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List of Abbreviations:

ARM – Army of Republic of Macedonia
DPA – Democratic Party of Albanians
DUI – Democratic Union for Integration
EC – European Commission
EU – European Union
EUPOL – European Union Police
FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IA – Intelligence Agency
ICITAP - International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
JNA – Yugoslav National Army
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP – National Democratic Party
NLA – National Liberation Army
OFA – Ohrid Framework Agreement
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDP-NDP – Party for Democratic Prosperity
PfP – Partnership for Peace
SAA – Stabilization and Association Agreement
SDSM – Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
UBK – Directorate for Security and Counter-Intelligence
UN – United Nations
UNPREDEP – United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
VMRO-DPMNE – VMRO Democratic Party for National Unity
Introduction

Broad Socio-Political Context


This paper looks at the general political and security sector context in the last two decades since Macedonian independence, and traces the major trends and events that shaped the political developments and progress with security sector reforms in post-communist Macedonia. For the purpose of this paper, the analysis of the post-communist transition period is divided in three parts, corresponding to the three periods on which we divided the context since 1991, for the sake of greater clarity and analytical coherence. For each of these three periods, we conducted an analysis of major political developments as well as institutional change. Based on this analysis, each period is qualified as characterised by a specific nature, whether post-authoritarian, conflict, post-conflict, or integrationist. In the Annex attached to this paper, a short overview of the key political actors and their role in the security sector reforms and the political transition in Macedonia is offered.

The first period analyzed is the period from the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, in 1991 until the ethnic conflict in 2001. These years mark the first decade of independent statehood and democratic politics in Macedonia. This period is particularly important since it sees the establishment of the Macedonian state, army, democratic and legislative institutions, which will shape later developments and the trajectory that Macedonia will follow in the years to come. The context during this period is predominantly post-authoritarian, due to the transition from communist to democratic political regime and the dominance of transitional issues on the political agenda. Some pre-conflict elements emerge during the late 1990s due to the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations and frequent ethnic incidents. However, ethnic concerns do not climb up on the political agenda until 2001.

The second period stretches from the ethnic conflict in 2001 until the NATO Summit in Bucharest in early 2008. The 2001 conflict had a profound impact
on the political and security context in Macedonia. It produced inter-ethnic violence and culminated in a far-reaching reform of the constitutional and institutional set-up of Macedonian democracy. It therefore marks the beginning of a new period of Macedonian politics, one where dominant issues are post-conflict concerns of reconstruction, disarmament and demobilization of armed troops, war crimes, and ethnic issues touching on constitutional, public administration and legal reforms. The dominant nature of the political context in this period is post-conflict. However, this period also witnesses the intensified activity towards EU and NATO integration and efforts to fulfil the necessary requirements in order to join these organizations, so it would be appropriate to point out to the integrationist nature of the political context during this period.

Finally, the last period is the short time after the 2008 Bucharest Summit of NATO. In 2008, Macedonia while having fulfilled the necessary requirements to join the Alliance, did not receive an invitation to become a NATO member, due to the veto that Greece invoked because of the name dispute. The Bucharest summit is an important event in Macedonian politics for two reasons. Firstly, it marks the successful efforts to reform the security sector after the 2001 conflict to an extent sufficient to become a member of NATO. This clearly points to a successful managing of post-conflict context challenges and therefore marks the end of the previous period of analysis. Secondly, the Bucharest summit is important since it did not result with Macedonia becoming a NATO member, as was the case with all previous post-communist states. This event indicates a different trajectory that Macedonia has taken when compared with other states in the region, not having resolved its problems with Greece almost two years after the Bucharest Summit. While this is a short period, it is rather distinct from the other two, and from what new developments have been analyzed it appears that this period is characterized by post-veto nationalism, the label which we use for the dominant political context in this period.
PERIOD 1: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO CONFLICT (1991–2001)

This part of the paper focuses on the general political and security developments in Macedonia during the first period of analysis between 1991 and 2001. The initial section deals with the general context during this period, paying special attention to two specific aspects that characterised Macedonian politics in this period: popular support to state-building and path-dependency in institution-building. It also presents an overview of the security sector and threats to security during this period. The following section focuses on institutional and sectoral analysis, outlining the major institutional and policy developments in the security sector.

1.1 General Context

The first period of post-communist politics in Macedonia is marked by two major events, which represent critical junctures. The first of these was secession from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and declaration of independence by plebiscite in September 1991 – marking the beginning of post-communist politics and sovereign statehood for Macedonia. Second, the ethnic conflict between Macedonian armed forces and ethnic Albanian armed groups in 2001 which, while brief, had a profound impact on the concepts of statehood and democracy in Macedonia as well as on the security sector and the wider security context including perception of threats and need for reforms. Since independence, there were a number of other junctures where Macedonian decision-makers could choose in which direction to steer Macedonian politics before 2001: institutional choices such as adopting a new Constitution in November 1991, changing the electoral laws, foreign policy choices, establishing diplomatic relations with international organizations and with neighbouring states, name and territorial disputes, and domestic policy choices such as reforming the public sector, privatisation, economic restructuring, and ethnic minorities policy. Perhaps the ethnic conflict could have been avoided had different decisions been made. With the advantage of hindsight, we can take a critical look back at this period and evaluate the impact that it had on the following periods and current developments in Macedonian politics in general, and in the security sector in particular.
Establishing a sovereign state in 1991 was truly a groundbreaking event in Macedonian politics and history. Before 1991, Macedonian experience with statehood was confined within the limits of the Yugoslav federation as one of the six constituent federal units, but coming short of actual sovereignty and independence. Therefore, for the political elites, as well as for the entire population, establishing a sovereign state was a historical event, one matched with an overwhelming enthusiasm as displayed in levels of public support on the independence referendum held on September 8, 1991 when more than 95% of those who voted supported independence.¹

One should note that the independence referendum was boycotted by the majority of the ethnic Albanian population in Macedonia, which although did not affect the outcome of the referendum it did pose some questions about the legitimacy of the newly-founded state among the different ethnic groups. Albanians were concerned about the status they would have in a new Macedonian state, fearing being relegated to a “minority” after decades of being a constituent nation in SFRY. Consensus among all groups in society (ethnic or other) on who the ‘people’ are and what the ‘state’ is, is one of the fundamental pre-conditions of establishing democracy according to most scholars of democratisation², so failing to bring on-board all ethnic groups at the moment of establishing statehood is a missed opportunity for placing Macedonian statehood on a foundation of initial consensus that did come to haunt the political elites in the years that followed.

Two aspects of the new statehood context are especially relevant for the present analysis and will be elaborated further: the popular enthusiasm - translated into strong support for state-building and related reforms, and the lack of statehood history which amounted to little institutional heritage to go back to when communism was discredited as official ideology.

### 1.1.1. Popular support to state-building

Much alike the other states that emerged out of communism on the eve of the 1990s, the Macedonian population entered the period of post-communist transition to democracy with great expectations. In the Macedonian

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case, perhaps even greater thanks to the excitement of establishing an independent state. From the present perspective of apathetic electorate and inactive governments, the period of the early 1990s seems to have been a window of opportunity for implementing many painful reforms in the public sector, from market regulation to security sector reforms. When elections turnout soared up to above 70% of the electorate and political parties could rally hundreds of thousands of citizens on city squares, a bold political leadership with daring reform programme could have achieved a lot. But the opportunity was missed. Looking at this period from a path-dependence perspective, the early 1990s and the first couple of democratic cabinets had the rare opportunity to make decisions that would set the trajectory for those that would follow. However, Macedonian political leadership of the 1990s can hardly be seen as bold and daring. The lukewarm privatisation efforts led to failed reconstruction of socialist economy and plunge in the living standards of the population while the public administration remained virtually unchanged from the mammoth structure of communist times. Instead, just like elsewhere in the region, political elites engaged in nationalist politics, exploring and re-discovering histories forbidden during communism, spending the political capital on symbolic issues, such as the name dispute with Greece, while failing to proceed with much-needed reforms and establishing closer relations with international organizations such as NATO and the EU. Such politics did not only amount to many missed opportunities for reform and the waste of precious political capital and public support, but by the end of the 1990s, the elites were faced with a shipwrecked economy, weak democracy, recalcitrant population, and no political capital for pursuing further reforms.

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6 Macedonia established diplomatic relations with the EU only in 1996, after the Preliminary Accord between Macedonia and Greece was signed in December 1995 under the auspices of the UN.
1.1.2. Path–dependency and institution building

Another problematic aspect of the early transition years was the lack of both democratic and statehood tradition and experience. The Macedonian state and democracy were built from scratch. A very common practice was borrowing models from other, mostly West European, states. The Constitution, the political and electoral systems, as well as many legislative solutions were copied from other states (a practice that never lost its appeal, especially with later Twinning projects of the EU) with little reflection over their applicability and the state’s capacity to implement them. Many of them (the Constitution, the electoral system etc.) later proved problematic and needed to be reformed.

The period after 1991 also marked the first Macedonian steps into democratic politics. With the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, the new Macedonian state was founded on democratic principles as enshrined in the 1991 Constitution. This translated into multiparty free elections where citizens could choose to vote for candidates from different political parties. Although some political fragmentation was inevitable, perhaps due to the majoritarian electoral system that was retained from communist times, Macedonia did not experience the splintering and fragmentation of political parties as some other post-communist states did. The two largest parties on the 1990 elections remained such for the next two decades (The Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) – which succeeded the former Communist Union of Macedonia; and VMRO the Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE)). Among the ethnic Albanian electorate the situation is a bit different, as the political parties which dominated the political scene in the 1990s (the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the National Democratic Party (NDP)) have all but disappeared in the post-2001 context while new political parties command the support of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia (Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA)). The elections, while never outright fraud, also never quite lived up to western democratic standards due to sporadic violent incidents, proxy and family voting or other irregularities. Other elements of democracy were at equally poor levels: civil society, while never stigmatized, was also never influential or accepted by the wider population as a means to controlling the work of

UNDP. "I will vote by myself, thank you" in Gender in Europe and CIS. Available at: http://europeandcis.undp.org/gender/show/30521F9A-F203-1EE9-B6D7F1FC3C89B37D
the government. The media were often under political influence, if never directly controlled, – both of which practises hold until today, which implies a worrisome conclusion about the lack of positive trend in the consolidation of Macedonian democracy.8

1.1.3. Security and security threats

The security sector, apart from the military, did not receive any special attention and was treated as the rest of the public administration, with a few superficial changes implemented during this period. The military was different since with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army (JNA) from Macedonian territory, Macedonia had no army. Thus, creating an Army was of highest priority as it was a matter of establishing full sovereignty and control over the territory as well as a necessity in times and place of great instability and threats to security. The Army of Republic of Macedonia (ARM) was created with personnel from JNA and members of the other security forces who joined the ranks of ARM. In the meantime, the president Kiro Gligorov invited UN preventive troops to patrol the new Macedonian borders along with ARM. UN troops remained in Macedonia until 1999.

In the internal political arena, the greatest security risk in this period relates to the inter-ethnic relations and the balance between the two largest ethnic communities in Macedonia: Macedonians and Albanians. The relations between the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian population deteriorated significantly in the course of the first decade after independence. Despite the participation of ethnic Albanian political parties in coalition governments since 1992, the major demands of the Albanian minority related to increased participation in the public administration, official Albanian language use and university education in Albanian, and constitutional recognition of Albanians as ‘constituent people’ or ‘founding people’ in the Macedonian state, have not been heeded. A number of violent incidents during the 1990s indicated tensions between the two communities and between the ethnic Albanian population and the state institutions in particular. In 1995 the police violently broke up the celebrations for the establishment of Albanian-language Tetovo University in Mala Recica village near Tetovo, while in 1997 special police units clashed with the masses demonstrating

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in the centres of Tetovo and Gostivar after the Albanian flags displayed in front of city halls were forcefully removed by the police. These, and many other smaller, incidents reveal that not only were inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia poor but also that the state security bodies had no capacity to deal with sensitive security situations and act preventively, on the contrary, the actions of the police and the special units further aggravated the situation.

Externally, the greatest security risks for Macedonia came from its neighbourhood. Macedonia’s recent statehood was questioned and challenged from many sides: Greece objected to the use of the name Macedonia and in return blocked Macedonia’s international recognition under that name while also blocking Macedonia’s membership in many international organizations until December 1995 when an Interim Accord was signed between Greece and Macedonia, and Macedonia could engage in international affairs under the reference FYROM. Bulgaria challenged the existence of Macedonian nation and Macedonian language, until in 1999 an inter-governmental agreement on the Macedonian and Bulgarian language was signed and the issue was dropped from the official agenda between the two states. The international border between Macedonia and Serbia was not marked until 2003, not to speak of the porous nature of that border on the strip with Kosovo and the failure of the Macedonian institutions to take full control of state territory (which triggered the conflict in 2001 when a journalist crew investigating claims of para-military forces taking control over the northernmost village on the border with Kosovo was abducted.) These security risks were not of a traditional military nature, but rather they threatened the identity and community (perceived as it was in ethnic terms). While few expected military clash with Greece and Bulgaria or Serbia/Kosovo, their attitudes towards Macedonia were taken seriously and to a great extent shaped the foreign (and domestic) policies of Macedonia as the question marks they placed over Macedonian statehood and its symbols remained even after efforts were made to overcome them. Even today the unresolved name dispute with Greece has serious ramifications on Macedonian foreign policy and more closely to security sector reforms, as that was the sole reason behind Macedonia’s failed NATO membership application. Insecurity fostered mistrust in the neighbours and that undermined regional cooperation, while trade embargoes from Greece and to Serbia harmed the Macedonian economy, as did the unresolved international recognition and the delays in membership in international organizations.
The result of the policies pursued by three government cabinets (of different ideological affiliation) during the first decade after independence, was a young and weak state, freshly out of a communist regime at the very start of democratisation, with weak and unconsolidated institutions, a ruined economy and a society polarized and divided on ethnic and political grounds. All of these amount to a strong post-communist (close to post-authoritarian) and ‘pre-conflict’ socio-political and security context.

1.2. Institutional/Sectoral Analysis

1.2.1. The Army

Quick mapping of the security sector in the initial period after the independence shows serious gaps and missing elements that required immediate attention. As already stated, just like elsewhere in the former Yugoslav republics, JNA withdrew and new army needed to be established. Between 1991 and 1992, when the newly elected president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, negotiated with Federal secretary for National Defence of SFRY, Blagoja Adzic, peaceful withdrawal of JNA from Macedonian territory, the remaining predominantly Serb and Montenegrin staffed JNA units were not considered by other security institutions, or political elites and the population, as part of the Macedonian security sector but more like a potential threat to the newly established independence and sovereignty of the Macedonian state. Moreover, and similar to elsewhere in former Yugoslavia, JNA took literally everything that could be taken including equipment, weaponry, materiel, supplies etc., leaving thus very scant infrastructure on which to build the new Macedonian army. The establishment of the Macedonian Army (ARM) started with the passing of the Law on Defence in February 1992 and the taking control over the borders and military objects in Macedonia which was completed soon, on March 27, 1992 as signed by the agreement between President Gligorov and JNA General Nikola Uzelac. The first ARM conscripts arrived in the barracks in April 1992 and took control over the Macedonian borders from the police.9

The capacity, human and technical, of the newly established ARM was regrettfully small. Even though ARM had officially taken over the control of the

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Macedonian borders, in the initial period while the recruits were undergoing basic training, the borders were guarded by professional, contracted, soldiers from the reserve units. The UN deployed a preventive mission in Macedonia – UNPREDEP, whose forces also assisted ARM in patrolling the borders until 1999. It takes a while to build an army from scratch, and so was the case with ARM, the building of whose capacity and potential took the best part of the 1990s. Most of the officers were actually former JNA officers socialized and trained in JNA, so perhaps the freedom to build the army on a new concept was not as great. Nevertheless, from the very beginning the objective was to create a modern and efficient army that could integrate well with collective security mechanisms in the region and wider. The results of these efforts could be seen already by the mid- to late-1990s, when in November 1995 Macedonia joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which meant a closer relation to NATO and as well as assistance in security and defence reform, and participation in and hosting of regional and international military exercises which happened in 1996 and 1997 respectively.¹⁰

In this period, the army was a rather young institution and not directly involved in providing security and interacting with the citizens. Therefore, ARM was not perceived in negative terms by the population as either corrupt or oppressive, although there are few resources to track the exact trend of popular trust in the military. Some scandals concerning ownership of army apartments and weapons procurement broke in the media, but in comparison to corruption scandals involving the police, political parties and government officials, the ARM comes off as a relatively transparent and trusted institution.

1.2.2. The Police

In the security vacuum of the early years of independence the police was the main security actor and provider in Macedonia. Before ARM took over the control over the borders in April 1992, the police was responsible for controlling them, since declaration of independence in September 1991, in addition to performing the regular police duties and providing security to citizens. During this time the police was overstretched in fulfilling all these tasks, considering its limited human and technical capacity (the police had only 6,000 members at the time). Those early efforts by the police to protect

¹⁰ Istorija na ARM. Ministerstvo za Odbrana na RM.
the borders and provide security for the newly independent Macedonian state made the police one of the most important political as well as security actors at the time.

The patriotic label that the police earned during the initial post-independence period did not translate into a general demand for reforms of the police. Unlike some other post-communist states, Macedonia did not proceed to dismantling the communist police apparatus, although there were some efforts at reforming the way the police worked. Until 1995, the work of the police was regulated by the old Law on Internal Affairs, dating back to Yugoslav times. Since the mid-1990s, the police have been subject to regular, if not intensive training in human rights, and rule of law, often funded and implemented by international organizations. These trainings were also aimed at improving the relations between the police and the growing sector of international organizations and NGOs in Macedonia. It is disputable how effective these training and reform efforts were, considering their incidental nature and the lack of follow-up. By the late 1990s, the regular Annual Ombudsman Reports confirmed that violation of human rights by the police was widespread, despite the efforts to train policemen in human rights.\footnote{Godisni izvestai za rabotata na Narodniot pravobranitel. Naroden pravobranitel na Republika Makedonija. Available at: http://www.ombudsman.mk/default.aspx?cld=104&Lan=MK} Over this decade, the numbers of the police grew, but recruitment was often not transparent and led to a phenomenon of politicization of the police, which will come to plague the work of the police and undermine reform effort in the following years.

\subsection*{1.2.3. Intelligence Services}

The 1995 Law on Internal Affairs provided for reforms in the intelligence sector, which during communist times was operating as part of the police. An Intelligence Agency (IA) was established as a separate body from the Directorate for State Security (UBK), a counter-intelligence body that during SFRJ existed as part of the Ministry of Interior. The Intelligence Agency was under double authority: of the President and the government, while UBK remained outside of presidential authority. This law instituted the basic principles of democratic oversight over the work of intelligence services. A Parliamentary Committee was named responsible for controlling the work of UBK and IA. This committee receives the annual reports of the work of intelligence services and, if necessary and the Parliament decides so, re-
ports can be discussed at a plenary session. Military intelligence was not integrated with the UBK and IA, and no cooperation between them was established on the operational level. Sharing information was possible only at the highest executive level. As a heritage from communist times, all intelligence institutions were perceived with mistrust by the larger population, in addition to which, very few of the reform efforts were publicized and little was done in terms of improving the image of these institutions in the eyes of the public. Thus for the better part of the early transition, the intelligence sector in Macedonia is not included in the early reforms along with the rest of the security sector.

At the executive level, the Constitution designates the President as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, while the management of the army and police is a responsibility of the government, in particular the Ministries of Defence and Interior. The political system in Macedonia is mixed, but the main executive powers are vested in the government, so the main policy decisions concerning security are made and implemented through governmental institutions – ministries and agencies. The President is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces, but his/her influence over policy is rather limited. In this period, while most of the governmental institutions are in place, the government lags in passing strategic security documents that would provide guidelines for reforms and policy development in the security sector. In the legislative branch, the Parliament is the responsible institution passing legislation as well as democratic oversight of the work of security actors. The legislative backbone is set with the Law on Defence and Law on Internal Affairs, in addition to which several other laws regulating the security sector were adopted, such as the Law on Borders and Border Areas, Law on Protection of Personal Information, and with the 1998 turnover of political power (from SDSM to VMRO-led government), the Law on Procedure for Personal Files led by State Security, with which access to these files was open to all who expressed a wish to see them.

The first period of analysis, spanning post-independence and pre-conflict years, is marked with post-communist and pre-conflict features of politics. The initial decade witnesses the establishment of basic state institutions and democratic practices after the fall of communism. This period also witnesses the establishment of the Macedonian army, as one of the major pillars of the Macedonian security sector, and initial efforts at transforming the rest of the security sector institutions into democratic security actors, although overall reform remains very limited.
PERIOD 2: 2001 – 2008: FROM OHRID TO BUCAREST

2.1. General context

The ethnic conflict between Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albanian rebels in the six months during spring and summer 2001 was a landmark event that opened a window for re-thinking a lot of the ideas on which Macedonian statehood and politics was based during the 1990s. By far, this was the greatest threat to Macedonian security since independence. Macedonian police, army, special units, intelligence and newly-founded paramilitary units both on the Macedonian and the Albanian side all engaged in the conflict - some of them for the first time in combat. The precariousness of the ethnic balance was revealed as well as the need for deeper intervention and reforms in the institutional set-up. The inconclusive end of the conflict and the need for external mediation revealed the lack of fighting and strategic capacity of Macedonian security forces as well as the lack of capacity of Macedonian institutions to peacefully resolve and mediate conflict. Therefore, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), brokered by the EU and US mediators, which was signed on August 13, 2001 by the leaders of the four largest political parties in Macedonia (SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE, DPA and PDP), provided for major reforms of the public sector: education, decentralization, language use, and the security sector.

2.1.1. The Ohrid Framework Agreement and post-conflict reforms

It is difficult to claim that there was a large popular demand for these reforms, apart from the decade-long demands of the ethnic Albanian population for greater inclusion in the public administration. The Ohrid Agreement reforms of the public sector were rather externally driven even if some of the political elites became aware of the need for reforms. The external involvement in the reform process continued (and perhaps even increased)

12 ARM units have participated in international peace-keeping missions before, but they have never engaged in combat. The equipment and weapons of both ARM and the Macedonian Police were obsolete and a lot of weapons and equipment were purchased and rented in the course of the short conflict.
as Macedonia expressed serious aspirations for joining the European Union and NATO, so the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement provisions was included in the political criteria against which Macedonia's progress was being evaluated. On the one hand this helped the implementation of the reforms due to the pull of conditionality, but on the other hand the ownership of the Ohrid reform process shifted to the EU and domestic elites often treated it as imposed by the EU not as an organic document agreed by domestic political leaders. In 2008, eight years after its signing, only about 44% of the Macedonian population feels the Ohrid agreement is a good solution for the ethnic problems in Macedonia (although in case of the ethnic Albanian population, this percentage is 70%).

The Ohrid Agreement instituted the principle of equitable representation in the public administration, which means ethnically-sensitive employment in public institutions in order to match the percentage of public employees from the smaller ethnic communities to their share in the population. This should make all public institutions more representative of ethnicity. In the security sector more substantial reforms were required, so international organizations assisted the Macedonian government in implementing police and army reforms, with EU, NATO and OSCE leading the efforts to reform the Macedonian police and army. The Army was restructured according to NATO standards as part of the integration effort. This included the rationalization of equipment according to NATO efficiency standards. It also led to the professionalization of ARM in 2004. The years between 2002 and 2007 saw the most active reforms in the area of defence, as provided by the National Strategy for NATO membership, and a number of other legal and strategic documents that were adopted in the security sector including the National Security Concept, the Defence Doctrine and amendments to the 1991 Law on Defence as well as passing of other related legislation. The implementation of the reforms, while not perfect, advanced well and by the end of 2007, Macedonian progress with defence reforms, as well as the other political criteria for NATO membership, was positively evaluated and Macedonia was deemed ready for NATO membership. Reforming the police proved more difficult than reforming the military, even though the EU contributed to police reforms through its police mission (EUPOL Proxima)


in Macedonia. EUPOL Proxima was meant to evaluate the need for reforms and assist the Macedonian government with expertise on police reforms, but many of the proposed reforms were politically sensitive and were stuck in the legislative or implementation process. The 2006 Police Law, as well as the new 2009 Police Law, was politically contentious and could barely get pass the Parliament. Decentralizing police competences and transferring police authorities to the local level was controversial in the post-conflict context as trust in the police was still being rebuilt.

Reforms in the public and security sectors were combined with introducing decentralization and gradual increase in the competencies of the local government in many areas, from education and urbanism to fiscal policy, but more importantly for this analysis, the local government was also granted some authority in the realm of police and public security. This marked the efforts at bridging the gap between the police and the local communities, which were now meant to have a greater say in who is in charge and what the police is to do about their concerns.

Much less attention was paid to reforming the other parts of the security sector (intelligence, private security companies etc.) as these years saw a surge in reforms in many areas so if an issue or area was not high on the EU and NATO agenda it would have likely been neglected and fallen down on the agenda. Macedonian politics in these years was markedly oriented towards integration in international organizations, mainly NATO and the EU. Macedonia joined NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999, and was a member of the Partnership for Peace since 1995. However, the real prospects for NATO membership opened after 2002 with the signing of the Adriatic Charter in 2003, when the Adriatic Three group – Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, was established and efforts at fulfilling the membership requirements intensified.

2.1.2. Reforms and integration efforts

At about the same time, EU integration efforts also heightened, especially after the EC launched the Stabilization and Association process for the Western Balkans. Macedonia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement intended to bring the country closer to the EU mainstream in 2001, applied for EU membership in 2004, and was awarded candidate status in late 2005. After that, the accession process stalled since three consecutive Progress Reports of the EC failed to recommend start of the accession
While the delays are due to the government’s half-hearted efforts at fulfilling the requirements of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and the eight benchmarks of 2008, they also tend to retard the reform momentum and dilute the effects of conditionality. Since the 2006 elections and the new VMRO-DPMNE led cabinets the pace of EU-related reforms has slowed and no further progress towards accession has been made.

In addition to efforts towards EU and NATO integration, Macedonian politics of the post-Ohrid period has also been marked by the consequences of the 2001 conflict and the challenges of post-conflict society. One of the major problems and security threats of post-conflict politics was handling extra-institutional armed groups from both sides. One of the first measures at reconciliation and re-integration undertaken by the then-president Boris Trajkovski was to bestow amnesty upon all who took part in the conflict but did not commit crimes against humanity (in which case they would need to face either Macedonian or international courts). But amnesty did not provide a sustainable solution to the problem of integration of former combatants and the large amounts of small (and big) weapons freely circulating among conflict veterans and criminals. These presented potential threat to the security of Macedonian citizens and potential increase in crime rates. Conflict veterans from the para-military units joined the police after short training courses. This did not add to the better quality of the services provided by the police or to the greater citizen trust in the police, which remained the same despite the ongoing reforms during these years.

In the immediate post-conflict period there were efforts to collect the illegal weapons used during the conflict through NATO missions Essential Harvest and Amber Fox, but neither was overly successful, as the number of collected weapons was much smaller than their estimated number. NATO remained present in Macedonia until 2003 when the Allied Harmony mission mandate was taken over by the EU. The EU mission was civilian and did not

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17 Trust in the police in 2003 was 61%, according to UNDP Early Warning Report, No.1, 2003. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN016469.pdf and with minor ups and downs remained about the same until 2008 when a total 58% of the population trusted the police, according to Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2008.
concern collection of weapons, as that issue was deemed solved by previous NATO missions.

Apart from the direct security threats stemming from the excess of available weapons and people willing to use them, the post-conflict period also saw softer threats to security – mostly in the increasing social distance between the ethnic groups in Macedonia. The nature of the Ohrid Agreement was such that it allocated rights on collective grounds\textsuperscript{18}, to groups rather than individuals, which shifted Macedonian democracy further away from liberal principles towards collective kind of consociational democracy\textsuperscript{19}. The undeniable advantage of this trend was the increased access to political power and participation to members of minority ethnic communities; however Macedonian politics was becoming increasingly ethnicized, as ever more issues on the political agenda were framed in ethnic terms and the double majority principle of decision-making (popularly known as the Badinter Principle) was very frequently used.\textsuperscript{20} This threatens to turn Macedonian politics into zero-sum game between the two largest ethnic groups, despite the fact that as a rule all Macedonian governments are coalitions between a Macedonian and an Albanian political party. The ethnicization of politics can lead to a nationalist backlash as political actors compete to win the electorate's support and thus to potential back-rolling of democratic reforms and integrationist policies. Another by-product of the ethnic conflict was the emergence of conflict veterans as a new actor in the security sector and in politics in general. Former members of National Liberation Army (NLA) and Macedonian para-militaries joined the police and created unions and associations, whose interests and demands were calculated in the complex equation of Macedonian domestic politics.

\textsuperscript{18} For instance, the rights to use other languages than the Macedonian language as official are granted to ethnic communities who constitute more than 20\% of the population in the given municipality. See Ohrid Framework Agreement: http://www.siofa.gov.mk/images/dokumente/Ramkoven\%20dogovor.pdf

\textsuperscript{19} The Ohrid Framework Agreement introduced power-sharing institutional mechanisms, such as proportional representation, equitable representation, double majority voting on certain issues in parliament, and extensive decentralization, which resemble the features of consociational democracies as described by Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), and his later works on the same topic.

\textsuperscript{20} The Badinter principle requires double majority – an absolute majority plus a majority of the MPs from the non-majority ethnic groups, for adopting legislation in areas sensitive for ethnic relations, such as: education, culture, local government, personal documents, languages use etc.
To summarize, the general socio-political context in Macedonia between 2001 and 2008 shows features of both post-conflict and integration contexts. In other words, the measures to recover from the ethnic conflict in 2001 and return to peace-time politics were combined with efforts aimed at integrating Macedonia in international organizations such as EU and NATO, a combination featuring increased reform activity in the public and security sectors.

2.2. Institutional/Sectoral Analysis:

The conflict in 2001, as brief as it was, revealed all the shortcomings and weak points of Macedonia’s security sector. In the first instance, it showed that Macedonia had no functioning crisis management mechanism in place, as it was not instantly clear whose responsibility it is to respond to the threats. Indeed, the Crisis Management Centre was established in 2006, and before that nobody was responsible for information-gathering, early warning, and management of crises. The lack of integration between the different security actors was also apparent, as cooperation between the police and the army, as well as the intelligence and military intelligence services was established only on the highest executive level, at the government and National Security Council meetings, while at operational and logistic level there was little cooperation. Moreover, armed units (army, police, reserves, except special units), lacked appropriate arms, equipment and skills to engage in combat and guerrilla warfare. Even though the government arranged quick procurements of weapons and equipment for the needs of the security forces, the military and police leadership displayed a lack of strategic knowledge and experience as most victims among the security forces were killed in ambush (8 policemen in Vejce in May 2001 and 10 soldiers in Karpalak in August 2001) due to insufficient surveillance and support. Finally, large part of the ethnic Albanian policemen and soldiers left the security forces to join their fellow Albanians among the rebel troops thus showing a stronger loyalty to the ethnic group rather than the state. This pointed to a deeper societal problem of double loyalties among the members of the security forces, even if in terms of numbers this did not affect the manpower of Macedonian security forces since until 2001 there were very few ethnic Albanians there.

The above long list of shortcomings of Macedonia’s security sector points to some of the directions in which security sector reform was conducted after the conflict and how the security sector was restructured afterwards.
The conflict also gave rise to new actors in the security sector, most prominent of which are the para-military troops that fought on both sides, NLA and Lavovi, as well as the conflict veterans, who later joined politics or exert pressure on political leaders.

One of the major tasks after the end of conflict was disarmament and demobilization of troops as well as police and army reform in accordance to the provisions of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). The former was done with the assistance of NATO, as the more credible institution among the ethnic Albanian population in order to convince as many NLA members as possible to surrender their weapons. Despite such efforts, NATO’s Essential Harvest mission collected less than the essential part of the weapons\(^{21}\), many of which remained in illegal possession among former fighters and made it to the criminal circles. The situation was similar with the weapons of Macedonian para-military troops, whom the police did not manage to fully disarm. The weapons collected after the conflict, were destroyed. Demobilization was made easier by the amnesty that President Trajkovski proclaimed on all who had taken part in the conflict, unless they have engaged in war crimes and crimes against humanity in which case they would be taken to court.

As a solution for re-integration of former NLA and Lavovi members, many were quickly re-trained to join the police. In line with the OFA provisions, all public institutions needed to become more representative of the ‘non-majority communities’ so more Albanians needed to be recruited by the police. The first cohorts of Albanian policemen joined the police by the end of 2001, after a short training provided by US Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), in order to establish multi-ethnic police units to patrol the areas which the NLA controlled during the conflict.\(^{22}\) Later, other international organizations joined to assist the Ministry of Interior in training the new police recruits and pursuing other reforms in the police, namely OSCE and the EU, which dispatched the first police mission Proxima to Macedonia in 2003. These reforms were aimed at a comprehensive makeover of the modus operandi of Macedonian police including strengthening of regional coopera-

\(^{21}\) Essential Harvest Force collected 3,381 piece of weapons, which was evaluated by NATO as about two thirds of the total NLA arsenal. See Statement of Lord Robertson at the NATO Press Centre in Skopje held at September 25, 2001. Available at: http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/2001/t010925a.htm

tion, improving public trust, effective fight with crime and corruption etc. Overall, in the years that followed the 2001 conflict substantial attention and resources, domestic and foreign, were committed to police reforms, which inevitably led to improved capacity, human and technical, of the police. In 2003, a new Police Academy was established to replace the Security Faculty, which was closed in 1999, as the place to train new policemen. In 2004 the Border Police was established to replace ARM in patrolling the borders and the border belts and from 2005 onwards, as the relations with the EU intensified, further efforts at integrated border management, document security and freedom of movement were implemented as part of the processes of visa facilitation and visa liberalization with the EU. The police was also affected with reforms in other areas in post-conflict Macedonia, such as decentralization and public administration reform, so the 2006 Law on Police introduced new principles of work in the police, such as new human resources management practices of more transparent recruitment and evaluation, while significant authority was given to the local government in decisions related to local policing and local security including a say in the selection of local police chiefs.

The reforms resulted with more intense relations between the police with other actors in the security sector and society. The police opened up for cooperation with international organizations and their expert teams who were responsible for evaluating the work and conducting trainings. Moreover, since police reform became a higher priority on the political agenda, it also attracted the attention of civil society and the academic community which approached the police more often in pursuit of information, expertise and assistance. With the creation of the Border Police a number of ARM members joined the ranks of the police and the relations between the two main pillars of Macedonia’s security sector were further aimed to be strengthened with the establishment of the Crisis Management Centre in 2006 a body that would better structure the response of state bodies in times of crisis and contribute to better integratedness of the entire security sector. Efforts were made to increase the public trust in the police, especially among ethnic minorities with the establishment of the multi-ethnic police units, as well as among the wider population. The indicators of the period between 2001 and 2007 show no significant increase in public trust in the police, rather Early Warning Reports suggest that public trust in the police was on the decline in these years.23

The intelligence services were the least touched by the ongoing police reforms. Part of EU’s Proxima mission evaluated the work of these institutions and conducted trainings for operational and strategic improvement of their work, however, the government and the ministry did not follow the recommendations with necessary regulation and legislation. No new legislation was adopted to address the work and status of the intelligence services or reform them following democratic principles of work. The Law on Internal Affairs was not amended with new provisions for the intelligence services and neither was a separate law passed to regulate their work, so the intelligence services remain governed by the 1995 law provisions.

In this period, the work of private security agencies came to be regulated. With the 1999 Law on Protection of Persons and Property, the framework for their work is adopted and later amended in 2007 in order to further regulate the licensing, authority and training of these agencies and regulatory bodies are established (Chamber for protection of persons and property). Despite legal provisions preventing the work of policemen and former policemen in private security agencies, these agencies foster close relations with the police facilitating the flow of information from the police to the private agencies. In addition, private security agencies are also linked to political parties, thanks to which affiliation they strengthen their share of the security services market. Currently there are about 30 registered private security agencies in Macedonia. Their rise suggests the increasing link between security and the private sector, in general, of which private security agencies are just one instance. The public has often questioned the rights and obligations given to these agencies by the above-mentioned law.

The period after 2001 also saw intensified reforms in the military. Thanks to the rise of NATO integration as a top national priority, much attention and resources were devoted to improving the capacity of the military and adjusting the military sector to the international, mostly NATO, standards in this area. The government conducted a Strategic Defence Review in May 2003, which led to the adoption of the new National Security Strategy (National conception for security and defence) as well as the Policy Framework that same year. This legal framework aimed to reshape the military from territorial defence to deployability and sustainability. Joining the Membership Action Plan after the Washington summit of NATO in 1999 Macedonia was allowed to benefit from NATO programmes for assistance for membership and the government stared preparing Annual NATO Membership

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Programmes from 1999-2000 onward, to guide the reforms in the military sector. In the following years the size of the army was reduced, from 40,000 in 1999 to 3,494 in 2007, and by 2006-7 the army was professionalized abolishing the concept of a conscript army, while obsolete weapons and equipment were replaced with NATO compatible technology.\(^{25}\) Re-training programmes were provided for the redundant officers since 2005 with the support of foreign donors, to allow for faster re-integration of former military personnel in civil life. The image of the army was further improved when Macedonian troops and units were sent on international missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and later to EU’s Althea mission in Bosnia, which improved their interoperability and experience, strengthened relations with international partners and promoted an image of a professional and efficient army at home.

Public trust in the army has always been higher than in the police, and in 2008 about 70% of the population had some or a lot of trust in the army\(^{26}\), which is the second highest in the region after Kosovo. Admittedly, the army has the advantage of rarely engaging in contact with ordinary citizens, its work being focused mostly on international missions, and thus these perceptions are based less on personal contact than on what is served by the media. However, the fact remains that the army has become one of the most trusted institutions in Macedonia.

Post-2001 governments paid substantial attention to public sector reforms within the guidelines of the OFA, security sector included. Most of the strategic and legislative documents necessary for the implementation of reforms, as well as for progress with EU and NATO membership have been adopted without major problems within governing coalitions or in the Parliament. In addition to the existing laws and strategic documents, such as the White Book of Defence and Defence Strategy, in the post-2001 period the government and parliament adopted Strategic Defence Review, National Concept for Security and Defence, while the Defence Strategy was missing. The only exception was the Law on Police, which was politically sensitive in the context of the decentralization process, but thanks to EU pressures was adopted in 2006, and introduced some of the necessary reforms in the work of the police.

To summarize, the main features of the period between 2001 and 2008 are post-conflict and integrationist. In the aftermath of the 2001 ethnic conflict,


\(^{26}\) Gallup Balkan Monitor. 2008.
Macedonia adopted many reform of the political system, the public sector and the security sector that were provided in the Ohrid Framework Agreement but also those required for EU and NATO integration. With external support of NATO and EU further reforms of the army and the police have been implemented, and initial steps were taken to regulate the work of private security companies. Intelligence services received the least attention in terms of reform.
PERIOD 3: 2008 – PRESENT: POST – VETO NATIONALISM

It is a long road to walk from Ohrid to Bucharest, the difficulty of which becomes even more apparent when upon arrival one is faced with the closed gates of Bucharest. In April 2008 Bucharest hosted the NATO summit where the Adriatic Three (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) were expected to receive invitations to join the alliance. However, due to the unresolved dispute about its name with Greece – a full member of NATO, Macedonia was not invited to join NATO. Membership was postponed until the name dispute is solved. The Bucharest Summit veto was a watershed event in Macedonian politics, one with multiple ramifications.

First, the veto prevented Macedonia from joining NATO and further aligning its security sector development to the Euro-Atlantic trends in this area. Having fulfilled the membership requirements for joining NATO before the Bucharest Summit, Macedonia is not anymore subject to conditionality and therefore the incentive to continue with reforms of the security sector is decreased significantly. Second, the veto threatened to discredit the entire reform discourse based on the assumption that painful reforms need to be implemented and endured by the population because they will be rewarded with better living standards in future and country’s membership in international organizations. The veto in Bucharest proved the opposite. Governments could not rely anymore on the same argument when insisting on pushing a demanding reform agenda. Some of the political elites immediately picked up on this rhetoric and government officials and commentators could be heard claiming that regardless of the progress made Macedonian further accession into EU will also be blocked by Greece. While this may be true, promoting such defeatist arguments only serves as an excuse for not doing much of reforms and fanning the wave of popular discontent. Third, Greek demands to change the constitutional name and the veto in Bucharest regretfully did not lead to a more constructive stand towards the name dispute but rather to the opposite. At present, an overwhelming 95.8% of the ethnic Macedonian population would rather not join NATO and the EU if that would imply changing the name of the state.27 Such attitudes may lead to a decreased support for EU and NATO integration and a shift in Macedonian foreign policy away from Euro-Atlantic integration.

Perhaps the most ominous consequence of the Bucharest veto is the nationalist backlash in domestic politics. In a country which has a recent history of ethnic conflict promoting nationalism can be very dangerous, as minority groups can feel excluded and threatened by the rising wave of nationalism among the majority population. In addition, the nationalist rhetoric among the elites in one group is bound to cause equally nationalist response in other ethnic groups, thus spurring a vicious circle of nationalism and hatred. The recent turn to ancient history and quasi-scientific re-discoveries of the ancient roots of the Macedonian nation is a move in this direction. Nationalist rhetoric is more attractive for the population than reform talk, so many of the necessary reforms in the public sector have been pushed into the background, as the government is focused on patriotic issues. Patriotic rhetoric and issues relating to the ‘name dispute’ with Greece often push issues concerning security sector reform in the background. A recent draft Law on Internal Affairs providing for an increased authority of the intelligence services, which followed a major increase in the budget of the intelligence service at the beginning of the year, saw very little public attention and debate about the implication of such law.

3.1. Institutional/Sectoral Analysis

In the brief period after 2008 there are few notable changes in the set up of the security sector in Macedonia, but which could set new trends in the security sector. One of the major events that brought the security sector to public attention was the increase in the budget of the intelligence service, especially UBK, in the 2009 budget, a controversial decision also from an economic point of view since 2009 budget was negotiated in the middle of world economic crisis, whose devastating consequences were also felt in Macedonia. Despite the crisis, the budget of UBK was increased to 25 million euro, on top of what UBK was allocated in the budget of the Ministry for Interior, for which amount it is very difficult to establish how it is spent, since the public, or even the Parliament have very limited authority over the spending of UBK. The effectiveness of parliamentary oversight over intelligence services will further be analyzed in a paper on parliamentary oversight over the security sector. This is not a unique instance since budgetary record in the past two years shows that military budget was cut twice in order to increase the budget of the Ministry of Interior.28 In addition to

the budget cuts, the status of the army and professional soldiers has also been contentious. From late 2008 until mid 2009 the professional soldiers held peaceful protest against the draft law on army service, which limited their right to work in the army to 9 years and limits their opportunities and benefits after the termination of their service. Such imbalance between the funding of the military and the police, and especially the intelligence services, points to an increase in police power in the state which runs counter to democratic principles of governance.

Another worrying trend is the limited democratic control and oversight of the intelligence services. In the course of the last almost fifteen years the work of the UBK was regulated by the 1995 Law on Internal Affairs which contains several broad articles providing general guidelines on the nature of its work and parliamentary oversight over it. The law left substantial margins of discretion to the Director of UBK and the government to decide on the work and structure of this body. In addition, parliamentary control, while never too strong, had gotten increasingly weak as in the last two years the parliamentary committee for control of the work of the intelligence services has been under-functional since the intelligence leadership has paid no heed to the call for greater accountability in front of the public and UBK Director never appeared in front of the Parliament. Some concerns are raised about the members of the parliamentary committee overseeing the work of the intelligence service, as committee vice-president Rexhep Dauti – Leka and committee member Hisen Xhemaili are under investigation for war crimes during the 2001 conflict, Xhemaili avoiding the police and courts for the last several years.

Overall the political and security context in Macedonia in the last couple of years raises some concerns about the irreversible nature of democratic consolidation and security reform. The halt in NATO and EU integration has opened the door for nationalist politics and the decreased international pressure has led to neglect of reforms and democratic principles of work, potentially endangering the entire security sector reform process in Macedonia.
Conclusions

This paper examined the general political context of post-communist Macedonia with particular emphasis on the security sector context. The paper looked in general at the political trends and developments in Macedonia since 1991, zooming in on those aspects of the political context that bear special relevance to security sector reforms. The analysis was divided on three periods: the first from 1991 to 2001, the second from 2001 to 2008 and the third after 2008. Each of these periods is distinct for the dominant issues and challenges differ throughout the years, and so does the dominant nature of the political context.

The initial decade after independence saw the establishment of independent Macedonian state, as well as the reform and creation of the crucial security institutions such as the army and the police, including the intelligence services. The insecure regional environment combined with weak domestic institutions and spoiled inter-ethnic relation produce an unstable security environment resulting with a pronounced post-authoritarian and pre-conflict nature of the political context.

The second period is post-conflict as the greatest attention is paid to challenges posed by the post-conflict political and security environment. This demanding environment is complemented by increased effort at integration in international organizations, mainly NATO and the EU, thus doubling the efforts of domestic political and security actors to pursue required reforms. This period testifies to the successful combination of post-conflict with integrationist political context. It shows the complementary nature of reforms required for overcoming conflict legacies and those for gaining membership in international organizations.

The final period after 2008 points to the rise of nationalism and shifts towards more closed politics in Macedonia after the Greek veto at the NATO summit in 2008. The veto caused a slowdown in security related reforms, as well as in many other policy areas and retarded the pace of reforms required for EU integration as well. This period, whose dominant context can be labelled nationalist, shows that the upward trajectory of post-communist transition cannot be taken for granted. The Macedonian case shows how NATO and EU membership are not always or necessarily the next step after post-communist transition and post-conflict reconstruction marking the end of the transition journey. This is a unique feature of Macedonian politics among the other states in the Western Balkans region, placing the
entire question of political and security sector reforms in a more open development-democratization framework.

To summarize, since independence Macedonia has undergone three periods of political and security transformation. The initial one, between 1991 and 2001, can be categorized as predominantly post-authoritarian. It saw limited reforms in the security sector as issues concerning independent statehood and international recognition were of higher priority on the governments’ agendas. During the first period, inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia deteriorated and led to the ethnic conflict in 2001. The second period between 2001 and 2008, covers the time from the ethnic conflict in 2001 until the 2008 NATO summit when Macedonia was expected to receive invitation for NATO membership. The main features of this period are post-conflict and integrationist, as a number of important reforms in the security sector: police, army, intelligence, PSC were introduced during this period in order to re-build inter-ethnic trust as well as fulfil the membership requirements for NATO and EU. The final period, from 2008, marks the decline of security sector reforms and intensified nationalist rhetoric, as a result of the problems faced in gaining NATO membership and opening EU accession negotiations because of the name dispute with Greece.
## Analysis of Key Political Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Actor</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Capabilities</th>
<th>Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>VMRO-DPMNE political party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party: democratic, supportive of constitutional design.</td>
<td>Political orientation: conservative, nationalist. Motivation: access to power, overthrow of remnants of previous regime</td>
<td>Democratic and institutional means of politics. Pronounced used of media campaigning since 2006. In general respects human rights and democracy, with minor undemocratic instances of governance since in power from 2006.</td>
<td>From 1990-2002 old pro-nationalist anti-communist part of population. Since 2006 wider base of transition losers and unemployed youth. Diverse supporters, cohesive ruling group under authoritarian lead of Nikola Gruevski. Since 2006, coalition leader in government, greatest power to affect the pace of reforms.</td>
<td>Until 2006, main allies include groups of anti-communist intellectuals and media. Since 2006 the allies include NGOs, businesses etc. Main opponents: SDSM and its supporters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### SDSM political party

**Political party:** democratic, supportive of constitutional design.

**Political orientation:** Social democratic, successor to old communist party.

**Motivation:** access to power.

**Democratic and institutional means of politics.**

In general respect human rights. Earlier in the 1990s some instances of undemocratic governance (problematic elections etc.).

**Early to mid 1990s wide support among the population and other institutions, including security sector. Declining popular support recently.**

Inherited developed organizational network, but after 2004 decline in cohesiveness of the party.

Currently in opposition, minor capacity to slow down reform.

**Main allies during 1990s domestic actors:** security, business, new business elites, media; international actors. Recently: declining support in security and business community as well as media.

**Main opponents:** VMRO-DPMNE and anti-communist intellectuals.

### DUI political party

**Political party:** democratic, at times anti-constitutional design.

**Political orientation:** centre-left, political successor to NLA.

**Motivation:** access to political power, increased collective rights to ethnic Albanian population.

**Mostly democratic means of politics, at times resorts to extra-institutional opposition and threats for violence.**

Plags support for human rights and democracy, at times engaged in electoral violence and fraud.

**After 2001 major part of the ethnic Albanian population, including intellectuals and media.**

Cohesive organization, less cohesive supporters.

Largest ethnic Albanian party, after OFA and double majority principle has major power to affect the pace of reforms.

**Main allies:** NLA veterans, international community.

**Main opponents:** DPA and its supporters.
### DPA political party

| Political party: democratic, at times anti-constitutional design. | Political orientation: right-of-centre, successor of more radical wing of PDP (first post-1990 Albanian party). Motivation: access to political power, increased collective rights to ethnic Albanian population. | Mostly democratic and institutional means of politics, with exceptional extra institutional instances of opposition. Pledges support for human rights and democracy, at times engaged in electoral violence and fraud. | Since mid-1990s had widest support of ethnic Albanian population, since 2002 in decline. Party cohesiveness is declining and so is popular support. In 2008 a fraction left the party to establish a new party (DR) draining popular and political support from DPA. Until recently was the second largest ethnic Albanian party, and with some power to affect reforms. | Main allies: part of the Albanian business community and a fraction of ex-NLA veterans. Main opponents: DUI and its supporters. |

### MRTV State Media

<p>| Regime supportive actor | Political orientation: during 1990s, state media supported the government and ideology: social democratic, a tradition that continued with the change of political parties in power. Motivation: access to state budget support. | Informing the public and spreading the message that the parties in power want. Limited democratic credential due to strong link with ruling elites and questionable commitment to independence of media. | In the early 1990s MRTV was the single source of information in many parts of the state, but as private media grew MRTV lost its support. A lot if its staff has left, but the staff is generally cohesive along political party lines. Limited capacity to influence pace of reforms as it follows official government lines. | Main allies: government, political parties in power. Main opponents: no opponents but rather competition with private media. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Private Media</strong></th>
<th><strong>Conflict Veterans</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mostly demo-</strong></td>
<td><strong>Limited com-</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>cratic.</strong></td>
<td><strong>mitment to</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political orientation:</strong></td>
<td><strong>democracy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>various, some pro-</td>
<td>national, rightist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government, some</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anti-government,</td>
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<tr>
<td>depending on the</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ownership structure.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>economic gain, share of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the media market,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>popular trust.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative journalism, propaganda, agenda-setting, opinion promotion.</td>
<td>Method of action: association, protest, membership in political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall, solid record of human rights reporting, especially in the recent decade, and with minor exceptions, pro-democratic stance and reporting.</td>
<td>Respect of human rights: very limited, as conflict veterans are accused and investigated for human rights violations during the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since mid- and late 1990s growing support among the population. As a group private media are not cohesive and often engage in mutual attacks. Journalists protect common interest through their association. Some capacity to influence the pace of reforms, by influencing the public perception of policies, and agenda setting.</td>
<td>Democratic credentials: Limited, apart from popular support during the conflict. Support base: Among the nationalist part of the population, in particular friends and families of conflict victims. Group cohesion: Not cohesive. Macedonian veterans divided between those who joined regular security forces and those who didn't. Albanian veterans the same, plus division over party political lines. Some influence over the pace of security reforms due to possession of weapons and still existing networks between members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main allies: depending on the ownership structure, political parties, single politician, private enterprises. Main opponents: competing media houses.</td>
<td>Main allies: some political actors: for Macedonian veterans Ljube Boskovski, for Albanian veterans mostly DUI. Main opponents: there is still rivalry between members of the regular security forces and conflict veterans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Business Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime actors, but not too democratic</th>
<th>Political orientation: depending on the party in government, Overall, during 1990s majority supported SDSM which administered the privatization. Recently, more private sector actors support VMRO government.</th>
<th>Method of political action: financing political parties and electoral campaign in exchange for preferential treatment.</th>
<th>Human rights and democratic credentials: no specific commitment, although some instances of violation of workers’ rights have occurred.</th>
<th>No wide popular support base, but large financial base on disposal and support among politicians.</th>
<th>Surprisingly large influence over security reforms, one Interior Minister and one UBK Director come from the business community.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation: primarily, economic gain; political influence, as a means to greater economic gain.</td>
<td>Method of political action: financing political parties and electoral campaign in exchange for preferential treatment.</td>
<td>Human rights and democratic credentials: no specific commitment, although some instances of violation of workers’ rights have occurred.</td>
<td>Motivation: primarily, economic gain; political influence, as a means to greater economic gain.</td>
<td>Method of political action: financing political parties and electoral campaign in exchange for preferential treatment.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## International Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro-democratic</th>
<th>Political orientation: most with no particular political orientation, however some donors and foundations do prefer working with political actors from one end of the political spectrum.</th>
<th>Method of political action: pressure and conditionality, assistance (technical, expert, financial), support for specific population groups and ngos.</th>
<th>Respect for human rights and democracy: very committed to respect for human rights, some with juridical authority over this area (ICTY), and support and promotion of democracy.</th>
<th>Support base: civil sectors, intellectuals and limited popular support.</th>
<th>Substantial leverage over the pace of security reforms, thanks to financing the reforms and political conditionality for membership.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivation: stabilization and security of the region and Macedonia; democratic consolidation.</td>
<td>Method of political action: pressure and conditionality, assistance (technical, expert, financial), support for specific population groups and ngos.</td>
<td>Respect for human rights and democracy: very committed to respect for human rights, some with juridical authority over this area (ICTY), and support and promotion of democracy.</td>
<td>Motivation: stabilization and security of the region and Macedonia; democratic consolidation.</td>
<td>Method of political action: pressure and conditionality, assistance (technical, expert, financial), support for specific population groups and ngos.</td>
<td>Motivation: stabilization and security of the region and Macedonia; democratic consolidation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main allies: civil sector, political parties (some more than others).</td>
<td>Main opponents: no significant opponents, marginal groups advocating against membership in NATO and EU.</td>
<td>Main opponents: no significant opponents, marginal groups advocating against membership in NATO and EU.</td>
<td>Main allies: civil sector, political parties (some more than others).</td>
<td>Main opponents: no significant opponents, marginal groups advocating against membership in NATO and EU.</td>
<td>Main opponents: no significant opponents, marginal groups advocating against membership in NATO and EU.</td>
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Opening note on the Chronology

This document is a product of project “Mapping and Monitoring of Security Sector Reform in the Western Balkans”, and contains a chronology of the most important events related to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Macedonia from 1991 to 2009. These are the events which outlined the context of SSR in Macedonia.

1991

- Kiro Gligorov was elected as the first President of independent Macedonia by the Assembly. This mode of election was done according to the existing rules from the previous regime.

- Macedonia held its referendum on independence on 8 September. The choice was for the citizens to claim whether they were in favor of Macedonia as a sovereign independent state, with the right to enter a future federation with the other Yugoslav republics.29 On the grounds of the results from this referendum, the Assembly adopted the Declaration for International Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, demanding for international recognition.30


- The first government of the independent Republic of Macedonia was formed, headed by Nikola Kljusev. This was a provisional government, created to govern in the period before the new Parliament (formed after the November 1990 elections) created the new post-federal government. The winning party, however, VMRO-DPMNE could not rally enough support in Parliament for its cabinet, since it refused to enter into a coalition with other parties.

- The new constitution of Republic of Macedonia was adopted by the Assembly on 17 November. This was the first constitution of independent Macedonia, and is still in force.

1992

- Macedonia’s Constitution was evaluated in January 1992 by the Badinter Arbitration Commission as a democratic one and fulfilling conditions necessary for international recognition.

- President Gligorov and representatives of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) sign an agreement whereby the JNA was to withdraw from Macedonia until 15 April. In the course of the withdrawal of the JNA, the Army of the Republic of Macedonia was created.

- The Macedonian National Guard was created by the VMRO-DMPNE (then opposition), ostensibly in order to protect Macedonia in case of clashes with the JNA.

- A referendum (deemed invalid because it did not follow the legal referendum procedure) was held by the Albanians for independence from Macedonia, which was later on followed by a proclamation of a “Republic of Illirida”.


- The OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje, the longest-running field mission of the OSCE, was established in Skopje. In the long years of its running in Macedonia, it has been an initiator, provider of finances, as well as expertise for many SSR projects in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{34}

- The first organic law of the Republic of Macedonia, the Law on Defense, was adopted in the Parliament in February. This law left many points unclear with regard to the rights, obligations, and authorisations of the defense sector. This is why it needed to be replaced with a new law in 2001.

- The UN (on a call from the President of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov, as well as with the diplomatic efforts of co-chair of the International Conference for Former Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen) started its UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia. The UNPROFOR had a task to prevent a spillover of the conflict in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{35} UNPROFOR patrolled the new borders of Macedonia along with members of the Territorial Defense until the Macedonian Army built the capacity to take over this task.

1993

- Resolution 817 was adopted by the UN Security Council, recommending to the General Assembly that Macedonia is admitted as a member into the UN, under a provisional reference (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) on the 7th of April\textsuperscript{36}, and a decision on admission by the General Assembly was adopted on the 8th of April.\textsuperscript{37}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[36] Resolution 817. UNHCR. <http://www.unhcr.org/reworld/category,LEGAL,,MKD,3b00f15623,0.html>.
\end{footnotes}
- Resolution demonstrating Macedonia’s willingness to join NATO was adopted by the Macedonian Assembly in December 1993.38

1994

- The second Parliamentary elections were held. Left-of-centre Social Democratic Union (SDSM) won another mandate on these elections, and Branko Crvenkovski formed the government, with Albanian coalition-partner PDP, a political combination which was to lead the country until 1998.

- The second Presidential elections were held, in parallel with the Parliamentary ones. The then President, Kiro Gligorov, was re-elected for another mandate, and served in office until 1999.

1995

- The Law on Internal Affairs was adopted, regulating the work of the Ministry of Interior. The 1995 Law instituted the principle of Parliamentary oversight over the work of the intelligence services. A Parliamentary Commission would oversee the work of the secret services (Directorate for Security and Counter-intelligence) and report annually to Parliament about it. The work of the police was also regulated under this law until 2007, when a new law on police entered into force.

- A Law on the Intelligence Agency was adopted. The Agency was instituted as a separate body under direct Presidential and Parliamentary oversight, thus separating the intelligence and counter-intelligence services, which until then were under the single authority of State Security. The Intelligence Agency Director is to be appointed by the President, not the Government (Interior Ministry), and reports directly to the President. However, the agency started to work in 1997 when its Chief of Staff was elected.

- At the opening ceremony of the then-illegal Tetovo University (later

recognized as State University of Tetovo), the police intervened and violently dispersed those present. At that time, the education in Albanian language in Macedonia was not provided in the tertiary education. The incident was one of the sparks and driving forces for the unrests in the western parts of Macedonia.

- The interim accord on the name dispute with Greece was signed on September 13, granting Macedonia the right to join international organizations (including the UN) under the provisional name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and calling upon both sides, Macedonia and Greece to find a commonly-accepted solution on the name dispute.

- The UNPROFOR mission was replaced with the UNPREDEP mission. This was the first preventive deployment mission in the history of the UN.\(^{39}\)

- Macedonia joined the Partnership for Peace. A frame agreement for acceding to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was reached in November 1995, among Macedonia and NATO.\(^{40}\)

- An assassination attempt on President Gligorov with a car bomb happened in October. The perpetrators of this act are still unknown.

- Military academy is established.

**1996**

- The SOFA Agreement between NATO and Macedonia was signed, giving the NATO forces a lot of competencies for using Macedonian territory for its activities.\(^{41}\)

- In July, Macedonia opened a liaison office at NATO Headquarters in Brussels.


1997

- The intelligence agency which was founded with the 1995 law finally started its work effectively, since its first director was finally appointed.\(^{42}\)

- In July, the police clashed with civilians in Gostivar and Tetovo over the removal of Albanian and Turkish flags displayed in front of Town Halls, deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. One person died and several were injured and Gostivar’s mayor Rudi Osmani was tried and sentenced to prison. This further exacerbated inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia.

- First international military exercise held in Macedonia—“Savior 97”, took place at military grounds near Negotino.

1998

- The third Parliamentary elections were held, with a change in the winning parties. VMRO-DPMNE won the elections, with its Albanian counterpart the DPA as its coalition partner. SDSM’s coalition came in second and was for the first time in the opposition.\(^ {43}\)

- Macedonia hosted air force and military troops’ exercises in which NATO and PfP members participated. Macedonian special army units took place in the exercise.

- White Paper on Defence adopted in August.


1999

- Due to China’s veto in February, the UNPREDEP mandate in Macedonia was terminated.44

- About 40,000 NATO troops were positioned on Macedonian territory during the 1999 Kosovo crisis (this is four times the number of the ARM).

- Macedonia officially became a candidate for NATO membership.45

- The third Presidential elections were held. Boris Trajkovski, nominated by the then leading party VMRO – DPMNE, won the elections and became the new President of Macedonia for the next five years.46

- Defence Strategy adopted in September.

2000

- Macedonia, together with Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania (Croatia joined later), created the Vilnius Group.47

- Between 10,000-15,000 police files dating to the early years of communism were opened for public access. This was the first effort at disclosing information about the communist past and step towards reconciliation with the SFRJ era.

- Action Plan for National Defence adopted

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2001

- The phone-tapping affair was exposed by Branko Crvenkovski (then, opposition leader) in January.\(^48\) It stirred debates about regulation of state control of communication, but a law on the matter would not be adopted until 2006.

- A TV news team was held hostage in the Skopje village of Tanashevc, in February, after it wanted to visit the village and check the rumors that an armed group was patrolling the village. Snezana Lupevska was the first to expose the coming conflict. It was beginning of the conflict that was to last until August.

- The Stabilisation and Association Agreement was signed in Brussels on the 9 April. Macedonia was the first country ever to sign this kind of an agreement. The SAA is today known as a tool applied to the Western Balkans.\(^49\)

- Due to the situation in Macedonia, the opposition called for the creation of a government of national unity. This demand was backed up by the international community, and such a government was created on May 13.

- During the conflict, Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski saw the establishment of special police units called Lavovi recruited from volunteers and reserve police force members, who fought in the conflict.

- On 13 August, the Ohrid Framework agreement was signed, formally ending the 2001 conflict in Macedonia. This agreement was signed by the leaders of the four biggest political parties: Ljubcho Georgievski (VMRO-DPMNE), Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM), Imer Imeri (PDP) and Arben Xhaferi (DPA), by the President of the country and by the representatives of the EU and of the US.

- The first of the NATO mission series started in August. It was the “Essential Harvest” mission, with the aim of collecting the weapons


The “Amber Fox” mission starting in the end of September 2001 replaced “Essential Harvest”.

- The constitutional amendments envisaged in the OFA were adopted. They were the grounds for all the laws through which the Ohrid process was conducted. Among other things, equitable representation of all ethnic groups in the police and army was envisaged.

2002

- Allied Harmony, the final in the series of NATO missions, ran from December 2002 to March 2003. It was replaced by Concordia, the first EU military mission ever.

- In March 2003, the Concordia mission of the EU started. It ran until December 2003.

- A donor conference for Macedonia was held in March 2002, where Macedonia acquired 307 Million Euros from the donors. However, these funds were conditional and some in forms of credits.

- A Law on Amnesty was adopted. This law granted amnesty to all those who had committed crimes in the period between 1 January 2001 and 26 September 2001.

- A new set of Parliamentary elections were held. SDSM won a ma-

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date to govern until 2006. Branko Crvenkovski was given the mandate to create the government.57

- Lavovi unit of police disbanded in November.

- Strategic Defence Review (Political Framework) adopted in October and the National Conception of Security and Defence, adopted in June.


2003

- Grenades by unknown sources hit government buildings in Skopje. The government claimed it was a terrorist attack. 58

- A voluntary disarmament program commenced in 1 November and was supposed to last for six weeks, ending on 15th of December.59

- The EU peacekeeping mission Concordia ended on 15th of December, and was replaced by the EU police mission PROXIMA.60 PROXIMA’s role was later in December 2005 taken over by EUPAT, a smaller police advisory team.61

- The Interior Ministry dissolved the special police unit Lavovi formed during the 2001 conflict. Half its members were incorporated in the regular police.

- Macedonian Parliament adopted the National Concept for Security and Defense, the major strategic document in the security sector


– defining threats, strategic interests, and values in Macedonian security.

- Military Academy is abolished.

2004

- President Boris Trajkovski died in a plane crash in Bosnia on 27 February. Speaker Ljubcho Jordanovski was acting president until the April 2004 Presidential Elections. The new Presidential elections were scheduled for 14 April 2004.

- Macedonia officially applied for EU membership on 22 March.62

- The Stabilisation and Association Agreement, signed between the European Union and Macedonia in 2001, came in effect on 1 April 2004.63

- First round of presidential elections was held, leaving Branko Crvenkovski from SDSM and Sashko Kedev from VMRO-DPMNE, to run for President in the second round. Second round of Presidential elections was held, whereby Branko Crvenkovski won the elections.64

- The Law on Territorial reorganisation of municipal boundaries, envisaged in the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was voted in the parliament with 61 votes for (Macedonian parliament held 120 seats) on 11 August. This Law was a crucial for both Macedonia’s EU membership bid and (even more) for the implementation of the OFA. A referendum regarding decentralisation was scheduled for later in 2004 (November) after the World Macedonian Congress gathered more than 150,000 signatures to force this referendum.65

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- A referendum was held on 7 November to determine the citizens’ preferences over decentralisation models, that is whether they preferred the model according to the old decentralisation law or according to the new one. The referendum failed because of a low turnout (26% out of 50% minimum needed in order to be successful).  

- Hari Kostov resigned from being Prime Minister, claiming unbridgeable differences in the economic policy as well as other reasons. Vlado Buckovski, former Minister of Defence at the time of the crisis as well as in the government of the resigning Hari Kostov, was given the mandate to create the new government, which came in office in December.

- The Border Police took over the patrolling and control of Macedonian borders from the Macedonian Army.

- Interior Ministry created special mobile police units intended to fight urban crime. The units (popularly known as ‘Alpha Units’) have been regularly criticised by the civil sector for their lack of respect for human rights.

### 2005

- Answers to the Questionnaire posted to Macedonia by the EU were presented in Brussels by the then Prime Minister Buckovski.

- Local elections were held in March. The first Round of elections for the municipalities, filled with irregularities as the OSCE observers missions reported. The second round was boycotted by the DPA and the PDP.

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- Macedonia, having pledged cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague, extradited ex-Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski to The Hague in March, after running away from Macedonia and being arrested and held in custody by the Croatian police. Johan Tarculovski, member of a special unit of the Macedonian police force joins Boskovski in the Hague.\(^\text{69}\)

- The Law on Flags was adopted, thus making the technical fulfillment of OFA complete. This law was highly contested during the long debates which started in June 2005.

- The Prime Minister Buckovski survived a vote of no confidence in September.

- The European Commission recommended, on 9 November, that Macedonia should be granted a candidacy status for entering the EU.\(^\text{70}\)

- A Brussels summit of December did confirm the candidate status but did not set a date for start of negotiations.\(^\text{71}\)

- EU established EU Policy Advisory Team (EUPAT) to replace the police mission PROXIMA.\(^\text{72}\)

- Defense Ministry established a Unit for Return to Civil Life, aimed at preparing military personnel for return to civil life after the end of their military career. Members of the military are re-trained for skills deemed useful for the transition to civil life.


2006

- The Parliament approved in May the abolition of mandatory conscription in the army, and the commencement of the professionalisation of the army, which was one of the conditions for NATO membership.

- After a series of hostilities and manifestations of violence between the two leading Albanian parties (DPA and DUI), a joint statement on continuing the elections without violence followed (in June 2006), under the patronage of the EU representative in Macedonia – Erwan Fouere and the USA Ambassador in the state – Gillian Mihovanovic.\(^73\)

- The Parliamentary elections were held on 5 July, with a switch in the governing structure. VMRO-DPMNE won 44 (out of 120) seats in the parliament, thus winning the elections. A second round was held in some places, and the voting was annulled in one place because of excessive violence and vandalism of the ballot boxes. VMRO-DPMNE won more seats at the second round, and Nikola Gruevski, the party’s president, was given the mandate to form the government. The Albanian party with a majority of votes was DUI. The new Parliament approved the government under Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski in August, consisted of VMRO-DPMNE as the leading party and other smaller parties as coalition partners. DUI continued to oppose its non-inclusion in the government since it won majority of Albanian votes.\(^74\)

- The public prosecutor Prcevski was removed on grounds of unprofessionalism and inefficiency in October.\(^75\)

- The police reform furthered in November with the Parliament’s passing of the Law on Police. The Law on Police provided for substantial decentralisation of police service and transferred authorities related to appointment of police heads to local government units. This was done without the support of DUI and PDP, who


warned their mayors would not cooperate with police.76

- Vlado Buckovski resigned as the leader of SDSM after a no-confidence vote, and was replaced later on by Radmila Shekerinska in December.

- The judicial reforms also furthered, since 8 new members of the judicial council were elected. This went in favor of enhancing the impartiality of the Council since it will no longer be elected by the Parliament but by the judges themselves.

2007

- The Macedonian government renamed the Skopje Airport after Alexander the Great, which was seen by Greece as a violation of the interim agreement.77

- In March, Gruevski met with the leader of the Albanian opposition and a former NLA leader, Ali Ahmeti agreeing to start over with the (until then) blocked political dialogue, as well as to have a meeting on which a list of laws which affect minorities and should be adopted with the so called Badinter majority, will be adopted.

- Another Albanian party joined the governing coalition on 20 May - the PDP. After this, DUI ended the long Parliamentary boycott and finally entered Parliament.

- The opposition proposed a no-confidence motion in June, which was rejected by the Parliament. This was followed by a short leave from the Parliament claiming altering of pre-agreed terms by DUI. However, they returned in office and together with the other parties, they all agreed on prosecution office reforms.

- National Security Council met to discuss potential security threats to derive from Kosovo in August. Shortly before these, another grenade attack on government facilities occurred.


- A Parliamentary debate between DPA and DUI resulted in a fist-fight between members of the two parties in the hall of Parliament and subsequent need of police intervention.

- Two Constitutional Court judges (one of which was the court’s President) resigned because of a decision of the court to restrict the use and display of Albanian flags on public buildings.  

- The police engaged in operation “Mountain Storm” on November 7 near the village of Brodec against a group of ethnic-Albanian criminals in which 8 gunmen were shot dead, and large quantities of weapons were found. Despite initial congratulations on the effective operation of the multi-ethnic police units, the conduct of the police in this operation has become the subject of criticism from Albanian political subjects and contentious point in inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia.

2008

- Parliamentary opposition (SDSM and DUI) demanded resignation from Gordana Jankulovska, Minister of Interior, because of the “Brodec” operation.

- DPA returned to the governing coalition after a few days crisis because of its leave over minority rights disagreements.

- Greece vetoed Macedonia’s bid for NATO membership at the Bucharest NATO summit in April. Macedonia was left out from the progress of the so called Adriatic Charter, since both Croatia and Albania did receive invitations to join NATO.

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- In May, Macedonia and the US signed a Declaration for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation aimed at furthering US-Macedonian relation in the areas of security, economy and trade.

- On DUI’s initiative,\(^{82}\) the Parliament dissolved and called for early elections on 1 June.\(^{83}\)

- VMRO-DPMNE coalition won 63 (out of 120) parliamentary seats in the 2008 Parliamentary elections held on 1 June. Reruns in some areas were held on the 15 June. New government of the Prime Minister Gruevski was elected in July 26, incorporating the Albanian political party which won most seats at the 2008 elections – DUI. Elections were full of irregularities in the first round, and had some small improvements during the second one. Implementation of the OSCE–ODIHR mission’s recommendations\(^{84}\), which was monitoring the elections became the ninth benchmark for Macedonia on its road to getting a date for start of accession talks.

- DPA announced a boycott of Parliament on 11 July; opposition Social Democrats joined this walkout on 17 July after arrest of party VP Zoran Zaev, charged with abuse of authority as Strumica mayor. President Crvenkovski called for an end to the boycott on 31 July, and said he would pardon Zaev.

- Ljube Boskovski was freed from the ICTY on 10 July in his trial for command responsibility. Tarculovski was sentenced to 12 years, and his case undergoes an appeal.\(^{85}\)

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- SDSM elected Zoran Zaev in September 2008, after Sekerinska resignation, as an interim leader until the mandate of the current president Branko Crvenkovski expires.86

- Macedonia filled a case against Greece in front of the ICJ on the 17 November on the grounds of having broken the interim accord from 1995 by blocking Macedonia's NATO membership bid thus causing for an invitation not to be extended to Macedonia.87 The Macedonia–Greece name dispute, the key for Macedonia's membership in NATO, will continue on the scene at the ICJ.

**2009**

- Ministry of Defense adopted the Programme for Equal Opportunities for Men and Women as part of its Human Resources Strategy and in accordance with the 2006 Law on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women. The objective is gender mainstreaming in the work of the Ministry and removing obstacles to equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women.

- The Interior Ministry drafted amendments to the Law on Internal Affairs aimed at instituting a career-based civil service system in the Ministry to improve the efficiency and professionalisation of the police.

- Presidential and municipal elections were held in March/April. Gjorgje Ivanov became the new President of the country.

- Military academy is re-established.

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