No. 6, June 2009. Available at: <http://www.infoizbor.ndcmn.org/>

Nansen Dialogue Centre – Podgorica. Watch Dog: NATO – Montenegro. Report No. 7, September 2009. Available at: <http://www.infoizbor.ndcmn.org/>

Number	Title of the challenge risk or threat	CATEGORY			LEVEL OF ANALYSIS – SCOPE OF THE THREAT					SORURCE OF THE THREAT (AS LISTED BY THE AUTHOR)	SECTOR (AS LISTED BY THE AUTHOR)	REFERENT OBJECT (WHAT IS AUTHOR PROTECTIN)	REMARKS
		Challenge	Risk	Threat	Global	Regional	National	Sub national	Individual				
		C	R	t	G	R	N	S	I				
1	Danger from the transfer of crisis from other regions			x	x					regions (North Africa, Caucasus, The Far East).		Security of Montenegro	
2	International terrorism and organized crime		x	x	x							Security of Montenegro	
3	Drug and weapon smuggling, illegal migrations, human trafficking, proliferation of weapons for mass destruction		x	x	x							Security of Montenegro	
4	Natural, technological, chemical, nuclear catastrophes as consequences of terrorist acts.		x	x			x					Security of Montenegro	
5	Surplus of arms in possession of the Military		x				x					Security of Montenegro	
6	Ecological disasters			x	x		x					Security of Montenegro	
7	Cyber Crime			x			x					Traffic infrastructure, telecommunications, health care and social system etc.	

Number	Title of the challenge risk or threat	CATEGORY			LEVEL OF ANALYSIS – SCOPE OF THE THREAT					SORURCE OF THE THREAT (AS LISTED BY THE AUTHOR)	SECTOR (AS LISTED BY THE AUTHOR)	REFERENT OBJECT (WHAT IS AUTHOR PROTECTIN)	REMARKS
		Challenge	Risk	Threat	Global	Regional	National	Sub national	Individual				
		C	R	T	G	R	N	N	I				
1	Possible Crises in the region of WB			x		x					State	Security of Montenegro	
2	Possible Crises from other regions			x	x						State	Security of Montenegro	
3	Asymmetrical threats			x	x						State	Security of Montenegro	

*Challenges, risks and threats as defined by Defence Strategy of Montenegro*



# Serbia

Maja Bjeloš

The paper focuses on strategic-doctrinal framework of the Republic of Serbia and consists of three major parts. The first part provides an overview of political context and major institutional changes framing the strategic documents in the sphere of the security and defence. The second part focuses on the analysis of security threat perception reflected in the aforementioned documents and the mechanisms for responding to the security threats. Finally, the third part, analyses link between strategies and security sector reform, along with its implication on regional, European and transatlantic integration. Along with the analyses of existing strategies the paper seeks to answer to what extent these documents reflect genuine security situation and actual perception of security challenges, risks and threats in the Republic of Serbia.

## I Context of framing strategic documents in Serbia

The process of preparation and passing the strategic documents, that significantly change and/or amend security and defence system of Serbia, lasted too long. Nine years after the democratic changes in the 2000 and three years since having regained its statehood, Serbia has completed the first generation of security sector reform by adopting strategic documents - National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia (NSS), Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia and Strategic Defence Review. Although some strategic documents, such as Military Doctrine of the Republic of Serbia<sup>1</sup>, are still not adopted, one can say that Serbia has adopted key documents on security and defence and that it has finalized its strategic-doctrinal framework.

Title of the strategy	Adopted – date	Amendment
1. Strategic Defence Review	March 19, 2009	No
2. National Security Strategy	October 26, 2009	No
3. Defence Strategy	October 26, 2009	No

*Table 8: Review of the adopted strategic documents in Serbia*

All the aforementioned documents were adopted in 2009. Taking into account the fact that other countries in the Western Balkan region adopted strategic documents in the period between 2002 and 2006, general impression is that in this respect Serbia is lagging behind other countries. In order to understand the reasons for belated adoption of these documents, we have to go back to the recent

<sup>1</sup> Draft Military Doctrine is in place and it has been prepared by the Ministry of Defence, but still not passed by the President of the Republic of Serbia.



past to shed some light on the political situation in Serbia that substantially influenced their creation and adoption.

After the split with Montenegro in 2006, Serbia found itself at the historic junction with respect to security framing. With the cessation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro<sup>2</sup> (hereafter: the State Union), one historical process was finished and from that moment on, the pace and level of change in Serbia's security sector became the sole responsibility of government officials and the ruling parties (Yearbook on Security Sector Reform in Serbia, 2009). Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro<sup>3</sup> did not mention existence of National Security Strategy or any similar document that would provide review and guidance for the security system of Serbia and Montenegro due to the fact that security system was not comprehensive, which was not the case with the defence system<sup>4</sup>. Thus, among all documents only the creation of Defence Strategy of the State Union was envisaged and each Republic ought to determine element of its national security. Nevertheless, in the period of the State Union, neither Serbia nor Montenegro did that. Following the referendum epilogue of the State Union, the Republic of Serbia started to build its own way in developing strategies and defining security and defence system (Dimitrijević, 2008).

First and foremost, new political situation required adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia<sup>5</sup> and then adoption of those strategic documents that would define security and defence system. First model of the National Security Strategy was a draft prepared by the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Boris Tadić in summer 2006. At the same time, the Government of the Republic of Serbia with the Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica set up the Working Group for the preparation of Draft National Security Strategy in June 2006. Representatives from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs, representative of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Serbia, representative of the Security Information Agency (BIA), Military Intelligence Agency (VOA)

---

<sup>2</sup> State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) represented legal successor of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It lasted from February 4, 2003 until May 21, 2006 when Montenegro on a referendum voted for independency. 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2006 Parliament of Montenegro proclaimed independency and since then State Union ceased to exist. Two days later Serbian Assembly proclaimed Serbia as sovereign republic and a successor of the State Union.

<sup>3</sup> Existence and functioning of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was regulated by the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, adopted on February 4, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> In SCG three mutually exclusive, and even occasionally hostile, security systems co-existed: one at the federal level - the army; and another in each of the two member states - the local police forces and intelligence services. This was mainly the case because the Government of Montenegro did not want to participate under any circumstance in the restoration of a mutual security area, and was particularly opposed to the creation of any unified or joint (coordinated) security systems. For a more information on this issue refer to Yearbook on SSR in Serbia 2000-2008.

<sup>5</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was adopted in November 2006. For an analysis of the position of the security sector in the Constitution see Ejđus, F., Popović Đ. i Savković, M. (2006) 'For in the hands of brave Madusić Vuk – Security in the proposed Constitution of Serbia', Western Balkan Security Observer, No. 2 (Sept-Oct 2006), pp. 41-45.

and Military Security Agency (VBA) participated in the work of the Group.<sup>6</sup> This somewhat confusing situation on preparation two NSS drafts is a consequence of differing perceptions of key national values, interests and objectives among Serbian political leaders, namely the President and the Prime Minister.

Due to the lack of clear legal framework that defines which actors have competencies in the process of preparation and adoption of NSS and because of differing perceptions between the President and the Prime Minister on the matter, preparation of this document has been postponed until formal approval of the Law on Military and the Law on Defence. With adoption of these two laws at the end of 2007, formal conditions to continue the process of preparation and adoption of NSS and other strategic documents, were met. In accordance with the Law on Defence, Ministry of Defence was assigned to perform the work related to the drafting National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, Defence Strategy and Armed Forces Long-term Development Plan, along with the adoption of documents for their implementation. In addition, the law asserts the National Assembly's competencies for the adoption of these documents.

Along with legal obstacles that influenced preparation and adoption of the NSS, political situation from time to time halted the process of preparation and adoption of the strategy. Events, such as parliament elections in January 2007, Resolution of National Assembly on the "Protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia" at the end of the same year, unconstitutional unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in February 2008, local and presidential elections, dictated tempo of creation of strategic documents and induced the need for occasional modification of certain stances in these documents to be in line with the current political situation.

Other existing strategic documents, such as Defence Strategy<sup>7</sup> and Strategic Defence Review<sup>8</sup> have been prepared at the same time as National Security Strategy. Therefore, their drafts underwent similar phases of modifications due to aforementioned political events. Since the Strategic Defence Review was not present-

---

<sup>6</sup> See daily newspapers Danas, issues from 22 Sept 2006 and 12 Oct 2006. Also, see news B92 from 11 Oct 2006. available at: [http://www.b92.rs/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=11&nav\\_category=11&nav\\_id=215021](http://www.b92.rs/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=11&nav_category=11&nav_id=215021)

<sup>7</sup> By the importance, Strategy of Defence of the Republic of Serbia takes second place while it is in the first place in the sphere of defence. In most countries this document further elaborates National Security Strategy, in particular parts relevant for defence. Initial text of the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia was based on the Defence Strategy of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as on comparative analysis of the content of defence strategies and defence systems of neighbouring countries.

<sup>8</sup> Strategic Defence Review represents institutional framework for carrying out the defence system reform of the Republic of Serbia on the Serbian Armed Forces. It is basic programme document for mid-term defence planning. Besides analysis on security environment with the assessment of challenges, risks and threats, this document contains missions and tasks of the Serbian Armed Forces, vision of the Serbian Army until 2015, account on current state of defence system and military capabilities, along with the depiction of necessary defence system capabilities until 2010 and development priorities.



ed to the public, this document will not be the subject of our research.<sup>9</sup>

## I. 1 Hierarchy of Strategic Documents

Within strategic-doctrinal framework of Serbia, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia represents the most important document, hierarchically above all other strategies and represents the foundation for development of additional strategic documents in the sphere of security and defence (such as Defence Strategy, Military Doctrine, Strategic Defence Review), and basis for development of strategies in the other established and crucial state related fields of activities.

Chronologically, soon after the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, the strategic documents on security and defence were on the agenda and the most general one was National Security Strategy. After that, it was important to adopt other documents that operationalize main strategic objectives and regulate sphere of security and defence in detail. Nonetheless, in Serbia this chronological order of preparation and adoption of the strategic documents was not followed as a result of the fact that entire process depended on political circumstances. Consequently, the opportunity to establish actual hierarchy between documents was missed. As previously stated, National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy were prepared at the same time and the National Assembly adopted them at the end of 2009 together with the set of laws concerning security and defence<sup>10</sup>. Bearing in mind that processes of preparation and adoption of different strategies corresponded, it is hard to argue that shift from general towards those more specific has happened. Comparing these two documents we reached the conclusion that certain degree of overlapping exists since some sections of the Defence Strategy have not been further elaborated but rather duplicated from the text of National Security Strategy.

Moreover, during the adoption process in the National Assembly there was potential fear that subordinated legal acts, i.e laws, would not be consistent with the strategic documents which present their foundation. In case of amendments to the strategic documents it is questionable if the Members of Parliament would be able to respond timely and professionally to the necessary amendments to the law proposals. In a hypothetical situation it may happen that due to the substantial amendments to the strategic documents, the law proposals be directly opposed to them (Milošević, 2009).

As a result of the above mentioned facts, there was an impression that certain

---

<sup>9</sup> The Government formally adopted Strategic Defence Review of 2009 which was not the case with the Strategic Defence Review of 2006. Nevertheless, Strategic Defence Review of 2009 was not introduced to the public review or posted on the official web site as it was the case with previous document.

<sup>10</sup> Besides two strategies, the National Assembly in October 2009 adopted Law on Amendments and Supplements of the Law on Defence, Law on Amendments and Supplements of the Law on the Serbian Armed Forces, then the Bill on Military, Labour and Material Duty, Law on Civil Service, the Law on the use of the Serbian Armed Forces and Other Defence Forces in Multinational Operations Outside the Borders of the Republic of Serbia, as well as the Law on Military Security Agency and the Law on Military Intelligence Agency. Law on Data Confidentiality adopted by the National Assembly on December 11, 2009 is also among the laws relevant for this area.



mistakes in procedural steps in the adoption of strategic and legal solutions were made. The most logical sequence in adopting these documents is to follow their hierarchy: National Security Strategy, then Defence Strategy and other strategies, followed by the law on Defence and the Armed Forces and operative document of Strategic Defence Review, all in line with the first two documents. Since this order has not been followed, Serbia at the moment has the Constitution, which does not mention all strategies; strategic solutions have been (hypothetically) adjusted to the Law on Armed Forces and Defence of 2007 instead vice versa. Above all, the adopted laws were based on the then non-existing strategic documents (Ibid).

At this point it is important to say that adoption of strategy of social development was not preceded by the adoption of all these documents. Also, Serbia even after the adoption of National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy, still lacks great number of strategies that should regulate different aspects of social life. The Ministry of Interior, for instance, still does not have sole Internal Security Strategy. Likewise, Foreign Policy Strategy does not exist along with strategy of economic, social development and strategies that regulate other areas of social life. Comparing the current practice in other countries of the South East Europe, we realized that a few of them made bigger progress. Croatia, for instance, following creation of Coalition Government in the summer of the 2000, proposed and passed not only the strategic documents on security and defence, but also on health care, economy, culture, foreign affairs and on all other established and crucial state related fields of activities. This was an overwhelming and serious task for the Croatian government who thus tried to define state policies in these areas and to shape its future activities.<sup>11</sup> At the time of writing this paper, members of academic community and civil society organisations in Serbia have drafted three proposals on foreign policy strategy and made them available for public review.<sup>12</sup> It remains to be seen whether the Government and competent ministry (ies) will soon create their own draft of foreign policy strategy and introduce it to the public.

## I. 2 Institutions tasked with preparation of strategic documents

The framing security and defence related strategic documents requires a thorough analysis of security environment, analysis of all threats to national security, definition of national interests and objectives of national security policy. As the creation of strategic documents is of great importance, all security-relevant government actors ought to be involved in this process, while other actors such as an independent statutory bodies and civil society organisations along with the representatives of international organizations could also contribute with their proposals.

<sup>11</sup> For a better understanding of this subject refer to the Zvonimir Mahečić's paper on Croatian Strategic-doctrinal Framework within this publication.

<sup>12</sup> Strategy proposals were prepared by the teams of students from four faculties of the University of Belgrade (Faculty of Political Sciences, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Economics and Faculty of Philosophy) with the help of their mentors within the project of the European Movement in Serbia supported by the Balkan Trust for Democracy. For further details about project refer to <http://www.emins.org/sr/aktivnosti/projekti/strategija-sp-pol/index.html>.



Process of preparation of the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy at the initial stage was lacking precise legal provisions that regulate institutions and their competencies for drafting and adoption of these documents. Hence, first draft was proposed by the Cabinet of the President of Republic of Serbia, then by the Government and it was not until the adoption of the Law on Defence in 2007 that the right to develop the draft of National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy and Strategic Defence Review belonged solely to the Ministry of Defence, in particular Department for Strategic Planning. Article 14 of the Law on Defence<sup>13</sup> stipulates that Ministry of Defence is assigned, besides the task to develop the strategic documents, with the assessment of risks and threats to the national security. It is not clear why the law delegates to the Ministry of Defence the exclusive right to create National Security Strategy and to assess the threats that endanger security of the Republic of Serbia when that should be also the task of the Government and other ministries along with the Ministry of Defence. We believe that question of security is wider than question of defence, and that the National Security Strategy doesn't deal only with defence. Taking this into consideration, our standpoint is that the Ministry of Defence should not be exclusive institution competent for the creation of this document. This omission could have been avoided if the law obliged the Ministry of Defence to undertake consultations with other state institutions or if the law prescribed that the Ministry of Defence is responsible for coordination of the working group composed of representatives of key ministries.

Since the law has not envisaged this or similar solutions, at the initial stage of the National Security Strategy drafting, the Ministry of Defence has not consulted either the representative of the other Ministries traditionally associated with the security sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Intelligence Agencies, etc.), or the Ministries that are not traditionally associated with this sector. Instead, inter-sectoral consultations and introduction of the drafts to the parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security were abandoned after public discussion. We strongly believe that this does not represent good practice. Instead, relevant Ministry should consult wide spectrum of governmental and non-governmental actors and synthesise their various visions into coherent approach to state security. The breadth of participation in the formulation of national security policy is a key to ensuring broad policy ownership, which can help enhance its implementation (DCAF Backgrounder, 2005).

Professional and general public became involved at the stage of harmonization when the Ministry of Defence introduced the drafts of National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy and opened public discussion in December 2008. Public discussion on the drafts of National Security and Defence Strategy initially was opened only for 15 days, but under the pressure of CSOs led by Centre for Civil-Military Relations public debate was prolonged up to 45 days and lasted from December 15, 2008 until January 31, 2009. On December 24, 2008 the Ministry of Defence organized roundtable on the draft of National Security Strategy, and five days later roundtable on the draft of Defence Strategy. Members of academic community (Faculty of Law, Faculty of Security Studies, Faculty of Political Sciences), representatives of international organizations ( the OSCE Mission in the Republic of Serbia) and civil society organizations (Centre for Civil-Military Rela-

<sup>13</sup> Law on Defence, Article 14, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 116/07

tions, Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, ISAC, the Atlantic Council, and Fund for an Open Society) participated in both meetings. Ministry of Defence held separate expert consultations with the members of the above mentioned faculties and non-governmental organizations. In addition, in January 2009 representatives of the Defence Policy Sector of MoD participated in a series of professional discussions, organized by the Academy of Diplomacy and Security, the Forum for Security and Democracy and the European Movement, along with other non-governmental organizations and experts.

It was evident that media, being a part of civil society, have taken special interest and got involved in the discussion about security issues. Reporting in the daily press about the strategic documents during the public discussion was raised to a significant level. On the other hand, the research of the texts in Serbian dailies dealing with the issues pertaining to the aforementioned strategies has shown that analytical texts contributing to the improvement of the public debate were lacking. The majority of the texts were only passing information, i.e. reporting merely about the content of the drafts itself, thus creating a gap when it comes to a deeper analysis of the proposed solutions (Bjeloš, 2009).

Generally speaking, participants in the public discussion stated that adoption of these strategies was a chance for the most important political subjects to express their opinion on the most vital strategic questions of national security policy. Also, common conclusion was that parts of the security sector were neither recognized nor regulated by the law, such as the private security companies, which should be precisely legally defined.

### **I. 3 Institutions tasked with adoption and implementation of strategic documents**

National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia has a significant role in shaping security and defence policy. The main National Assembly's authorities and responsibilities within the field of security and defence are: adoption of laws and other legal acts related to security and defence, and democratic civil control over the security sector (Constitution, 2006: Article 99).

Besides these general regulations, National Assembly is also responsible for the adoption of National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy. The National Assembly's authority to pass the Defence Strategy is regulated by the Article 99, paragraph 9 of the present supreme legal act, namely the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. Since the National Assembly's authority to pass the National Security Strategy was not stipulated in the Constitution, the Law on Defence (2007) tried to overcome this obstacle. According to the Law on Defence (Article 9), National Assembly, as the highest body of legislative power, is entitled to pass the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, Defence Strategy and the Armed Forces Long-term Development Plan. To perform its legislative function, National Assembly relies on expert proposals from respective Ministry, in other words, the Government.

The Law on Defence currently in force (Article 11) stipulates that the President of the Republic of Serbia has certain authorities and responsibilities regarding the



preparation and passing of the strategic documents in the field of the security and defence. President's authorities and responsibilities include:

- Giving consent to the proposal of the Strategic Defence Review,
- Passing the Military Doctrine, proposed by the Ministry of Defense.

When it comes to the process of passing the strategies, two issues arise as vital. First, why framers of the Constitution have not recognized National Security Strategy as the most important document for the security and defence issues and why they have not envisaged the National Assembly to be an institution responsible for its adoption. Second, what are the National Assembly's legislative capacities, in other words, what is the real parliament's power regarding the adoption of the documents within its scope.

Preparatory work of the Defense Strategy was in line with the Constitution which stipulates that Parliament is responsible for adopting a Defense Strategy. However, one of the possible explanations to why the framers of the Constitution failed to mention a National Security Strategy could be that they were not sure whether political leaders would be able to reach consensus on two initial NSS drafts, proposed by the President and by the Prime Minister separately. Also, the other possible answer to the first question may stem from the fact that strategic documents in the sphere of the security and defence belong to the executive, and it is the executive, rather than the parliament, that should have as decisive role in the process of preparation of strategies, as well as in the process of its adoption. Last but not the least, this process should be regulated by the law and not by the supreme legal act.

With respect to the second question, we think that the Parliament seldom uses its own legal capacities. In addition to that goes that fact that both strategies and most of the laws in the sphere of security and defence have been considered and adopted by the emergency procedures, without qualitative public debate. There are few reasons for considerably weak position of the National Assembly in the Serbian political system. Parliament tradition has been poorly rooted into Serbian political culture; its constitutional position is also weak and political elites do not show strong interest in empowering legislative branch over executive power and partocracy (Ejdus, 2009). Hence, tendency of executive supremacy (Government or President) over legislative has moved the center of political power toward political parties. Consequently, the principle of the separations of power has been seriously damaged making the parliament "chatting room", "debate club" or "public forum" that just confirms decision rendered somewhere else. If the executive supremacy is worldwide trend, marginalization and subordination of the parliament in context of Serbia is source of that trend (Pavlović and Orlović, 145).

With respect to the adoption of the strategies it is hard to reach unique legal model that would represent the best solution. Current solutions in other states show that legislative authorities of executive branch are wide. For instance, the United States requires the President to submit a national security strategy every year to the Congress, though in practice this does not always occur annually. In Latvia, the Parliament must approve an NSP written by the Cabinet and approved by the National Security Council every year. In other cases, the executive undertakes to produce a national security strategy on its own. In the Russian Federation, for

instance, the National Security Council produces security strategies that are approved by the executive. In Austria, the Parliament established a National Security Council in 2001 that is mandated to guide national security policy, but not necessarily to produce an integrated National security policy document (though this has been done) (Backgrounder DCAF, 2005).

Taking into account all elements of national security system<sup>14</sup>, the executive defines and implements strategic documents in the sphere of security and defence. In line with the legally stipulated responsibilities, the Ministry of Defence within the executive represents one of the most important institutions competent for the implementation of the strategies. The condition for successful implementation of strategic orientations, stated in the strategic-doctrinal documents, depends on the integration of all activities of the national security and defence system and upon the support of certain parts of the government. Hence, permanent and efficient engagement of the Ministry of Defence and other Ministries of the Government of the Republic of Serbia is needed for the success of the implementation.

The executive authority to implement strategies does not exclude either parliament's authority to monitor and control implementation of these documents, or the role of independent state institutions and civil society in this process. If we observe monitoring and controlling role within the security sector reform, it can be concluded that this role is important, not just for the implementation of the strategies, but also for the exercising of democratic civil control over the security sector. And it is exactly through the democratic civil control that accountability of the security sector (to the society, for which it exists) is achieved.

## **II Security threat perception and mechanisms for responding to the security threats**

This section will deal with security threats reflected both in the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy. Since the Republic of Serbia faces different global, regional and internal challenges and threats, whose nature is not military, or not exclusively military, we will devote one section to the mechanisms for responding to them.

### **II. 1 Security threats identified in the Strategic Documents**

The Serbian Strategic Documents describe the Western Balkan region as a relatively stable. Having gone through the civil war in the 1990s, the countries of the former SFRY turned to democratisation, European integration, and stabilisation of their respective economies, whilst, at the same time, proclaiming good neighbourly relations and setting peaceful resolution of disputes as a key foreign policy priority (NSS, 2009:11). In addition to taking this affirmative stance, the

<sup>14</sup> National security system is a normative, structural and functional organized unity of elements that protect national interests of the Republic of Serbia. In general, National Security System, consists of the highest institutions of the legislative, executive and judicial branches: National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, President of the Republic of Serbia, National Security Council, the government, and courts and prosecutors (NSS, 2009).



Strategies identified a number of key threats as the factors that can potentially cause instability in the region. Namely, the possibility of breach of the peace in the region and security of the Republic of Serbia is still seen as something beyond the threats coming from the military sector. The threat of armed conflict between states, similar to the one occurring in the 1990s, according to both strategies, has been significantly diminished. However, the sources of possible military threats, i.e. armed clashes, uprisings, or other disputes involving the use of armed forces, have not been entirely eliminated.

Beside military threats, large number of security threats is coming from non-military, political sector. The unresolved status of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija and secessionist aspirations of the Albanian national minority are seen as the greatest threats to internal security of the Republic of Serbia, with a potential for negative spillover effect on the security of neighbouring countries (NSS: 5; DS: 6). In accordance with Strategies, security situation in the region is further aggravated by the threats, such as negative legacy of the war and transition problems. With regard to common legacy, among the problems impeding further progress of the countries in the region, the Strategies underline the unfinished demarcation process of the countries of the former SFRY, as well as the unresolved status of refugees, expelled and internally displaced persons. In this regard, they also express great dissatisfaction with the slow resolution of the refugee return issue and poor protection of their rights. Accumulated political, economic, and social problems arising from transition process further burdened these interrelations and increased the danger of having conflicts revived. Terrorism, as a threat coming from the political sector, is placed in the context of violent religious extremism, but no specific terrorist groups are mentioned and neither is the religious extremism, with which they may be associated. The fact that Serbia is situated at a crossroads contributes a lot to qualifying it as a terrorist transition region. It may be added, that terrorism is widely connected with all forms of organised, transnational, and cross-border crime. In spite of this, our standpoint is that Serbia is not a direct target of terrorist activities and that the Strategic Documents rank terrorism, as a threat, unjustifiably high. Unlike the Western European countries, the non-involvement of Serbia in global war against terrorism prevents it to perceive the terrorism of radical Islamists of the Near or the Middle East as a classic threat.

The Strategies identified, among other things, organised crime and corruption as serious threats to the society's and country's development that have a potential to thwart the democratisation process in the countries of the region (NSS: 6; DS: 7). However, the Strategies did not mention the deep roots of crime or its connections with some parts of the government and institutions, including a number of security institutions. The assassination of Serbia's first democratic Prime Minister, Mr. Zoran Đinđić, in March 2003, proved that criminal structures allied with or supported by state security institutions can undermine the stability of a country and, by their activities create difficulties, not only in terms of security challenges, but also in terms of general process of the country's development in keeping with the European values. The experience gained in previous period indicates that, in Serbia, organised crime is present mainly in drug trade, trafficking in human beings, and illegal migrations, as well as in the economic-financial sphere, proliferation of conventional weapons and propagation of the weapons of mass destruction.

Natural disasters and technical and technological accidents which may involve and jeopardize territories of neighbouring countries, or spread from the territories of neighbouring countries to the Republic of Serbia and adversely affect its territory or its population, are mentioned as the last, but not least important, threats. It seems that all the above listed threats may trigger armed conflicts in the region and divert these countries from their European prospects.

A conclusion drawn from the challenges, risks, and threats (CRTs) discussed in this paper was that a large number of threats comes from the non-traditional, political sector. That is an indicator of the weakness of state institutions and it implies the so called phenomenon of a weak state<sup>15</sup> which is linked to nearly all security threats, potential threats and risks affecting the security of the Republic of Serbia, as well as other countries in the region.

## II. 2 Features of Challenges, Risks and Threats presented in Strategies

Having analyzed the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy our conclusion was that the sections of the Strategic Documents devoted to challenges, risks and threats (CRTs) faced by the Republic of Serbia, are relatively small. We also believe that, in addition to this quantitative problem, some qualitative problems can be identified too. Namely, in the section in which CRTs are listed, relevant categories were not clearly defined, nor were they clearly differentiated. While at some points it is clearly indicated that challenges, risks and threats are the subject matter of discussion, at other points such indication is missing or is only indirectly referred to. Moreover, the logic behind the order in which they are discussed is vague– whether they are listed according to their weight, intensity, or some other criterion remains unclear. Considering that the sections of the Strategies related to the CRTs open with a list of military threats, we can suppose that the main criterion was the scope of damage that can be caused by a threat. However, we do believe that this criterion does not suffice; rather, if we want to rank possible challenges, risks, and threats in a right order, not only the scope of damage, but also the probability of a harmful phenomenon should be taken into account.

With regard to the terminology and writing style, the authors of the Strategies occasionally used vague terms to identify the intensity of a threat/risk. Namely, they would use a phrase “serious threats” or say that a particular occurrence has reached “serious proportions” without specifying what “serious” means. Vagueness in terminology or the use of overly general phrases may give rise to a situation in which a single sentence can have different meanings and the text can be interpreted wrongly, even with bad intentions. This can be avoided if overly

---

<sup>15</sup> There are different approaches to the phenomenon of a weak state; accordingly, there are different criteria and indicators suggesting the weakness of a state that are applied in different contexts. One of the three dominant approaches to this phenomenon relates to a perception that is grounded in the institutional dimension of a state and in good governance – the strength/weakness of a state is therefore evaluated based on its capacity and capability to ensure fundamental values for its citizens, security being one of the most important among them. See more about the concept of poor state in Svetlana Đurđević-Lukić (2006) „Bringing the State Back: Strong versus Weak States“, *Međunarodni problemi*, vol. LVIII, Nor.1.





general segments of the texts of the Strategies and individual risks and threats are analysed in more detail and placed into the appropriate context.

Consequently, general impression is that risks and threats are not fully and adequately defined and prioritised, and that some of mentioned threats and risks should be given more weight than it was done in the Strategies. In the latter event, we believe that CRTs should be somewhat different, namely that CRTs such as organised crime, corruption, energy crises, natural disasters, technical and technological accidents, or problems with economic development should be ranked higher in the Strategic Documents, considering that, at the moment, they present much greater threat to the security of Serbian population than terrorism or armed aggression.<sup>16</sup>

### **II. 3 Mechanisms for responding to threats**

The Strategic Documents do not devote appropriate attention to the mechanisms which would strengthen and ensure security of the state and society and provide effective responses to security challenges, risks and threats. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia and the Defence Strategy do not contain specific paragraphs which elaborate on such mechanisms; however, certain mechanisms are mentioned in the section dealing with the security environment and in the chapter discussing the national security policy.

The Strategies describe the security situation in a contemporary, post-cold war, security environment as being very complex and the threats present in such environment as being dynamic, changeable, and often unpredictable. Having this in mind, the authors inferred that, at present respective countries are not capable of responding to all challenges, risks and threats autonomously. A potential solution for such situation could be that these countries take active part in the processes of cooperation and joint action with other countries, as well as to integrate into more complex security structures, such as the system of collective defence and collective security. Specifically cooperation through dialogue, partnership, and integration into security structures is seen as a possible mechanism for responding to concrete security threats and problems that have mounted up.

The authors of strategies believe that regional cooperation is especially important for Serbia; namely, they stress the shared role that the Western Balkans countries have in regional security cooperation. Regional cooperation is critical for security, political stability and economic prosperity of the countries in the region. The importance of regional cooperation is also based on the fact that countries in this region share the threats – such as organised crime, corruption, terrorism, natural disasters – and it has become almost pointless to make individual attempts to resolve all those threats. Consequently, these countries need to take joint action in

---

<sup>16</sup> General overview of the situation in the EU on terrorism shows similar trend of decrease of the number of terrorist or extremist attacks and increase of organised crime. See more about this issues in The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT 2010) <http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr100428.htm> and EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment, OCTA 2009 published by EUROPOL [http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European\\_Organised\\_Crime\\_Threat\\_Assessment\\_\(OCTA\)/OCTA2009.pdf](http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/European_Organised_Crime_Threat_Assessment_(OCTA)/OCTA2009.pdf)



order to suppress negative processes that affect their vital national interests. That is the reason why strategies take such affirmative attitude towards regional security cooperation and suggest that such cooperation should take place through the integration of national security systems. The actual accomplishments of the cooperation in security area, however, were not specified in strategies; namely, problems in the existing cooperation were not specified and no mechanisms to remedy them were offered.

Fully respecting the position that the authors of the Strategies took with regard to the importance of regional security cooperation in prevention and elimination of potential threats, we believe that it is necessary to point out the current problems affecting the regional cooperation and explain the underlying reasons.

For quite some time already, the politicians, scientists, and journalists, both in the region and beyond it, have been underlining the importance of regional cooperation. Despite the fact that all states' officials have declaratively expressed interest for regional security cooperation, we note that scope and intensity of such cooperation is far from being satisfactory. Official statements were followed by a large number of different initiatives that were supposed to promote regional cooperation. Irrespective of the large number of initiatives, there is actually only a small number of regional institutions and organisations which are developed sufficiently to be able to autonomously implement and conduct the process of regional security cooperation. Sufficiently developed institutions, such as the Regional Co-operation Council (formerly the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe), were launched and funded from outside the region. And even those institutions are successful only to a certain degree (Koneska, 2007-2008).

The states are making certain efforts to have this cooperation really in place, but, in reality, the progress is pretty limited. One of key reasons for slow progress is that the main incentive for cooperation in the security area comes from outside, i.e from the international community, rather than from inside - from the countries in the region. For the European Union, regional cooperation is a requisite equal to other requisites such as the fulfilment of formal requirements for accession. One of the five segments of new financial Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) is dedicated to regional cooperation exclusively. One of the 35 chapters of the *acquis communautaire* is devoted to the regional and international cooperation, which is one of the matters of negotiations for the EU integration. In addition to the support in the form of financial assistance, the EU has developed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation of the progress made with regard to regional cooperation, in order to further encourage countries in the region to maintain and increase their cooperation (Koneska, 2007-2008). That is why the establishment of regional security cooperation is today exclusively perceived as an instrument for achievement of ultimate objectives – integration into the European Union and/or NATO – rather than as a genuine need for establishment and strengthening of mutual cooperation in view of maintaining peace and stability in the region. Second factor having adverse effect on the development of regional security cooperation is a negative discourse about the Balkans as a primitive, underdeveloped region which belongs neither to Europe nor to the Orient. Such a discourse originated in a group of Western European countries in the 1990s and took roots among the population of this region. Because of the negative connotation of the term “Balkans” in both political and general discourse, and because of the belief



that “the Balkans” is something contrary to “Europe”, the states in the Balkans are first and foremost striving to get rid of the image of the Balkan region. These attitudes exacerbate the establishment of cooperation in the area of security since the Balkans discourse leads to the securitisation of the states, i.e they portray their neighbours as a threat rather than entities in favour of cooperation.

In order to make progress in the region, states should take over from foreign actors the ownership over regional security initiatives and, on multilateral basis, develop an official agenda for combating common security challenges and threats. This would result in cooperation of all security sector institutions. Besides, regional security initiatives should not depend on political, social, or other current circumstances. They should be institutionalised as effective cooperation instruments ensuring positive development of security situation, democratic processes, and creation of a general climate of mutual trust.

Integration into complex security structures could be one of many possible ways for maintaining and enhancing national security. The Strategies state that Euro-Atlantic countries strive to build and promote their security and defence in the system of collective defence, unlike other countries in the world which chose to have their security issues resolved within the system of collective security (OUN), that provides for the international community’s response on the occasions when international legal order or peace are disrupted. Examining Strategies’ texts, one gets the impression of facing two systems; Serbia found that it is more important to strengthen its international position and reputation through full and active participation and constructive contribution to the OUN, rather than to endeavour to become a full member of a collective defence system such as NATO.

### **III Connection between the strategic-doctrinal framework, security sector reform, and integrations (European, transatlantic)**

#### **III. 1 Connection between the strategic-doctrinal framework and security sector reform**

The existence of a reliable and institutionally endorsed framework is important for the effectiveness of the security sector reform process. The completion of the strategic-doctrinal framework, i.e the adoption of the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy, created favourable environment for the implementation of the planned and rational security sector reform (Hadžić, 2004). Security sector reform, as seen in the Strategic Documents, implies adjustment of security sector to new security environment, as well as the ability of the security sector to respond to the contemporary challenges, risks and threats. Main presumption is that only a reformed security sector can effectively respond to new challenges, risks, and threats. It thus becomes a vital element of the national security system that protects proclaimed social values and national interests.

In the case of Serbia, security sector reform did not derive from the Strategic Documents; the reform process of security sector in Serbia took a rather different turn. The security sector reform process had started even before the Strategies were adopted and was carried out within a wider process of overall social-political transition. The military was among the first actors which recognised the need for

the adoption of such strategic documents, which will allow its efficient transformation. Also, the military recognised the need for the adoption of other doctrinal and operational documents and laws that would set foundations for and facilitate functioning of all factors in the security and defence system. For this reason the representatives of the Military insisted that the strategic documents should be adopted soonest possible. However, due to above circumstances, the process of adoption had been repeatedly postponed and, because of the non-existence of strategic-doctrinal framework and unsettled political circumstances, success of reforms in this field was highly questionable.

Now, having the Strategic Documents in place, it remains open whether we can count on a far more stable approach to the reform and the prospects of having a more precise normative and organisational regulation of the security and defence systems and the Armed Forces of Serbia, or it is the current political situation, rather than the objectives and priorities defined in the Strategies, that will guide the political elites in the reform implementation processes, just as it was the case before.

### **III. 2 The National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy in the light of integrations (European, Trans-Atlantic)**

The Strategies are affirmative with regard to the integration into European, regional, and other international structures. Foreign-policy objectives expressed in the Strategies clearly indicate that Serbia is primarily committed to maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty, European integration, and building good-neighbourly relations. Contrary to the clearly stated commitment as regards European integration, the Strategies neglect the issues of potential Serbian integration into NATO and its military neutrality.<sup>17</sup>

In order to get a better understanding why the discourse on Euro-Atlantic integration did not find its place in the text of the Strategies, and was replaced by the discourse pertaining European integration, the issue of the accession and inclusion into the EU and NATO should be considered in the context of recent political developments in Serbia.

The consensus over the membership of Serbia in the EU exists not only among political parties in power and those in opposition, but also between political parties, in general, and the citizens; consequently, this is reflected in the Strategic Documents and the integration is marked as the most important foreign-policy objective of Serbia. The National Security Strategy (2009: 11) states that strategic priority of the Republic of Serbia is to accelerate the EU integration process. The Republic of Serbia will continue its intensive implementation of political and economic reforms of the society and their alignment with European standards, as well as the fulfilment of other requested conditions on its road towards European integrations. Through the process of European integration, Serbia is ready to build capacity and capability of the national security system, in accordance with the

<sup>17</sup> The Resolution of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia on the "Protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia", proclaiming military neutrality, was adopted on 26 December 2007, [http://www.parlament.gov.rs/content/cir/akta/akta\\_detalji.asp?id=360&t=0](http://www.parlament.gov.rs/content/cir/akta/akta_detalji.asp?id=360&t=0).



standards and obligations arising from the European Security and Defence Policy. Enactment of the EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement allowed Serbia to intensify its dialogue with the EU about the issues of common interest, including the security/defence issues (NSS, 2009: 9).

With regard to the Atlantic integration, however, no consensus among the political parties in Serbia is in place and the public is extremely divided with regard to potential membership in NATO. Public polls conducted in the recent period have shown that two thirds of the population support the joining the European Union whilst only 25% of the population want Serbia to become a member of NATO.<sup>18</sup> These findings are based on different perception that citizens of Serbia have about these two organisations. Their negative perception of NATO derives from the experience from the past period, primarily the 1999 bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After Kosovo's declaration of independence, the support to Serbia's potential membership in the Alliance fell from just over 30 to 25 percent. Maybe this negative image of NATO, embraced by most of Serbian citizens and politicians, can explain why the authors avoided mentioning Atlantic integration in the Strategic Documents. Considering that no clear commitment to becoming a member of NATO stems from the Strategic Documents, we would surely like to know what options are offered instead. It seems that the participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP)<sup>19</sup> programme does not carry the same negative undertones while the mere mentioning of potential membership in NATO does; as a framework for political, security, and defence cooperation and joint action of the Member States, the Partnership for Peace is therefore at present the only acceptable arrangement for Serbia. That is exactly why the Defence Strategy (2009: 8-9) states that the Republic of Serbia, assuming greater role in the activities of European Security and Defence Policy and NATO programme – the Partnership for Peace, will strengthen its security and, through dialogue and cooperation, promote peace and stability in the region, thus strengthening good neighbourly relations and resolving all pending issues in an amicable manner. Another possible option is to get closer to Russia and establish firmer security cooperation with that country. For the time being, the Strategies mention that the links between Serbia and Russia have been strengthened by a strategic partnership in the area of energy. It remains to be seen whether this cooperation will get a new, security dimension.

With regard to military neutrality, we will try to explain why military neutrality was not mentioned in the Strategic Documents. In the end of 2007, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Resolution on the "Protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia", which, among other things, proclaimed military neutrality of Serbia as related to the existing military alliances. Since the Resolution offered no answer on the content and method of accomplishing the neutrality, and considering that the concept of military neutrality was not further elaborated in the form of concrete strategic directions and legislative norms, it is reasonable to ask whether Serbia

---

<sup>18</sup> Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), Public opinion survey conducted in September and December of 2009, <http://www.cesid.org/lt/news/o-nama/projekat-jacanje-podrske-evropskim-integracijama-u-srbiji.html>.

<sup>19</sup> In 2006 the Republic of Serbia became a member of the Partnership of Peace NATO programme.

can really remain militarily neutral. Answer to this question cannot be found in the Strategic Documents; namely, it was already indicated that the Strategies do not mention the issue of military neutrality. Since the citizens of Serbia also do not agree about this issue, a debate about military neutrality was opened in an attempt to come to a consensus. In any case, the question about military neutrality should be answered since the answer to that question will help us realise how the security orientation influences the planning of the national security and defence system and further progress of other related reforms. Considering that this paper has certain limitations in terms of its scope and length, only key issues will be discussed. If the foreign-policy and strategic objective of Serbia is military neutrality, then the country must be prepared to rely on its own defence capacity to protect its national security. Strengthening and modernisation of existing defence capacity would include large financial allocations which, taking into account the economic crisis, would not be a pleasant surprise for the citizens of Serbia. Moreover, the question is whether the self-proclaimed military neutrality is sustainable in the situation when it was not internationally recognised and guaranteed, and when most countries in the world are affiliated with one of the existing security systems. It is most likely that the issue of military neutrality was not included in the National Security and Defence Strategy due to the existing dilemmas and, consequently, it is our assumption that Serbia in this way made itself sufficient room to eventually change its security orientation from military neutrality to full membership in the collective defence system.

## Conclusion

It was not before 2009 that Serbia adopted its first two strategies – the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia and the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, as well as the Strategic Defence Review. The process of drafting these documents started after Serbia acquired its independence and adopted its Constitution in 2006 as this was when Serbia was for the first time given the opportunity to shape its national defence system in a comprehensive and in-depth manner, consistent with its own capacity and needs, i.e. in accordance with the challenges, risks and threats that are present in Serbia. When the Strategies and laws were adopted, namely when the strategic-doctrinal and normative framework were completed, the first generation of security sector reform was concluded and the pillars were put in place for further building the security and defence related reforms. Unfortunately, the Strategic Documents preparation and adoption process in Serbia took quite a lot of time and, due to the absence of an appropriate framework, the reform in these areas were stalled. Another characteristic of this process is that Strategic Documents have not been adopted according to the previously set activity plans/schedule; rather, legal regulation has largely depended on political circumstances and willingness of the competent ministries and those who were heading them.

Since these documents set a framework for functioning of the national security system, the executive branch of power now has a leading role in the process of preparing and implementing these documents. This surely does not mean that the Assembly, as a legislative body, should not have an important role in adopting and monitoring the implementation of these documents. It is exactly the opposite, cooperation between these two branches of power is critical for effec-



tive functioning of national security system. However, we have seen on many occasions that the executive branch in Serbia tends to prevail over the legislative branch. This has disrupted cooperation considering that the Parliament was reduced to a body that merely approves the Strategic Documents proposed by the Government.

Strategic documents in the area of security and defence are based on the assessment of the security environment and the threats affecting the security of the Republic of Serbia. To make this assessment as truthful as possible, it is necessary that the ministry competent for drafting the Strategies consults a wide range of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders and incorporates their different viewpoints into a single approach to state security. Since this was not the case when the Strategies were drafted, we believe that the assessment of threats as provided in the Strategies do not truthfully reflect the perceptions of all stakeholders in the security sector. Our opinion is that this omission could have been avoided if the law provided that the Ministry of Defence shall consult other stakeholders in the security sector or if an arrangement was provided with the Ministry of Defence coordinating a team that comprises the representatives of the state authorities important for security as well as the representatives of civil society.

When analysing the content of Strategies, we have noted the presence of quantitative problems in those documents. The Strategic Documents devote relatively limited part of the text to the challenges, risks and threats faced by the Republic of Serbia. Furthermore, the general impression is that the challenges, risks and threats are not properly defined and prioritised in the Strategic Documents. Also, because of the bureaucratic argot and overly general formulations, the listed threats are not clear enough and can be interpreted in a number of different ways. It would therefore be necessary that the authors of these Strategies analyse these generalised formulation in more detail and put them in the appropriate context. And, what is maybe even more important, we suggest that the authors of the Strategies should change the sequence in which the challenges, risks and threats are listed, considering that the order in which they are placed now evidently does not correspond to the security situation that is currently present in Serbia.

Radical changes in the security environment after the Cold War have placed the states in a situation in which they face global, regional and internal challenges and threats whose nature is not military, or not exclusively military. And, maybe even more importantly, they cannot be dealt with effectively without resorting to military force. Considering their altered nature, those challenges and threats open the question of the manner and means in which the states can effectively respond. Due to the complexity of security situation, the states are not capable of autonomously responding to all challenges, risks and threats. That is why the mechanisms for responding to threats as proposed by the authors of the Strategies include active participation in the process of cooperation and joint action with other countries, as well as the integration into international security structures such as the systems of collective defence and collective security.

The Strategic Documents are affirmative with regard to the integrations into regional, European and other international structures. For the time being, regional initiatives are not an effective mechanism for settlement of existing problems in the region. It is critical for the effectiveness of these initiatives that they are con-

ducted through a process that is focused on the suppression of shared threats – a process that is in the ownership of the countries of the region, and not being regarded as a form “homework” set by the Euro-Atlantic community. It is very hard to change the mindset of countries and citizens in the region, particularly because of the fact that the indicators of the region’s consolidation are predominantly external, and are based primarily on the initiatives and pressure of the international community, and are therefore difficult to internalise by the societies in the region (Gyarmati and Stančić, 2007). That is reason why we do not expect the situation to change quickly in this regard. As to the integration into other security structures, the situation seems quite confusing. Serbia is at this moment somewhere between the self-proclaimed military neutrality, the process of the association into the EU, the participation in the Partnership for Peace programme, and the alignment of its own security capacity with NATO. It seems to us that this bewildering situation arises from the absence of consensus of all stakeholders in the security sector when it comes to the issue of foreign-policy security orientation. We believe that political elites in Serbia should as soon as possible take a clear position with regard to the issue of foreign-policy security orientation and thus avoid that we once again come into a situation in which instable political situation and different strategic directions influence the implementation of reforms in all spheres of life, the security and defence sphere included.

## Bibliography

Bjeloš, M. (2009) ‘Lack of Quality Public Debate in the Process of Passing the Laws in the Security Sector.’ *Western Balkans Security Observer*, 15, pp. 56-65. Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations.

Centre for Free Elections and Democracy. (2009) ‘Public opinion survey in September and December of 2009.’ Belgrade: CeSID.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. (2005) ‘National Security Policy.’ *The DCAF Background Series on Security Sector Governance and Reform*. Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Delević, M. (2007) ‘Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans.’ *Chaillot Paper*, no 104. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Dimitrijević, B. (2008) ‘Nacionalna strategija bezbednosti – model.’ *Vojno delo*, 60 (2), pp. 65-92. Beograd: Ministarstvo odbrane Srbije – Vojnoizdavački zavod.

Ejdus, F. (2009) ‘Koncept reforme sektora bezbednosti.’ U *Godišnjak reforme sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji*, ur. Hadžić, M., Milosavljević, B., Stojanović, S. i Ejduš, F., pp. 65–71. Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose.

Gyarmati, I. and Stančić, D. (2007) ‘Study on Assessment of Regional Security Threats and Challenges in the Western Balkans.’ Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Force.





Hadžić, M. (2004) 'The Concept of Security Sector Reform.' In: Flury, P. and Hadžić, M. (ed.) *Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform*. Belgrade: DCAF, CCVO.

Hadžić, M. (2004) *Uloga parlamenta u reformi sektora bezbednosti u državama Zapadnog Balkana*. Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose.

Hadžić, M. (2007) *Security Sector Reform in Serbia*. Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations.

Hadžić, M. et all (2009) *Yearbook on Security Sector Reform in Serbia 2000-2008*. Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations.

Hadžić, M., Timotić, M. and Milosavljević, B. (2004) *Smisao reforme sektora bezbednosti*. Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations.

Koneska, C. (oktobar 2007- mart 2008) 'Faktor koji nedostaje u oblasti bezbednosti na Zapadnom Balkanu.' *Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana*, 7-8, pp. 116-117. Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose.

Milošević, M. (2009) 'The Law on Serbia's Participation in the Multinational Operations.' *Western Balkans Security Observer*, 15, pp. 22-30. Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations.

Popović, Đ. (oktobar 2007 - mart 2008) 'Komentar Nacrta zakona o odbrani i o vojsci.' *Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana*, 7-8, pp. 120-131. Beograd: Centar za civilno-vojne odnose.

Radoman, J. (2008) 'Concept of Security Sector Reform.' *Western Balkans Security Observer*, 11, Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations.

Simić, D. (2002) *Nauka o bezbednosti*. Beograd: Službeni list SRJ.

## Documents

Federal Assembly. (2003) *Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro*. Official Gazette of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 1/2003.

National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. (2006) *Constitution of the Republic of Serbia*. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 98/06.

National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. (2007) *Law on Defence*. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 116/07.

National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. (2007) *Law on the Armed Forces*. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 116/07.

National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. (2009) *Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia*.



National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. (2009) *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia*.

NUMBER	NAME OF THE CHALLENGE, RISK OR THREAT	CATEGORY		LEVEL OF ANALYSIS – SCOPE OF THREAT			SOURCE OF THREAT (AS STATED BY PROPOSER)	SECTOR (AS STATED BY PROPOSER)	REFERENCE OBJECT (WHAT IS PROPOSER PROTECTING)	NOTA BENE
		Challenge	Risk	Threat	Global	Regional				
1	Armed aggression			x	x		Global or regional armed conflict	Military	Security of the Republic of Serbia	Why is in the first place when the proposer stated that threat of armed aggression has diminished?
2	Separatism (Separatist aspirations of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija)		x	x	x		Nationalist and religious groups, the Albanian national minority in Kosovo	Political	Territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia	This threat is on the fifth place in the Defence Strategy. DS doesn't explicitly mention separatist aspirations of the Albanian national minority.
3	Unconstitutional unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo			x		x	Enforcement of unilateral solution	Non-traditional, political	Security of the Republic of Serbia	This is the biggest threat to the security of the RS and it's in the third place on the list of CRTs.
4	Armed rebellion		? ?	? ?		x	Unconstitutional and violent tendency of change of borders	Military	Security of the Republic of Serbia	Second position in Defence Strategy. It isn't specified whether source of threat is internal and who would be main actors of potential armed rebellion.
5	Disputes involving the use of armed force			x		x	Escalation of terrorism and border, territorial and other disputes	Military	Security of the Republic of Serbia	
6	Terrorism		x	x	x	x	Violent religious extremism	Political	Security of the Republic of Serbia	Fourth place in the DS
7	Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction			x	x	x	Terrorist groups, individuals	Political	Security of Republic of Serbia	
8	National and religious extremism		x			x	Extremist	Political	Security	Threat to security? Why is security of Republic of Serbia left out? 6 <sup>th</sup> place in Defence Strategy
9	Intelligence			x		x	Intelligence activities	Political	Security of the Republic Serbia	Only Serbia in its Strategic Documents recognised intelligence as a real threat to its security.
10	Organized crime			x		x	Illegal trade of narcotics and human trafficking, as well as proliferation of conventional weapons, including weapons of mass destruction	Political, economic	Security and development of the state and society	It is classified as a serious threat, but on the list of CRTs of NSS it takes 10 <sup>th</sup> place. 7 <sup>th</sup> place





## **Comparative Analysis of the Strategic Documents of the Western Balkans**

**Adel Abusara**

### **Introduction**

One of the important tests of the achieved level of democratization for every country in transition is the state of affairs of its strategic-doctrinal framework. By analysing the number of main strategic documents of a country (in transition, but also in general), their hierarchy, main stakeholders that participate in their creation, the (non-)existence of the flow of information between the authorities and the public before these documents are adopted, and most importantly - their content, one can find out much more than mere security and defence aspirations of its political elite.

On the basic level, the sole existence of these documents tells us indirectly if the first generation of the security sector reform (SSR) is finished and if there is an effective (!) democratic oversight of the whole security sector and all the stakeholders in it. Also, they depict how political elite perceives the need for a comprehensive dialogue with the wider public (interested CSOs, academia, independent experts) on the country's essential issues, i.e. the real level of acquired democracy. The importance that is being given to the adoption of these documents according to democratic standards and following the right hierarchy shows if the need for their existence is really understood. For example, if they are being adopted at the same time, in a twisted and speeded up procedure, with wrong institutions to pass them, it is very likely that main stakeholders are just trying to have the "shell", the empty "form" of a democratic country, without making a real effort to create comprehensive security and defence systems as well as security policy. On the other hand, even if main strategic documents do not clearly state the aspirations of the country in transition on the international security scene (this is precisely what they should do, but it is not always the case), the model that is used for writing can be a clear indicator in this sense.

Despite all the benefits of making this kind of analysis for the Western Balkan countries, it is very difficult to do so. The Balkans (more or less) "successfully" defies any logical framework; the ongoing process of building economic and security community in the region and its (slow) integration in the most important international security and economic organizations is happening due to a strong push and influence coming from the international community. It is highly uncertain that all the countries of the region would remain on the same course without this pressure. The geopolitical status of the region is still a matter of concern and worries: ten years after the last conflict in the region, not all the boundaries are clear, the status of Kosovo is still somewhat disputable, the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is still gloomy and Macedonia is not much closer to the solution of its dispute with Greece (although recent bankruptcy situation that Greece has been faced



with might seriously affect its capability to remain on the same course concerning the name dispute with its northern neighbour, as well as the non-recognition of Kosovo). Nevertheless, we will try to pursue the analysis believing that it will give us at least some insight into the dubious balance sheet of the region as well as in different security trends in its countries.

The efforts to detect and observe new trends in security sectors in the Western Balkans and their general level of democratization through methodological usage of comparative analysis of main strategic documents (the National Security Strategy, Defence Strategy and Strategic Defence Review) of the countries of the region is justified on several levels: firstly, the countries of the region had similar experience of instabilities and crises in the last decade of 20<sup>th</sup> century, as well as a slow stabilization process at the beginning of the new century; secondly, the timing for the creation of new strategies was again very similar – they have all adopted their first strategic documents in the last 10 years or so; finally, the countries' answer to the ultimate push from the international community (and especially the EU in this sense) for regional cooperation, their sincerity and willingness to cooperate clearly show how far they have moved from the "remnants" of their recent gloomy past. Naturally, the scope of our analysis needed to be narrowed down only to the *main* strategic security documents in order to be able to grasp the most important new trends in different security sectors in the region.

### General Context

Twenty years after the demise of the Cold War system and the start of the wars for the heritage of socialist Yugoslavia, the Balkan region is consolidated in security sense, meaning that there is no immediate threat of another large-scale armed conflict in it. Security vacuum that was created by the dissolution of the previous system and socialist Yugoslavia as a remnant of that system has mostly been filled. Still, the region remains much more divided than connected: starting from purely political division, the term "Western Balkans" has been created by international community in order to exclude Slovenia (which is now perceived as a Central European country), Romania and Bulgaria, all members of the EU and NATO. Secondly, the problem of Kosovo has not been solved yet despite strong pressures and nobody can predict the final solution for it.<sup>1</sup> Thirdly, the heritage of the conflicts and different perceptions of the importance of regional cooperation is still apparent in the relations between the countries<sup>2</sup>, although on the lower levels of interaction there are examples of good cooperation.<sup>3</sup>

Fourthly, the countries of the region are in the different stages of Euro-Atlantic integrations: Croatia will become a EU member in 2012 or 2013; Macedonia has been a candidate since 2005 (but it hasn't started the negotiations yet); Albania,

---

<sup>1</sup> Without any prejudices to its status, Kosovo is treated here apart from Serbia due to a complete differentiation from the Serbian security system and efforts of the international community and local actors to create its own strategic-doctrinal framework.

<sup>2</sup> For further information of regional cooperation: Delevic (2007), Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans, Chaillot Papers no. 104, ISS, Paris.

<sup>3</sup> Police cooperation between Croatia and Serbia can be one of those examples.

Montenegro and Serbia have submitted their candidacies and will probably become candidates this or next year, while Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to become a fully functional state before it gets to that point. Finally, Kosovo has been given strong European prospect, but its status needs to be resolved first once and for all. When speaking about purely security integrations, things are not much clearer here – Albania and Croatia are already NATO members, Macedonia was prevented from becoming a member by Greece on the 2009 Bucharest NATO summit, while the Serbian National Assembly has proclaimed military neutrality, which has not (yet) been recognized in the world. Bosnia Herzegovina and Montenegro have strong NATO ambitions (they have both been given Membership Action Plan), but weak democratic capabilities (at least BiH), while NATO is main security force on Kosovo.

Having all this in mind, it can be hardly said that the Western Balkans is a genuinely unified security-policy region. This all comes from the sole fact that political elites, but also societies that they represent, still do not interpret the fundamentals of the security in a similar manner even on the common, regional level (of course, with different content stemming from one country to another). As we will show, there is no notion of security as a more general structure that involves the whole region. Finally, political elites in the region are not yet capable of defining, structuring and prioritising the basics of their security policies.

### **Creation and the State of Affairs of Strategic Documents**

The strategic and doctrinal documents of the countries of the Western Balkans have all been created in the first decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century. The first ten years after the breakup of the Socialist Yugoslavia were marked by the wars for its heritage and creation of new states. These states were too preoccupied with their war plans, increased poverty and sanctions imposed by the international community to pay attention to the needed consolidation and creation of security framework. On the other hand, its mostly authoritarian leaders did not have the security framework as a priority on their agenda: they thought they knew much better than anybody else how to answer the main security questions or they did not even want this issue to be raised, because it could bring to an unwanted debate on the status of their countries or their own, mostly authoritarian rule. The same goes for Albania which was faced with major poverty and political insurgency in 1997, followed by the break-down of state and security institutions. This is why the first serious efforts for writing strategic documents did not happen before 1999 by the then Macedonian government.

After 2000 and until 2006, practically all the countries of the region had their first strategic documents. Albania passed its first strategic document, the Security Strategy Document in 2000, whilst the first document labelled as National Security Strategy was adopted in 2004 and revised in 2007. The National Defence Strategy was adopted in 2000 and revised several times afterwards, the last revision dating to 2007. Finally, the Military Strategy was adopted in 2002 and revised in 2005, while the White Paper on Defence was published in 2005. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the so-called Defence Policy was adopted in 2001, the Military Doctrine was endorsed in 2003, and the Security Policy of BiH in 2006. The Defence Review is in the drafting stage and is expected to be submitted before the



October elections in BiH. Croatian case saw the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy being passed at the same day in 2002. A year later, the Military Strategy was approved, while the Strategic Defence Review was adopted in 2005. Macedonia adopted the Strategy of Defence in 1999 (it was amended in February 2010), then approved the National Security and Defence Concept and Strategic Defence Review in 2003 and the White Paper on Defence in 2005. Finally, the National Security Strategy was adopted in 2008. In this case though, there is another document that needs to be taken into account as part of strategic documents of Macedonia – it is the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which was signed in August 2001 and which set a frame that ended the hostilities between the ethnic Albanian minority and Slavic majority in the country. This document “...has included number of provisions on the issue of security and defence...which have guided overall security policies in the country” (Yusufi, 2010).

The case of Serbia and Montenegro is somewhat peculiar, because of the efforts to keep alive firstly the federation (after the fall of Milosevic), and then the State Union consisted of those two republics, despite the evident lack of interest for this at least from one side. This caused both countries to finish their strategic framework just after the “velvet break-up” of the State Union and acquired independence. Montenegro had its first versions of the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy adopted only few months after independence in 2006, whilst upgraded versions were adopted two years later, at the end of 2008. Serbia, on the other hand, had even bigger delay in adopting its security and doctrinal documents due to political turmoil caused by the self-proclaimed independence of its outbreak province, Kosovo and Metohija, and due to different perceptions of security that then main political parties had. This is why it took three years for the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy to be adopted at the end of 2009. The Strategic Defence Review from 2006 (relevant for the period 2006 - 2010) was revised in 2009 as well.

Finally, the National Security Strategy of Kosovo is at this moment under development. Its strategic and doctrinal framework has been up to now constrained by the uncertainty of its political status and, to some extent, the unwillingness of the international community to hand over the ownership over important political and strategic decisions to local structures. Lastly, the defence of Kosovo is still in the hands of NATO forces, and will remain so in the foreseeable future<sup>4</sup>.

---

<sup>4</sup> For all these reasons, Kosovo is not present a lot in this analysis, since it still doesn't have its own strategic-doctrinal framework.



Albania	BiH	Croatia	Kosovo	Macedonia	Montenegro	Serbia
National Security Strategy (2004)	Security Policy (2006)	National Security Strategy (2002)	/	National Security Strategy (2008)	National Security Strategy (2008)	National Security Strategy (2009)
National Defence Strategy (2007)	Defence Policy (2008)	Defence Strategy (2002)	/	Strategy of Defence (2010)	Defence Strategy (2008)	National Defence Strategy (2009)
/	Defence Review (to be submitted in mid-2010)	Strategic Defence Review (2005)	/	Strategic Defence Review – Political Framework (2003)	/	Strategic Defence Review (2009)

*Table 9: Review of all the relevant security and defence strategies in the Western Balkans, and years of the adoption of latest versions*

Starting from their names, the strategic documents of the countries of the Western Balkans do show some similarity. The highest document in the hierarchy of strategic documents in all countries is the National Security Strategy, although this was not the case everywhere at the very beginning (Macedonian National Security and Defence Concept which was replaced with the National Security Strategy). The exception is BiH which has the Security Policy of BiH. Apart from this cover document, all the countries possess another two types of documents: one is military or defence strategies and the other is white papers or strategic defence reviews.

Some of these documents are either revisions of previously adopted documents, or are soon to be replaced by new versions. Although the fast and ongoing changes in the political and security sectors of the Western Balkans can present pertinent explanation for this trend, it is much more likely that, at least at the beginning, the political elites of the countries were faced with the “unknown” when trying to copy from developed Western democracies and create their own security framework. The times of wandering might have ended quite recently, with second or even third generation of the revised strategic documents. On the other hand, the similarity of the names of strategic documents (after the inconsistencies that existed at the beginning) could indicate that most of the countries, despite internal differences, have eventually chosen the same or at least similar model of strategic documents to copy and re-shape to their particular needs. This premise is going to be challenged when we start analysing the structure of the documents.

### **Drafting and Adoption of the Documents**

As we have already stated, even the way that strategies and doctrines were drafted and passed, thus creating the strategic system of the Balkan countries, is very indicative of the countries’ level of democracy. Firstly, the extent to which the in-



ternational actors are included into the drafting of these documents is a certain indicator of a country's capability to independently make the important decisions on its own future. Also, a more sophisticated analysis can give us an insight in the general relations between the main stakeholders involved in writing and passing of these documents: the relations between the President, the Government (specifically the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior) and the Parliament of a country. Another important insight stemming from the analysis of the drafting of these documents is the political elite's attitude towards the media, academic community, and civil society organizations – if the latter are included in the drafting process, or at least if their opinion is heard, we can assume healthy and partner relations between the sides. In contrast to that, the lack of any public discussion and preparation of the documents "behind the closed doors" signifies poor communication and lack of mutual trust between the two (sometimes confronting) sides.

Countries of the region, with no exception, had a difficult task in showing their democratic abilities during this process. A striking example for the first step, the drafting of the strategies, would be the only country that will definitely enter the EU in 2012 or 2013 – Croatia. An excellent idea of creating an independent body tasked to write the National Security Strategy which spent a year and a half drafting this document was neglected in a matter of days and a small group of people from several state ministries wrote the Strategy within few weeks. Serbian case shows that there is a need for a wide consensus at least among the elite and proper procedures in order for a strategy to be written and adopted. During the period of "cohabitation" between the then Prime Minister and the President in 2006-2007 there were two teams, two Working Groups which produced as many proposals. The proposal of the Presidency's cabinet and the Government's one reflected somewhat different and even (in certain cases) contradicting ideas of the two main political actors in Serbia at that time on the important strategic decisions related to the approaching self-proclamation of Kosovo's independence and other security issues. This problem could have been avoided if the need for a strategic framework had been clearly stated in the supreme legal document of the country, its Constitution, and consequently, if the procedure of their drafting and adoption had existed. Since none of this was the case, politicians found themselves in some sort of a limbo – a situation that even might have been favourable for them at the moment, leaving them without obligation to draft strategies, thus raising controversial issues. It was only when it was clearly stated that the Ministry of Defence was in charge of drafting the document and the National Parliament of adopting it<sup>5</sup>, that this problem was sorted out in a proper way (with significant and a hardly acceptable delay, though).

It is very important to observe to what extent the international community, which has been in various forms and constellations present in the area since the very beginning of the conflicts twenty years ago, participated/pushed for drafting and adoption of the documents. This situation is most apparent in Kosovo, whose provisional authorities are not yet in charge of its defence. It is still a task carried out by the International Military Presence, i.e. NATO. Also, due to the lack of local base of knowledge, Kosovo (as well as BiH) has become some sort of a "playground"

---

<sup>5</sup> Of course, we should not underestimate the importance of the fact that the co-habitation government has changed after the elections, thus easing the agreement within the institutional structures.

for various attempts of drafting strategic documents. Different consultancies and international organizations brought their own experience from various post-conflict regions in a new “laboratory” and tried to implement it, although it might have been somewhat inappropriate for the situation in Kosovo. The same (or similar) thing happened in Bosnia Herzegovina after the end of the war, but also in Albania after the 1997 fall of state structures and, to some extent in 2001 after the insurgency in Macedonia. Dayton agreement, Ohrid agreement and Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo are today not only known as the documents that ended a war, a hostility or gave a solution for a deadlock situation – they are also first provisional strategic documents of BiH, Macedonia and Kosovo. The problem with this kind of approach, which is persistently used in the Balkans (but not there exclusively), is that it gives solutions in the form of various strategic documents without building capacities for local ownership and their implementation. A positive exception (that does confirm the rule, though) is the international involvement in Macedonia which focused from the very beginning on capacity building and education, thus creating a solid base of knowledge, and after 2001, a full local ownership of the process.

Speaking of the positive, one should not get an impression that the involvement of the international community brought no good to the region. The driving force for the creation of the strategic-doctrinal framework of all the countries of the region is undoubtedly the prospect of EU and NATO membership. The possibility to become a part of one of those organizations, or both, is pushing countries to make necessary reforms of their societies, economies, even to some extent to acquire completely different values. Therefore, the “open door” policy of NATO and a clear commitment of the EU that all the countries of this region do have membership prospect, providing that they fulfil the necessary standards, have been of utmost importance up to now for the security sector as well and will be essential in the following years<sup>6</sup>.

When it is about adopting the strategic document, it is all about *who* does that (which state institution), since it increases or decreases its legitimacy and might seriously affect longevity. Since all the countries of the Western Balkans are proclaimed parliamentary or semi-presidential democracies, if it is not the legislative body who gives the final word – the Parliament, it means that the people of the country, through their elected representatives (all of them, not just the ruling nomenclature) did not have a say and that a document was (usually) prepared, drafted and adopted by the executive branch, the government. This doesn't make it the document of the country and for it, but to some extent a paper expressing the views and wishes solely of the party/parties in power at the particular moment. This was the case with the first set of strategic documents of Montenegro (2006), where the Ministry of Defence was in charge of drafting the document that was later passed in the session of the Government. This grave mistake that

---

<sup>6</sup> The role of the EU in this matter is very dubious. Although stating from 2000 that the region has a prospect of membership and despite the clear commitment from Thessaloniki summit in 2003, the EU and its leading politicians have doubted a lot whether it is necessary to accept all the Balkan countries. These doubts are still present, and make the case of Balkan accession still not fait accompli, mostly due to internal problems of the functioning of the Union itself. Still, mixed signals that were being sent during the last decade gave a lot of maneuvering space to local politicians and ultimately, slowed down the reform pace.



significantly reduced the relevance of the documents was corrected in a second attempt with the National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy of 2008. Still, this is, apart from Bosnian case<sup>7</sup>, rather an exception than a rule. The other countries allow, for instance the Ministry of Defence, to draft *and* issue defence and security policy without consulting the rest of the Government or the Parliament only in special cases (e.g. Macedonia has this provision, but without clearly stating which are the cases when this exception can be applied).

Still, not everybody shares this opinion on the importance of the adoption procedure to end up precisely in the Parliament. The author of the analysis of Croatian strategic documents questioned this right of the Parliament, considering it “illogical”. The explanation is in line with the idea that the “content of the fundamental policy documents of the executive branch” should not be decided upon in the Parliament, because it “takes away its credibility and dignity” (of the executive branch), “and makes the Parliament impotent should any issue with the content of the strategic documents occur in the future” (Mahecic, 2010). Therefore, the author proposes that the Parliament should only give its opinion on the drafts of strategic documents, and that either the President or the Prime Minister should adopt them.

If the Parliament’s powers in this issue are reduced only to giving opinion, the problem that might arise is that executive institutions would be able to shape strategic documents of the country without any consent of its people represented by the Parliament. As we have seen from the example of the European Parliament, giving an opinion does allow some space for a manoeuvre, but is simply not enough for a legislative institution. It is not elaborated, for instance, what the Parliament’s “no” would mean? Would it be binding for the executive branch? Would it mean the creation of some joint committee that would seek for a mutually acceptable solution? It is our opinion that the main strategic, but not doctrinal (!) documents need to be adopted in the Parliament. Their significance and ranking in the hierarchy of documents of a country go right after the Constitution; they show the future course of a country’s security philosophy and therefore need to be approved right in the Parliament.

One of the most important challenges in creating a strategic-doctrinal framework that the countries of the Western Balkans have not yet managed to deal with is the competence of those who are drafting them. As already explained, the international community did engage itself in building local capacities for ownership over the process of drafting the documents and creating an overall favourable environment in the countries that were torn by the conflicts. Still, there is a significant lack of this local basis in many of them, except for, to some extent, in Serbia and Croatia. Another problem with trained and educated staff is that they are very often highly politicized and, being parts of public administration, subject to frequent changes following the changes in the government. None of the countries of the region has acquired the necessary level of understanding that drafting of the country’s most important documents is not a matter of daily political (mis)understandings, but a work that goes beyond that. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the governments themselves are anywhere in the Balkans competent to

---

<sup>7</sup> The peculiarity of the ethnic-based political system of BiH defies any serious analyses of the relations among different authorities.

decide on and implement the security policy or to change the pace or direction of security reforms.

The last, but by far not the least important issue is the level of involvement of the media, academic circles, and civil society organizations in drafting strategic documents. Again, the best example is set in Macedonia, with the so-called "Process 2002" initiated by the then President of Macedonia, and consisting of a series of roundtables that brought together the "relevant national and international governmental and non-governmental authorities to discuss security issues...that later served as basis...in the design of the strategy documents" (Yusufi, 2010). This is actually the only case in the Western Balkans when official structures initiated and conducted a series of (in)formal meetings with representatives of non-governmental organisations *before* the drafting process has even begun! Somewhat similar process happened in Croatia, as previously explained<sup>8</sup>, but with poor final results. None of the governments of the countries in the region have showed any intention up to now to include the public in the drafting process. As a matter of fact, they even gave their best, in a more or less subtle way, to keep everybody away from giving any insights even when the documents were drafted. The most striking example happened in Serbia when the government published the draft proposal of the National Security Strategy and the Defence Strategy and offered it for public discussion during Christmas and New Year's holidays. It was hardly an administrative mistake, but rather an intention of the makers to avoid any public criticism or serious discussion. Nevertheless, the pressure from several dozens of NGOs forced them to extend this period for one month, which did eventually result in a fruitful discussion. On the other side of the coin is the interested public of Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo which was never consulted during the process of drafting and adoption of the strategies. One, although lame explanation, might be that there is not enough expertise in those countries for a quality evaluation of the strategy proposals to be carried out. Still, a much more convenient one is that the governments of these countries did not want anybody else to be involved in the process, which delegitimizes the process itself to some extent, but also speaks a lot of the democratic culture of a country.

### **Hierarchy of Adoption of the Strategic Documents**

The adoption of strategic and doctrinal documents in the right order shows the maturity of political elite and their understanding of the importance of encompassing a strategic doctrinal framework in a proper way. At the top end and first to be developed should be the National Security Strategy and all the other documents should be subordinated to and in line with it. The necessity of adopting this overarching strategy first lies in the fact that it would give the framework for all the others. In this sense, politicians of the Western Balkans countries have shown that, at least at the beginning of this process, they just wanted to gain democratic "credentials" by the mere adoption of strategies, so they were pushing to finish the process as quickly as possible without paying attention to the right order and to the fact that the strategies need to follow this basic hierarchy. This is why most of the strategic documents do overlap in their content in the manner that the same expressions and wordings are used, which is not that problematic,

---

<sup>8</sup> See page 6.



or simply by copying the content (especially challenges, risks and threats) which is much worse.

None of the observed countries followed the right order of drafting and adoption, i.e. the lack of transition from general documents to more specific ones is a rule. For instance, Croatia adopted its first National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy at the same day, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2002. Serbia did the same with its own documents of the same importance, adopting them in October 2009. Again, this resulted in certain overlapping – some segments in the Defence Strategy have not been elaborated enough, but entirely “imported” from the National Security Strategy (NSS). Further on, the Serbian Strategic Defence Review was adopted 7 months prior to these two documents, contributing to somewhat chaotic situation. Montenegro, albeit being among the last ones to adopt strategic documents, has already “had a chance” to make the same mistake, and afterwards to avoid repeating it. The NSS and Defence strategy were firstly adopted within 20 days in 2006 – the NSS on November 27<sup>th</sup> and the Defence Strategy on December 17<sup>th</sup>, not giving enough time for the latter to be made in line with the NSS. Still when these documents were revised in 2008, there was enough time left between their adoptions to conclude that the process was sound enough (in theory).

Even more confusing situation occurred in Bosnia though, where the first strategic and doctrinal documents defining BiH’s strategic security goals were the Defence Policy and Military Doctrine. Nearly three years later, the Security Policy (the most general security document, counterpart of the NSS) was adopted, although logic presumes the reverse order. It is only in Kosovo where the current situation justifies the so-called “*bottom-up approach*”, meaning drafting and adoption of sector-based strategies instead of development of a national security strategy.

Finally, at first glance, Macedonia seems to make the same case as all other countries. Not only the first Defence Strategy and White Paper on Defence were adopted before the NSS (or National and Security Concept, as the first version of the NSS was called), but all other documents (apart from Ohrid Framework Agreement, whose adoption was dictated by the conflict and efforts for its resolution) were adopted in the same year, 2003 (with White Paper on Defence and Strategy for the Police Reforms amended in 2005 and 2004, respectively), although not at the same time. Such a tight schedule does not leave a lot of faith in the capabilities of the authors to make a sound coordination and right hierarchy. Still, despite these disturbances, in principle the strategic framework of Macedonia is by far the most harmonized in the region. For instance, the Strategic Defence Review and the revised White Paper on Defence explicitly state their subordination to the National Security and Defence Concept and explain that they follow the views, positions and guidance set out in it. On the other hand, “the Defence Strategy refers mainly to the National Security Strategy” (Yusufi, 2010).

### **Content Analysis, Part One: the Differentiation and Place of Challenges, Risks and Threats in Strategic Documents**

The analysis of the content of security and doctrinal documents existing in the region confirms what was previously stated – the countries mostly dealt with the creation of these documents without a real and thorough understanding of *why*



it had to be done. Very often the idea behind their creation was either to please domestic public (fulfilling the form that implies the democratization of the security sector) or to be in line with the international standards, and to show to foreign “evaluators” of domestic reforms (coming either from the EU or from NATO) the maturity of the political leadership and the country by a mere existence of strategic and/or doctrinal framework.

This statement is easily confirmed by the lack of any prevailing model upon which the strategies were based. If the strategies had been made with the only intention of mapping the security sector of respective countries, it would have implied a thorough analysis of the various security and doctrinal frameworks, including those of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Western models. Eventually, some model would have been taken and, since the countries, despite their peculiarities, belong to a common security environment, there would be a possibility to detect the prevailing one. Still, this is not the case. The strategic documents have completely diverse structure one from another, making a comparative analysis somewhat complicating and challenging. Even the documents that succeeded the old ones do not resemble them too much. Still, this can be perceived in a positive manner, that each revision of a strategic document is a step in the right direction (if the change in the respective document is positive, of course). More realistically, it means the countries are still toying with various ideas.

It is very likely that new revisions of strategic documents in the region will start resembling each other, taking NATO standards as a model. The trend has already started to be applied, with Montenegro making its NSS and Strategic Defence Review challenges, risks and threats (CRT) completely in line with NATO ones, as well as with Croatia waiting first to become a NATO member (which happened in 2009), then for the new NATO Strategic Concept to be adopted (fall 2010, most probably) and then finally to adopt its new, revised set of strategic documents. This new line has already, in the case of Montenegro, led to somewhat grotesque formulations in their NSS, where it is, for instance, stated that the regions that could “spill over” challenges, risks and threats to Montenegro security system are the Middle East, North Caucasus and North Africa. While these regions are potential risk and threat “exporters” for NATO countries (and even then, not for all of NATO members, despite globalization), making this kind of statement is at least in ignorance of the geopolitical position of Montenegro in international relations and ultimately, of its geographic position. Eventually, due to this urge to be fully in line with NATO position, the creators of the NSS of Montenegro have basically completely “ruled out” the very country from its own Strategy.

The second observation stemming from the reading of the documents is that none of them makes a clear and overall distinction between challenges, risks and threats. This makes a proper risk analysis of various documents even more complicated, leaving the researchers to make their own conclusions and interpretations from the reading and general ideas of the texts. For instance, Serbian NSS clearly states that “non-legal, unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo and Metohija represents the biggest *threat* to the security of the Republic of Serbia” (NSS of Serbia, 2009), whilst the other enumerated challenges, risks or threats are not always clearly put into one of the categories. The negative side of this lack of lucidity is, of course, not due to the problems they raise for researchers to read



them, but in the fact that they do not fulfil their primary purpose then – the main stakeholders in security sector do not get a clear vision on how to react to a certain problem and how to be prepared to overcome it in advance.

The third important part of the analysis that stands for most of the countries is the lack of hierarchy between challenges, risks and threats enumerated in the documents. This serious problem means that again the readers of the documents cannot anticipate immediately what is perceived as the biggest threat for the country. For some of the documents, we can assume that the order of presentation in the strategies actually represents a certain level of prioritization, but we cannot be certain about it. Other documents do state what the biggest threat to their country is, but leave the other CRTs out of any hierarchy. This is the case with Serbia: “non-legal, unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo and Metohija represents the *biggest* threat to the security of the Republic of Serbia”. Then again, unless this threat is put as first on the list, which is not the case in Serbian NSS (it is on the third place), we can then exclude the possibility to perceive the very order of presentation as a sort of hierarchy. Croatian NSS makes the problem even worse by dividing the enumeration of the CRTs in two chapters. The first chapter mentions some of the CRTs, whilst they are being enumerated and rephrased in the third chapter. The only presumption that can be made is that those CRTs mentioned in the first chapter have a higher “ranking” in the prioritization than the others. Still, this does not fully solve the problem of the necessary prioritization, because even among the two groups of CRTs there is again no differentiation by importance.

Finally, the only country whose documents (only one of them, actually) do have some sort of hierarchy of perceived CRTs is Macedonia, where they are put in *time dimension* (*currently, mid-term, long-term*) and sorted by the *level of intensity* (*high, medium, low, very low*). In this hierarchical structure, the top place (the most significant CRT) goes for “possible manifestations of extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance, international terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, illegal trade with all types including trade with strategic and dual use of materials, insufficiently secure and efficient borders etc.” As we have already stated, this prioritization exists only in Macedonia’s Strategic Defence Review of 2003. Since none of the other documents repeats this prioritization, thus not making coherent overall strategic framework, it loses a lot from its relevance.

Both this and previous issue, as well as the very language of the Strategies refer to a problem that needs quite some time to be solved in the Western Balkans – most of the countries have not yet fully acquired the logic and the very new language of the post-cold world. Therefore, they are circling around the modern threats, risks and challenges, usually using the so-called “copy-paste” method to take CRTs from various other strategic documents and trying (unsuccessfully) to apply them in their own strategies unable to grasp the real differences and thus make the proper hierarchy.

### **Content Analysis, Part Two: Internal, Regional and Global Threats**

The major similarity of nearly all countries of the region and their strategic documents is the way they structured the perception of threats for their country. The



division into internal, regional and global threats is appropriate, allowing a reader to move easier through the document and to distinguish the intentions of the writer when referring to certain threats. It is only the Montenegrin strategic documents that are not structured this way, yet they can be put in the same frame and analyzed in the same way as the other ones due to a small number of threats (only seven) that they presume. Although the documents generally do not leave a lot of space for the analysis of CRT we will dedicate sufficient space for observing the differences, similarities and peculiarities among them, because it will help us gain important insight into their logic and strategic philosophy.

### Internal Threats

Two CRTs emerging at the national level for nearly all the countries are *disasters* and *transitional problems*, whilst other two of them, *organized crime* and *terrorism* exist as perceived internal threats in all the countries except BiH and Montenegro. Organized crime remains a chronic problem for the whole Balkans that none of the governments of the region has yet managed to deal with. It is rooted deeply even in the institutional structures of the state, knows no borders and has no ethnic, nationalistic or any other obstacles for a "joint action". This is by far "the most successful" aspect of regional cooperation. Organized crime networks have been very active throughout the region in illegal trafficking of narcotics and people, illegal migrations, proliferation of conventional weapons etc. It is therefore very interesting, and to some extent indicative, why this very threat has not been listed in Bosnian and Montenegrin documents as internal, although EC Progress Reports for both countries state that despite some progress regarding the fight against it, "organized crime remains a matter of serious concern" (Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Commission 2009). As much as the creators of Montenegrin strategic documents might have intentionally done that in order to "avoid" emphasizing organized crime as an internal threat, it is unclear why it is not a part of internal threats in Bosnian document.

The usage of terrorism as an internal threat is somewhat ambiguous – it is very hard to prove the existence of terrorist "cells" in the region and since the conflicts in the southern part of the Western Balkans – Kosovo, southern Serbia and Macedonia have ended, there were no real terrorist threats in the region. On the other hand, the countries of the region, although most of them do send troops to Afghanistan and Iraq to help American "fight against terrorism", have rather insignificant number of troops on the spot, which renders it unlikely to provoke any sort of reaction from terrorists. The only explanation for the inclusion of terrorism as a threat is a possible "transitory position" of the countries of the Western Balkans for terrorists whose final destination would be the EU.

Transitional problems are thoroughly described in the documents as problems of "political transition which result in a slow development of effective and efficient executive, legislative and judicial authorities; problems of the transition to *market economy*, which result in a low level of domestic and foreign investment and are favourable for grey economy and black market; slow pace, difficulties and irregularities in implementation of privatization process...technological regression and deterioration of production capacities...unemployment..." (Bosnian Defence Review – not yet published). Macedonian documents add to this list some peculiar threats – "urban terrorism, serious crime including blackmail, racketeering,



murders and attacks on the property of citizens, economic crime, tax evasion..." (The National Security and Defence Concept, Macedonia). Inclusion of disasters (ecological, technological and epidemics) as internal threats shows that the countries of the region do follow at least a minimum of standards regarding contemporary security issues.

Apart from threats that are, more or less, part of the documents in all of the countries, there are some that are connected to very particular internal security milieus and perceptions. Serbian strategies, as already mentioned<sup>9</sup>, perceive the declared independence of Kosovo as the biggest threat to Serbia's security. In line with this claim, separatist aspirations are also enumerated as a strong factor of instability for Serbia, possibly for the region as well. Macedonian strategy (most probably) refers to the consequences of its long-lasting dispute with one of the neighbours when, using very "cold-war-phraseology", it states that one of its internal threats are "activities of foreign special services directed towards worsening of the security situation and thus down the democratic and integrative processes, specially those toward NATO and the EU" (The National Security Defence Concept of Macedonia, 2003). Also, while the other documents only mention the notion of energy interdependency, Macedonian ones openly state that one of the threats for the country's security are "the consequences of clashes of interests for the use of the sources and the routes of strategic energy materials, as well as blocking their importation into the Republic of Macedonia." Having in mind that the whole region is highly dependent on the imports of gas from Russia, it is very strange why at least this level of attention was not paid to this very relevant problem elsewhere in the region.

Bosnia defines several threats that are direct consequences of the war held on its soil, some of them in a very interesting way: firstly, there is an "incomplete and selective implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord". The wording here is probably the lowest common denominator that was agreed upon, since the two confronted sides have firm, stubborn and completely opposite stances on the issue. One view stipulates that Dayton Accord and the "monster" that has been created with its provisions should be dismantled, thus giving way to functional state, while the other considers Dayton Peace Accord as the "Holy Bible" that cannot be touched upon. The "Legacy of political and social animosity advocating various kinds of nationalistic extremism" is another threat inherent only for BiH, as well as the "weapons and ammunition stored in inadequate storage sites and illegally held in individual possession".

Finally, the authors of Albanian and Serbian NSS have paid special attention to demography problems, i.e. illegal migration that leads to "brain drain" effect, as well as "uncontrolled population movement" (Albanian NSS), a phenomenon present in all Western Balkan countries, but specifically emphasized only in these two strategies. The Serbian NSS had just a bit different wording, stating that the problem is the "non-proportional economic and demographic development of the RS and neighbouring countries" leading to migrations from underdeveloped regions to the more developed ones (NSS Serbia, 2009). Apart from that, the last two internal threats in Albanian NSS are very confusing, possibly misleading and barely understandable. The first is connected to "misinformation of the public opinion"

---

<sup>9</sup> Check page 14

that “favours destabilization”, while the second refers to “inadequate development of education, science and culture”, because “...fundamental condition for the development, prosperity and protection of the national identity are specialized human resources, scientific capacities and a realistic presentation of our culture and tradition.” The last sentence can have dangerous implications, because it can give to the state apparatus the role of the final arbiter in deciding what is a *realistic* presentation of Albanian culture and tradition, the role that it should not have, by all means.

### Regional Threats

Before we elaborate a bit more on regional threats in strategic documents, it would be very indicative and compatible with the analysis to see how the countries explain their own role in the security structures in the region. It would also give us an insight on how these states perceive themselves, first and foremost in the regional context. Despite the recent conflict and deadlock in ethnic relations in nearly all multinational communities, basically all the countries of the region use similar wordings when trying to position themselves: the idea that a country has “evolved” from the position of a “security consumer” into a provider of stability, contributor to peace and good neighbour relations is the *motif* of all strategies. To what extent is this realistic or just a wishful thinking is another issue.

The most controversial in this sense is without any doubt the Albanian National Security Strategy and the concept of the so-called “Albanian national issue” that it raises. This “issue” is set among the Strategy’s most important mid-term and long-term objectives contributing to the regional stability: “Albania aspires to be an active partner in the regional policy. In this context, the *Albanian national issue* will be achieved through the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries of the region and also solutions that will provide a long-term and acceptable guarantee for the international community” (National Security Strategy, Albania). The authors of the analysis of Albanian security documents emphasize the focus on European and Euro-Atlantic integrations (calling them wrongly “Europeanization”<sup>10</sup>), which is, in their opinion, a clear sign of avoiding the “nationalistic approach” in seeking the “solution for the Albanian issue” (Kamperi, 2010). The real question though is how to explain the raising of this issue as one of the top Security Strategy objectives. Hidden behind an innocent name and overall Euro-Atlantic integrations goal, it actually states that there are still existing nationalistic aspirations of Albanian political elite to gather all ethnic Albanians scattered in different Balkan countries in one state, or at least one political entity. One might ask then what would happen if the convenient possibility for the integration into the EU were not there anymore, or even worse, if some of the Balkan countries with ethnic Albanian minority did not make it to the EU? How would Albania then seek to solve the “the Albanian national issue”? The sole existence of this kind of idea in a high ranked official document can raise a lot of doubts in the sincerity of all other statements that reconfirm Albania’s commitment to good

---

<sup>10</sup> This term is used in the literature meaning “downloading” of the EU policy into the national polity, but sometimes also “uploading” of national preferences to the EU level (Borzel, 1999). It is very rarely, and only with huge simplifications implying the process of joining the EU, instead it almost always signifies adopting EU norms and values. For more on the issue of Europeanization check the works of Grabbe, Schimelfennig and Sedelmeier and other authors.



regional cooperation.

Still, when reflecting on regional threats, the countries of the region show the highest degree of similarity in their documents. This comes from the notion that the legacy of the wars for socialist Yugoslavia's heritage and historical factors are still present and constitute a significant burden for creating a favourable security environment, which is acknowledged throughout the region. Therefore, the documents in different variations state that, although the possibility of an *armed conflict* is reduced, "...it can never be entirely ruled out" (NSS of Montenegro). The degree of certainty that there is no possibility for another regional "chaos" does differ though – Albania is neutral in this sense, whilst only Macedonian documents speak of the "realistic risks and dangers" coming from the regional "national, religious, greater-state and territorial confrontation". BiH finally, in the scope of its own fears, emphasizes the "aspiration for secession, autonomy and independence of certain ethnic groups" and armed conflicts that can arise from these aspirations as a serious regional (let alone national) problem.

A careful reading of the documents shows that the articulation of regional threats stems from internal problems that the countries have. Naturally, a lot of these problems have their roots in the fact that the region is still labelled as a post-conflict area, burdened with serious social, political and economic problems. On the other hand, the perception of regional threats gives us, even between the lines, the picture of very complicated relations among different countries in the region. Unfortunately, first neighbours are still in most cases perceived as "the others" that are not an imminent threat, but might be a destabilizing factor in the (near) future.

Due to this fact and a lot of other unresolved issues, the *regional instability and crises* are one of common regional threats for all the countries. It seems that, although peace, some sort of fragile stability and technical democracy have been achieved, even the countries themselves (let alone the EU and the rest of the international community) are not yet certain if all the problems and troubles are way behind, or likely to happen again. Specific in this sense is the case of BiH and Serbia which emphasize "secessionist tendencies", each of the two burdened with their own problems.

On the other hand, most of the countries refer to organized crime and extremism as regional problems. *Organized crime* has been already proven as a real threat with a potential to seriously undermine the efforts to "drag" the region into the EU. The murder of the famous Croatian journalist Ivo Pukanic showed in its worst how these informal networks work. It is being verbalized everywhere in the region by the statement that organized crime in the Balkans knows not for ethnic or nationalistic problems, sees no borders and has no visa issues. *Extremism* is being referred to as a problem throughout the region, mostly connected to its nationalistic, ethnic and religious side and has arisen as a consequence of the brutal clashes in the 90s. Whether it has existed before in the minds, collective memory and narrative of the peoples who were very often and throughout history on the opposite sides in very bloody conflicts is a very serious issue with a lot of pro's and con's, but beyond the scope of this analysis. Although extremism is specially emphasized in ethnically polarized countries (e.g. Macedonia), because of their imminent fear of destabilization, it exists everywhere. Macedonia therefore has

as a regional threat a “possible manifestation of extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance”, while Serbia states that “national, religious and political extremism, and destruction of cultural heritage” characterize the state of affairs of security in the region, thus “burdening the process of democratic transition” in its countries. *Transition* is also being mapped as the regional and not just an isolated country problem. Actually, the strategies stipulate that transition causes various political, social and economic cleavages that, they themselves can be source of regional instability.

Apart from the regional threats that are being put in the documents by all the countries, other (important) issues are also being raised by only some of them. Among the most interesting is certainly the issue of energy routes and a possible instability if energy imports are stopped. Although none of the documents states clearly what the impetus for putting this as a possible regional and national threat is, it is obvious that the trigger for it were two gas crises caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Their effect was both devastating for the economies of the Balkan countries (but not only for them!) and showed the level of their dependence on these imports. Macedonian documents therefore point to the “consequences of clashes of interests for the use of the sources and the routes of strategic energy materials, as well as blocking their importation into the Republic of Macedonia”. This is a threat on both national and regional levels as perceived in the Macedonian National and Security Defence Concept. Strangely enough, it is only Macedonia who put it as a threat, although the recent crisis have shown that the countries of the Balkans are among the most dependent ones in all Europe, with numbers that go up to 90% of gas imports from Russia. This applies especially to Serbia and Montenegro, whose strategic documents were the last ones to be adopted or revised, leaving the two enough space after the last winter’s crisis to reconsider this specific problem as a possible challenge, threat or risk.

The last but not the least important, there are issues that have been tackled very briefly and without a lot of explanations, but that do complete the overall picture of how regional threats are perceived from a country’s perspective. Serbia, for instance, elaborates a bit on a tough position of the refugees and IDPs and their unresolved status in the region. This is normal, if we bear in mind that Serbia has the biggest number of people with that status in Europe. On the other hand, BiH and Croatia rightfully point to a huge number of anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordinance on their territory and the territories of the neighbouring countries.

Generally speaking, this part of the CRT analysis tends to be the most important one – if the countries are capable of understanding what the main obstacles on the regional level are, thus showing at least a certain level of maturity and mutual understanding, their Euro-Atlantic (or European, in case of Serbia) prospects are much brighter. Unfortunately, as we have shown in the analysis, there is a long way ahead before the creation of some sort of community or at least “regional” sensitivity can occur.

### Global Threats

This is the least elaborated category of all. The world’s “usual suspect” in the last nine years – terrorism - is elaborated on in every strategy as the biggest threat of



the modern humanity, with possible (“spill-over”?) effects for the Balkans as well. The same goes for organized crime, which (as we have already stated) works as well in the Balkans as in the other parts of the world. Every document does also mention the possibility of interstate armed conflicts, but emphasizes that there is a low probability for this to happen. The Macedonian Defence Review even gives an estimation that, in the long-term (10 years and beyond), this probability will further decrease, as well as the probability of the “non-conventional and asymmetric threats, risks and dangers”. Still, the Review does not explain the basis for this estimation and especially the source of optimism for the latter, since none of the indicators points to a decrease in the possibility of asymmetric threats.

Environmental challenges are mentioned in all the countries as a problem that can have a serious effect on the security. Among the most mentioned environmental problems are: pollution, degradation, climate change, but also the scarcity of natural resources and the potential for future clashes arising from the possibility of having the monopoly over their use.

The enumeration of global threats in the regional strategic and doctrinal documents clearly shows signs of copying from other documents of that kind, or using documents of other countries as models. As we have already mentioned, this is not strange for the region – the countries that have become part of NATO are either using this organization’s documents to show that they are in line with its perception of the CRT, or waiting for new strategic documents to be adopted to do the same. On the other hand, several countries in the region were (or still are) to some extent the protectorates of the international community, meaning that the first versions of their strategic documents were written by the members of the international community and simply adopted by (selected) local stakeholders. Finally, even the countries that don’t fall into the two mentioned categories (yet), do try to comply with the ideas and standards of the Euro-Atlantic community, perceiving it as their natural surroundings.

## **Conclusion**

Despite all deficiencies, the very existence of the strategic-doctrinal framework for (nearly) all the countries of the Western Balkans is a serious breakthrough towards the stability in the region. What must be understood now across the region is that this is just the first step. Strategies and doctrines are to some extent like living organisms – they need to be changed, shaped and re-shaped according to the change in their country’s security philosophy, along with security sector reforms and changes in regional and international security perceptions. The security community in the Balkans has not been made yet, despite the efforts coming from the region. On the other hand, it is obvious that the reconfiguration within the region is not over yet, and this will inevitably influence the future strategic perceptions and be a cause of their constant change.

Still, ten years after the last regional conflict, the first, but significant steps have already been made. The next steps will be much harder, though. The countries will have to move from the very technical perception of the need for a strategic-doctrinal framework to acquiring necessary values that will place the very idea of the existence of these documents in a more normative perception. Once this is

acquired, the main preconditions for a quality revision of the documents will be in place, thus pushing all the stakeholders to participate and correct the anomalies that now exist and that were explained in this analysis in a more or less detailed manner. Of course, as we have already said, this requires a clear political situation in the region, which is at this moment not really in sight.

### **Bibliography**

Bjeloš, M. (2010), *Strategic Policies in the Western Balkans - Serbia*, Belgrade: CCMR.

Dautović, K. (2010), *Strategic Policies in the Western Balkans – Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Belgrade: CCMR.

Delević, M. (2007), *Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans*, Chaillot Papers no. 104, ISS, Paris.

Gyarmati, I. and Stančić, D. (2004), *Study on the Assessment of Regional Security Threats and Challenges in the Western Balkans*, DCAF, Geneva.

Hide, E. and Camberi, H. (2010), *Strategic Policies in the Western Balkans - Albania*, Belgrade: CCMR.

Kovač, M. and Stojković D. (2009), *Strategijsko planiranje odbrane*, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd.

Mahečić, Z. (2010), *Strategic Policies in the Western Balkans - Croatia*, Belgrade: CCMR.

Qehaja, F. (2010), *Strategic Policies in the Western Balkans - Kosovo*, Belgrade: CCMR.

Radević, R. *Strategic Policies in the Western Balkans - Montenegro*, Belgrade: CCMR.

Yusufi, I. (2010), *Strategic Strategic Policies in the Western Balkans - Macedonia*, Belgrade: CCMR.

### **Documents**

Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (2002)

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia (1998) *Strategy of Defence*, Skopje.

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia (2005) *White Paper on Defence*.



- Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia (2010) Defence Strategy.
- National Defence Strategy of Albania (2007).
- National Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia (2009)
- National Security Strategy of Albania (2004).
- National security strategy of Montenegro (2006).
- National security strategy of Montenegro (2008).
- National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia (2002)
- National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia (2009)
- Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001)
- Predsjedništvo Bosne i Hercegovine, (2008) Odbrambena politika Bosne i Hercegovine. Sarajevo.
- Strategic Defence Review of the Republic of Croatia (2005)
- Strategic Defence Review of the Republic of Serbia (2006)







## Authors' Biographies

### Albania

**Enri Hide** is Lecturer of International Security and Geopolitics at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of International Relations at the European University of Tirana. He graduated in Greece, in the field of International Relations and Organizations and holds an MA on the EU Relations with Developing Countries, and an MSc. on International Relations and Strategic Studies from Panteion University, in Athens. Actually, Mr. Hide is a PhD candidate for International Relations at Tirana University. He has published several papers and articles on international, regional and domestic security issues in Albania and abroad. His academic interests are focused mainly in the field of international security (especially Islamic terrorism), geopolitics, US foreign policy, theories of international relations and strategy in the contemporary world.

**Mr. Geron Kamberi** has an extensive experience in the research on the EU studies and security issues as well as in designing and monitoring projects. He holds an MA degree in European Politics (MAEP) from Sussex European Institute (SEI) in the United Kingdom. His interest in security management policies is particularly evident in his engagement as an associate researcher with the IDM where he has published various articles and studies. Since 2006 he has also been one of the editing consultants for the quarterly edition "Security Issues" which is published by the IDM.

### Bosnia and Herzegovina

**Kenan Dautović** is the Commander of the Peace Support Operations Training Center, a multinational PFP Training and Education Center based in Sarajevo. He holds a PhD in Defence and Security Studies at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo. He is also an assistant professor, teaching Prevention of Social Conflicts at the Department of Security and Peace Studies at the Faculty of Political Science in Sarajevo. He has published a book "Conflict Prevention in International Relations" and several articles. His main areas of expertise include conflict prevention, NATO/PFP and other security-related topics.

### Croatia

**Zvonimir Mahecic, M.Sc. (Col.(R))** Retired Colonel of the Croatian Armed Forces. Graduated from the Faculty of Law and later acquired a Master's Degree at the Faculty of Organisation and Information Sciences. He is currently working on his doctoral thesis, entitled "Sociological Aspects of Building the National Security Structures in the Small Transitional Countries – a Case of the Republic of Croatia". From 1996 to 2005, he was the Assistant to the Head of the Military Cabinet of the



President of the Republic of Croatia and afterwards he was the Head of the NATO and PfP Section in the General Staff J-5 Division for two years.

Mr Mahecic became a Major in 1997, Lieutenant Colonel in 1999. and Colonel in 2002. He graduated from the Croatian Armed Forces War College "Ban Josip Jelacic" in 2007. In 1998, he completed the "Leaders for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" Course at the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies and was a Distinguished Graduate of the College of Strategic Studies and Defence Economics at the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies in 1996. He participated in many international and domestic activities and projects with institutions such as IISS London, CESS Gronningen, DCAF Geneva, NATO DC Rome, ISIG Gorizia, IMO Zagreb, CCMR Belgrade, CMR Podgorica, CSS Sarajevo, etc. Mr Mahecic contributed with his articles in assorted domestic and international security and defence-related magazines and publications He is now working at the Institute for International Relations (IMO) in Zagreb.

## Kosovo

**Florian Qehaja** is the Head of Operations and a Senior Researcher at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, a local think-tank in Pristina. He holds an MA in Contemporary European Politics from the University of Sussex in Brighton. He is also a lecturer assistant at the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations, at the University for Business and Technology (UBT) in Pristina. Mr. Qehaja is the author of several publications on the security matters and sector in Kosovo and wider.

## Macedonia

**Islam Yusufi** is a former Deputy National Security Adviser to the President of Macedonia and a founder of Analytica, a think-tank in Macedonia. He has also worked for the European Commission, the European Agency for Reconstruction and has served as a fellow at the Center for Policy Studies in Budapest, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC, the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, NATO in Brussels and UNESCO in Paris. He holds degrees in international relations and political science. The views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not represent the views of the organisations that he works for.

## Montenegro

**Rajko Radević** holds a degree in the International Studies from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, where he completed his postgraduate master studies in the International Security. Since 2007 he has been working as a researcher at the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights – CEDEM in Podgorica. His special interests include the security sector reform and Euro-Atlantic integrations. He is the author of several articles and analyses. In the publication *Strategic Doctrinal Framework of the Western Balkan Countries*, he is the author of the text on the *Strategic Doctrinal Framework of Montenegro*.

## Serbia

**Maja Bjeloš** is the Research Fellow of the Belgrade School of Security Studies at the Centre for Civil-Military Relations. She was appointed to her current position in July 2009. Before being appointed to the current position, she was the intern in the same organisation and she also attended the School of the European Security. Ms. Bjeloš is the author of several articles dealing with security issues, such as the European Security and Security Sector Reform in Serbia, mostly published in the CCMR publications.

She holds a BA in International Relations from the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia. Currently, she is completing her Master's Studies in the field of International Security at the same faculty. Special fields of interest include: International Relations, Peace Studies, Security Sector Reform in Serbia, European Union, gender issues.

## Comparative analysis

**Adel Abusara** is a BA in International Relations, the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade and he holds an MA in European Politics and Administration from the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium. He is currently working as a Research Fellow in the Centre for Civil-Military Relations. His main areas of interest and specialisation are: EU conditionality policy, EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, EU-NATO relations, issues of European identity, Europeanization etc.

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији  
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

327.56::351.88(497)(082)

351.86(497)(082)

351.74/.75(497)(082)

SECURITY Politics in the Western Balkans  
/ [editors] Miroslav Hadžić, Milorad Timotić  
and Predrag Petrović. - Belgrade : Centre for  
Civil-Military Relations, 2010 (Belgrade :  
Goragraf). - 189 str. : table ; 30 cm

Tiraž 500. - Authors' biographies: str.  
187-189. - Napomene i bibliografske reference  
uz tekst. - Bibliografija uz većinu radova.

ISBN 978-86-83543-86-1

а) Безбедност (политика) - Балканске државе  
- Зборници б) Национална безбедност -  
Балканске државе - Зборници с) Безбедносни  
сектор - Реформа - Балканске државе -  
Зборници

COBISS.SR-ID 175955724